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Abstract
The study examines the impact of corporate takeover 
activities upon managerial and non-managerial 
remuneration in the acquiring companies. A regression 
model is empirically tested on a large panel data from LSE 
FT-A11 Share Index list for the period 1980 through 1992. 
The data is collected through DATASTREAM (361 
companies) and also supplemented by a survey conducted 
by the researcher on Executive Share Options in a sample 
of organisations size 79 companies. The remuneration 
measures are regressed separately onto a common set of 
exogenous variables which measure corporate acquisition 
activities, size, performance and governance. The model 
thus is also employed to provide an explanation of the 
impact of corporate size, performance and governance 
upon managerial and non-managerial remuneration. The 
relationship is examined using Arellano and Bond’s 
Generalised Method of Moments estimators after 
accounting for some of the statistical problems encountered 
when modelling the data.
The findings of this study reveal that corporate size and 
acquisition activities are significantly related to managerial 
remuneration. The results also suggest that non-managerial 
remuneration is not significantly related to corporate 
acquisition but instead to corporate size, performance and 
governance.
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CHAPTER 1: Managerial Motives in the Market 
.for Corporate Control
There are a number of market mechanisms that are, theoretically, 
supposed to prevent corporate decision-makers from undertaking 
investment decisions that do not lead to added returns to corporate 
shareholders. Such arguments are proposed by Jensen (1988) along with 
others. They view takeovers and their threats as disciplinary mechanisms 
for settling the agency problem between the capital owners and the 
management of the target company in the market for corporate control. 
Yet, many scholars remain sceptical about the disciplinary role of 
corporate takeovers. Hughes (1989) argues that in a perfectly effective 
market for corporate control, all companies must operate efficiently and 
produce maximum potential profit and thus avoid being taken-over. He, 
therefore, suggests that corporate takeover, occurs for non-disciplinary 
motives. One possible non-disciplinary motive would be the increase in 
the managerial remuneration of the acquiring company managers. 
Theoretically, both arguments are sound, but, it is an empirical issue as to 
whether managers can personally benefit from engaging in corporate 
acquisition activities. Based on a survey of UK empirical studies, pursuit 
of rapid corporate growth is argued by Hughes (1989) as the non- 
disciplinary motive for corporate takeover activities. Indeed, Hughes 
suggests that with their internal discretion, managers of the acquiring 
company, will favour pursuing corporate growth rather than enhancing 
corporate profitability as their financial rewards, status and prestige are 
more tied to corporate size than profitability.
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The data used in this research does not include information on the target 
companies’ pre-takeovers profitability and hence we are unable to test if 
takeovers are driven by an effective disciplinary mechanism in the market 
for corporate control. Nonetheless, the data can explore the theory that 
takeovers are motivated by non-disciplinary motives through examining 
the relationship between managerial monetary rewards in the acquiring 
company and corporate acquisition activities. This study attempts to 
develop a better understanding of managerial motives in the market for 
corporate control, with respect to managerial remuneration.
The primary hypothesis in this research, is that managers might use 
corporate acquisition as a means to obtain rapid growth in corporate size 
and the consequent increase in their own economic self-interest. Taking a 
review of the economic and management literature, there is a universal 
agreement that executive compensation is related to corporate size. Indeed 
Baumol (1959), Marris (1964) and Mueller (1969) found that managerial 
compensation, as well as power and prestige increase as corporate size 
increases. Since acquisition represents a fast and easy means to increase 
corporate size (Lambert and Larcker, 1987), it is then plausible that the 
acquiring company managers use acquisition to obtain rapid increase in 
corporate size and consequently in their remuneration.
These views are empirically examined in this study, by statistically 
measuring the impact of corporate acquisition activities upon the 
monetary rewards received by the managers and non-managers in the 
acquiring company, while controlling for corporate size, performance and
9
governance. This study would also attempt to provide an explanation of 
the relationship that various studies have found, between remuneration 
and corporate size, performance and governance.
A large sample of companies is derived form the London Stock 
Exchange FT-ALL Share list during the period 1980 through 1992. There 
are important innovations in the data type, research methodology and 
statistical techniques used in this study. Consequently, the real 
contribution of this research lies in its ability to offer a comprehensive 
view and a statistically sound explanation of how the financial reward 
systems for the highest paid director, all directors and employees are 
influenced by corporate acquisition activities, controlling for the other 
variables. One aspect of highest paid director reward to which we draw 
particular attention, is the gain from executive share option schemes.
To obtain perspective for the current analysis, this study is organised into 
eight chapters. The three starting chapters are essentially preparatory in 
that they prepare the way for the analysis of the results in later chapters; 
following this brief introduction, chapter two is essentially a survey of the 
literature on the efficiency of corporate takeover activities and a review of 
the previous research findings on the ’determinants’ of executive 
remuneration. The next chapter, number three, is concerned with 
explaining the research concepts, data and methodology. The analysis of 
the regression results and the propositions derived for each of the research 
samples are presented in chapters four to seven; starting with the 
regression results for basic remuneration of the highest paid director, then 
the results for the total remuneration of the highest paid director, followed
10
by the average paid director and employee results respectively. Finally, 
chapter nine discusses the overall conclusions, limitations of the study and 
the implications of the research findings for shareholders and policy­
makers.
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CHAPTER 2: Corporate Takeovers Efficiency Argument and a 
Review of the ‘Determinants’ of Managerial 
Remuneration
Corporate acquisitions and restructuring activities have increased since 
the beginning of the last decade. During this period, the purposes, 
motives, contributions, and impact of acquisition have been at the centre 
of controversy amongst managers, public policy-makers and scholars. 
Yet, despite this attention, no clear conclusions have been reached. This 
study contributes to developing a better understanding of the corporate 
acquisition activities by examining the impact of corporate acquisition 
upon senior management financial rewards in the acquiring company. The 
discussion in this chapter revolves around two interrelated topics, the 
efficiency of corporate takeover activities and the ‘determinants’ of 
managerial remuneration. Therefore, the chapter is divided into two 
sections. The first covers the debate on the efficiency of takeover 
activities which revolves around six themes: ‘synergy’, increase in share 
price, increase in productivity, breach of explicit and implicit contracts, 
takeover as arbitrage and disciplinary mechanisms. The second section 
reviews the findings of previous research on the relationship between 
remuneration and corporate acquisition, size, performance and 
governance.
2.1 Corporate Takeovers: Efficiency Argument
The theme of this section revolves around a discussion of whether or not 
takeovers enhance efficiency, or are merely a redistribution mechanism 
with high social costs. At one extreme takeover is seen as an innovative 
type of economic activity and a valuable contributor to productive 
efficiency. At the other extreme takeover is seen as a means of capturing
12
and redistributing ‘economic rents’ with little or no social value. These 
two views are explored below.
2.1.1 The ‘Synergy’ Argument
‘Synergy’ assumptions underpin some motives to combine companies, 
whether via acquisition or merger. It simply proposes that the coalition of 
the companies is worth more than the two companies standing as separate 
entities. The presumed gain could stem from different sources like 
realisation of economies of scope and scale1, tax reduction2, increase 
monopoly power . While the synergy concept is a useful one, companies 
may fail to reap the full benefits. Peacock et al (1991) argue that despite 
the rational consistency of the ‘synergy’ argument it does not offer an 
explanation of the motives for takeovers and does not benefit the overall 
performance of the country. Indeed, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) 
claim that corporate acquisitions are ‘wasteful’ activities for the economy 
as a whole.
2.1.2 Movements in Share Price
‘Event studies’ measure changes in stock prices during a period 
surrounding the announcement of the takeover bid4, the period ranges 
from few days to few weeks. The findings of 'event studies', by both the 
financial analysts and academic researchers, commonly agree that target
1 Williamson (1968)
2 Kaplan (1987), Lehn and Poulsen (1987), Jerrell et al (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1988),Shleifer and 
Summers (1991).
3 Jensen and Ruback (1983), Eckbo (1985) and Ravenscraft etal (1987).
4 ‘Event studies’ treat the announcement of a merger as an event in the history of stock price of the 
merging firms. “Using a method derived from the capital assets pricing model, each company’s stock 
prices is normalised to take into account the price movements of all traded stocks bearing comparable 
risks. Cumulative deviations from the normal pattern are computed for the acquired and acquiring 
enterprises” (Ravenscraft et al, 1987, pp. 5).
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company share prices experience a positive abnormal return around the 
announcement of the takeover bid (Rosen, 1992)5. This increase could be 
seen as a 'newly1 created wealth and hence takeover is then viewed as a 
value-enhancing mechanism6. However, the picture is not so uniform for 
the raider company stock, but the most common finding has been that 
mergers are on average net zero present value investment for the 
acquiring firm (Jensen and Ruback, 1983 and Rosen, 1992 for a review on 
the literature). Takeover therefore is not a 'value-enhancing' mechanism 
for the acquiring company shareholders. Furthermore, a sceptical view is 
taken by some scholars on the validity of the results of ‘event studies’.
The techniques used in the event studies can be criticised from three 
perspectives. First, share price can be inappropriately assumed to be a 
good indicator of productive performance (Baumol, 1993). Shleifer and 
Summers (1991) argue that share price is a biased measure of productive 
performance, while Baumol (1993) argues that some studies have shown 
that takeover targets are usually undervalued and hence movements in 
share price is not a good indicator of post-takeover efficiency. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of using the movements in share price as a productivity 
indicator is open for debate. Second, ‘event studies’ are based on the 
assumption that markets are ‘efficient’ while Brealy and Mayers (1988), 
Helm (1989) and Fairbum and Kay (1989) argue that markets are riddled 
with imperfections. Third, the length of many ‘event studies’ is viewed as 
too short and hence their findings are weak (Scherer, 1988). Indeed, 
studies that extended the research period found that target share prices 
decreased in the long term. Magenheim and Mueller (1988) extended the
5 Rosen (1992) provides an excellent review of the studies on movements in share price around the 
takeover bid period.
6 Refer to Scherer (1988) for the full argument.
7Ravenscraft et al (1987); Morck et al (1989) also found that target companies are under-valued.
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'event' period to three years and found that by the most conservative 
measures, target share prices decreased by an average of 16 percent. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), also measured the post-merger return for a 
period of seven years and found that the average annual reduction in 
target share price is around 5.5 percent. The reduction in target firm share 
prices is further proven by studies that report the extensive divestitures of 
the 1968 conglomerate mergers (Scherer, 1988). Taken together, these 
critiques weaken the findings of the typical 'event studies' and suggests 
that the increase in post-takeover target share price is not necessarily 
value-enhancing.
2.1.3 Movements in Corporate Productivity
A few studies focused on observing the effect of takeover on the 
productivity of the acquiring company. These studies seem to agree that 
takeovers do contribute positively to corporate productivity.
Q
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and Lichtenberg (1992) found that plants 
involved in leverage buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs), 
had a significant post-takeover productivity above otherwise comparable 
plants, not involved in LBOs or MBOs. Baumol (1993), found that it is 
difficult not to accept Lichtenberg and Siegel’s findings because of the 
competence of their research methodology. Nonetheless, he argues that 
productivity is expected to increase considerably in managerial buyouts, 
because management being owners minimise the conflict of interest 
between managers and owners. So, the post-takeover increase in 
productivity cannot be generalised to all types of takeovers. Studies only 
show that increase in productivity is likely, if management is the buyer.
* These two studies used the same US Census Bureau data of several thousands companies which are 
involved in buyout during 1981 -1986.
15
Lack of research in this area hinders a comprehensive view for other 
types of takeovers.
2.1.4 Takeovers and Breach of Implicit & Explicit Contacting
Some scholars base their argument that takeovers could be seen as a 
‘redistribution’ rather than a ‘value creation’ mechanism on the view that 
takeovers capture rents by expropriation from workers, suppliers, and 
other corporate stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1991). By using case 
studies, Shleifer and Summers (1991, 1987) found support for the view 
that increase in target share price is financed by (i) breach of external 
contracts i.e. with suppliers; and/or (ii) breach of internal contracts with 
employees as a result of laying off employees. They do not suggest that 
breach of implicit and explicit contracts is the only merger motive; rather 
they argue that, even if takeover is motivated by other reasons, most of 
the shareholder's gain comes as a result of transfer from the stakeholders 
who have not considered changes in corporate operation when signing 
such contracts. Also, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) found that 
subsequent to a change in corporate ownership, there is around 4 percent 
reduction in the relative wages of labour. Brown and Medoff9 (1991) also 
measured the post-takeover changes in wages and the level of 
employment after classifying corporate takeover activities in three types. 
They found that all the types of takeover activities have simultaneous and 
opposite effects on wages and employment. For instance their results 
suggest that if companies only purchase the assets of another without 
observing its workforce, the post-takeover wage bill increases by 5
9 The data in the study has three limitations: (i) Limited to Michigan and not representative of the 
entire nation; (ii)The data contain only a few number of the mega-acquisitions which dominate public 
attention; (iii) No distinction between friendly and hostile takeover. Hence, the findings do not apply to 
all types of corporate takeovers.
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percentage while the employment decreases by the same percentage. To 
sum, there is substantial support for the view that takeovers allow for a 
redistribution or a transfer of ‘rents’ from stakeholders to target 
shareholders.
What is more striking is that some scholars argue that the threat of 
takeover can cause inefficiency. Shleifer and Summer (1991) argue that 
the threat of takeovers affects current implicit contracting with both 
internal and external bodies. Externally, potential suppliers will not be 
willing to invest in ‘relationship-specific capital’ and hence the 
opportunities for long term contacting will be limited along with a 
reduction in possible efficiency. Internally, the hostile takeover threat 
might reduce the corporate investment in company-specific skills, which 
reduces corporate efficiency. Hence, just the threat of takeover could lead 
to an ex ante inefficiency. However, other scholars argue that the threat of 
takeover could lead to enhancing corporate performance. For instance, 
according to Fairbum and Kay (1989), the threat of takeover, encouraged 
P&O (shipping company) substantial management re-organisation and 
improvement in corporate performance.
Summing up, there is substantial support for the view that ‘rent’ 
expropriation from workers, suppliers and other corporate stakeholders 
are the sources of at least some of the ‘takeover premium’. This suggests 
that the benefits obtained from breach of internal and/or external implicit 
contracts are redistributed rather than newly created values. This 
argument prompts a close look at sources of the alleged takeovers' gains.
2.1.5 Takeovers as Arbitrage Mechanism
Proponents of the notion that takeovers enhance efficiency, claim that 
takeovers act as an arbitrage mechanism. They argue that target
17
companies are usually under-valued (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; 
Morck et al, 1989; Baumol, 1993). Hence, an outright purchase of an 
under-valued company prevents the economy and the public interest from 
experiencing a substantial resource mis-allocation. However, there is 
inconsistency in the findings of the empirical research.
Some scholars found that target companies are undervalued (Ravenscraft 
and Scherer, 1987; Morck et al, 1989); while other rejected the view 
(Lowenstein and Herman, 1988; Franks and Mayer, 1992). The rejection 
of the under-valuation theory is based on three grounds.
First, if under-valuation is indeed present, then being a takeover target 
with the accompanying close scrutiny should cause a correction in the 
share price even after a takeover defeat. Ravenscraft and Scherer10 (1987) 
empirically found that in the event of failure of a tender offer, and while 
no second takeover is attempted, stock values tend to retreat towards their 
pre-takeover price. They therefore conclude that target firms cannot be 
depicted generally as being ‘under-valued’ by the stock market.
Second, other scholars' criticism of ‘under-valuation theory’ is based on 
the substantial increase in the value of the target company returns. By 
using option pricing theory, Bhagat et al (1987) showed that the returns 
during the announcement period of cash tender offers are‘too large’ to be 
explained by incorrect valuation, hence, they rejected the ‘under 
valuation’ hypothesis.
Third, some argue that target firms cannot be depicted generally as being 
‘undervalued’ by the stock market but rather that the under-valuation is 
related to the so-called ‘random-walk’ movement11 which suggest that
10 They conducted a study on 6,000 acquisitions that occurred between 1950 & 1976 in the American 
manufacturing sector.
11 The random-walk hypothesis imply that non-random patterns price behaviour could only arise from 
the imperfection of the pricing mechanism of the market.
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movements in stock price do no follow any pattern, changes are rather
random (Keane, 1983). Scherer (1988) argues that share price of the
12target firm could be randomly so low, that it motivates others to hunt it . 
Lowenstein (1988) called this phenomenon, speculative 'bubbles', which 
he defined as the price movements of target firm having little relation to 
any reasonable expectations for the earning prospect of the firm. To 
conclude, some scholars argue that there are no under-valued shares, but 
rather the price of some shares are randomly low and hence takeovers do 
not necessarily act as an arbitrage mechanism.
2.1.6 Takeovers as Market Disciplinary Mechanism
Some scholars argue that takeovers and the threat of their occurrences are 
efficiency-enhancing mechanisms as they facilitate the replacement of 
inefficient management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Indeed, Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1987) found that firms that undergo change in ownership had 
a 4 percent lower productivity growth (total factor productivity) than the 
remaining firms in the same industries. However, in a survey of more 
than two hundred directors, Lowenstein (1988) found that 91 percent of
13directors believe that poor management is not a takeover motive .
A sceptical view is also taken by Shleifer and Summers (1991) who as 
we had the occasion to note, argue that the need to replace the original 
management is not because of their inefficiency but rather to facilitate 
breach of implicit contracts. Moreover, Baumol (1993) argues that 
managerial efficiency can not be measured as there is no exclusive 
measure of managerial performance that separates other influences which
12 The validity of this argument is based on the rejection of Efficient Stock Market Hypothesis (EMH).
13 Also, 84 percent of directors attributed good management as one of the main attraction in assessing 
potential targets (Lowenstein, 1988).
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effect productivity and the profitability of the firm. While, Kaplan (1987) 
argues that even if the takeover's disciplinary role is accepted, there is no 
means of assuring that the new management is more efficient than the 
old one (Cowling et al, 1986) or that their strategies will purely focus on 
maximisation of the ‘absentee owners’14. In sum, these results weaken the 
arguments for takeover’s disciplinary role.
Taken together, there are conflicting views about the efficiency of 
takeover. These views must be accurately weighted before reaching a 
clear conclusion. However, some scholars argue that corporate takeover 
will always result in some inefficiency and, thus, the question is not 
whether takeover mechanism enhances efficiency, but rather how much 
inefficiency it induces. Fairbum and Key (1989) argue that it is almost 
surely true that if one carefully investigates a large enough sample of 
mergers, all of these consequences will be found in varying proportions, 
and often simultaneously across different companies. The point is that 
parties involved in takeovers will not be equally affected. Being a winner 
or loser is essentially contingent upon takeover’s real motive and the 
extent of the conflict of interest between the different parties. In the 
research reported in this thesis, we will examine takeover motives for the 
decision-makers. We will attempt to find if the highest paid director and 
all directors gain from increases in corporate acquisitive activities. We 
will also examine whether or not employees (non-managerial) benefit 
from increase in corporate acquisitive activities. The 'determinants’15 of 
remuneration are discussed below.
14 Lowenstein (1988)
15 Despite the use of the word remuneration ‘determinants’, no cause or effect relationship is implied. 
This point will be explicitly discussed in the next chapter.
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2.2 Some determinants* of the Managerial Remuneration
The economic literature does not yet converge on a unique set of factors 
that effect managerial remuneration. However, the commonly used 
quantitative factors can be classified into four categories, (1) acquisition, 
(2) corporate size, (3) corporate performance and (4) corporate 
governance. It is important to note that this is not a comprehensive set of 
the 'determinants1 of senior management remuneration, as it does not 
account for non-quantitative, behavioural, individual or macro economic 
variables.
2.2.1 Corporate Acquisition
The essence of corporate acquisition is traditionally discussed in terms of 
enhancing the shareholder returns and assumes that managers will engage 
in takeovers only if it will maximise shareholder returns. Empirical 
research, however, found that while on average corporate takeover is a net 
zero present value investment for the acquiring firm shareholders16, it 
enhances its senior management’s financial returns (Firth, 1991). These 
findings imply that corporate acquisition could be used as a means to 
advance the private interests of managers over the interest of their 
shareholders17. The importance of studying the relationship between 
managerial remuneration and corporate acquisition could be made on 
three grounds. The first is that such a study would reflect the extent to 
which corporate takeovers maybe driven by optimising managerial self-
16 Jensen and Ruback (1983); Rosen (1992) for a review on the literature
17 Gordon (1961), Marshall et al (1980), Amihud and Lev (1981), Smith and Watts (1982), Larcker and 
Balkcom (1983), Lev (1983), Lewellen et al (1985), Ravenscraft et al (1987), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988), Morck et al (1990).
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interest rather than maximising the welfare of the shareholders 
(Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985). The second is that it would provide 
empirical evidence of the extent to which current managerial 
remuneration schemes align the interest of shareholders and managers. 
Lastly, the study would provide a yardstick for measuring the 
effectiveness of managerial compensation plans in narrowing the conflicts 
of interests between the shareholders and managers in other investment 
decisions (Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985). A review of the literature 
findings on the relationship between corporate acquisition activities and 
directors remuneration is presented below.
There are a limited number of empirical studies on the relationship 
between managerial remuneration and acquisition. Using data of 160 
companies, for the period 1985 and 1990, Conyon and Gregg (1994), 
found that the basic remuneration (salary plus cash bonus) of the highest 
paid director increases substantially if firms are engaged in takeover 
activities. Their results suggest that if firms were engaged in two or more 
takeovers in the previous three years, then the highest paid director's 
remuneration increased by approximately 8 percent per annum for three 
years. Other scholars used a broader measure of senior management 
remuneration, total remuneration, which is the sum of their basic 
remuneration and actual and potential gains from managerial share 
options, salary and cash bonus. Seward and Welsh (1995) conducted a 
study on 152 firms and found that CEO total remuneration is strongly 
related to both friendly and hostile acquisitions. This is in line with Abell 
et al (1994) findings, who conducted a study on 25 British companies in 
the period of 1986 through 1990 and found that corporate acquisition is an
22
important determinant of the top director's total remuneration. 
Furthermore, some scholars examined whether the impact of acquisition 
upon remuneration could be dependent on acquisition’s impact upon 
corporate performance.
Firth (1991, 1980) extended his research to test whether the positive
impact of acquisition upon senior management remuneration is related to
the subsequent changes in the acquiring company's share price. The study
(Firth, 1991) reports that senior management seems to benefit from
acquisition activities irrespective of changes in the acquiring company's
18share price. Firth reports that the change in remuneration for the highest 
paid director following a takeover bid is around £4832 for companies 
experiencing positive abnormal returns and £3917 for companies 
experiencing negative abnormal returns. However, the findings of an 
earlier study by Lambert and Larcker (1987) are not consistent with 
Firth's. They found that the impact of acquisition upon growth in 
managerial compensation and wealth19, is dependent on the movements
in the stock price of the acquiring firm. Their results suggest that there is
20 • no significant increase in senior management's remuneration growth if
the acquisition results in negative returns to the shareholders of the
acquiring company. The inconsistency between Firth (1991, 1980) and
Lambert and Larcker's (1987) findings could be attributed to the fact that
the latter restricted their study to large acquisitions in the USA, while the
former used a moderate measure of acquisitions in the UK. In summary
the findings of the empirical research suggest that senior management’s
18 The median.
19 Measured as changes in executive compensation and changes in his/her stock holdings of the 
company.
20 The top three executives
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post-acquisition basic and total remuneration increases, but the effect of 
corporate performance upon this relationship is unclear.
The findings of these studies suggest that corporate acquisition activities 
may be driven by managerial self-interest, which does not necessarily 
imply that takeover activities are harmful to shareholders. However, there
is a large number of scholars who suggest that the acquiring company
21profitability and share price decrease after acquisition . Hence, the 
overall findings of the literature support the view that corporate takeovers 
decisions might be driven by managerial welfare and casts some doubts 
on the benefits of takeovers to the acquiring company shareholders.
In general, the empirical findings indicate that senior managers may 
pursue acquisition activities as a means to maximise their remuneration. 
The number of studies on this topic, however remains limited. The 
research reported in this thesis is an attempt to empirically examine the 
relationship between corporate acquisition activities and managerial 
remuneration.
2.2.2 Corporate Size
Corporate size has been found by many scholars as a primary
22‘determinant’ of senior managerial remuneration . Gregg et al (1993a),
21 Research based on UK data found that subsequent to takeovers, acquiring company profitability 
decreased (Utton, 1974; Meeks, 1977). Moreover, UK studies found that at best acquiring firm share 
price decreased at the announcement of takeover and this loss was not recovered in the subsequent 
months (Firth, 1976,1979,1980). Although American scholars found that some acquiring companies 
experienced stock price increase while other suffered a decrease (Dodd, 1980; Malatesta, 1983), Firth 
(1991) concluded that their evidence casts doubts on the profitability of takeover for the acquiring firm.
22 The following empirical studies have found a positive and significant relationship between corporate 
size and senior executive remuneration: McGuire et al (1962), Gosh (1975), Meeks and Wittington 
(1975), Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Hogan and McPheters (1980), Hirschey and Pappas (1981), Belkaoui 
(1990), Gregg et al (1993),Conyon and Leech (1994), Main et al (1994), Abell et al (1994). However,
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found that the estimated elasticity of sales growth upon growth of the 
remuneration of the highest paid director is in the region of 0.14 to 0.20. 
Baker et al (1988) also found that a 10 percent growth in sales is 
statistically related to a 3 percent increase in managerial remuneration. 
While Cosh (1975) found that sales alone explain, on average, up to 49 
percent of the variance in highest paid director’s pay. These studies, along
23with others , concluded that corporate size is an indicator of managerial 
preference for absolute growth which in turn determines managerial 
remuneration.
Some scholars hypothesised that managers use corporate acquisitive 
activities as a rapid growth mechanism to increase their remuneration, 
irrespective of the impact of acquisition upon corporate performance. 
Indeed Reid (1968) empirically found that merger contributes more to 
corporate size than profitability which prompted him to conclude that 
takeover decisions might be driven by the mere reason of exploiting the 
advantages of a large organisation, specifically the subsequent increase in 
managerial remuneration. The research reported in this thesis examines 
this proposition by empirically regressing remuneration against corporate 
size, acquisition, performance and governance.
2.2.3 Corporate Performance
Economic theories of efficient pay suggest positively linking managerial 
remuneration with corporate performance (Baker et al, 1988) as a means 
to align managers' with shareholders' interests (Smith and Watts, 1982). 
There are two types of corporate performance measures, market and
some researchers found no relationship between corporate size and managerial remuneration: Masson 
(1971)and Main (1991).
23 Ibid.
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accounting measures24 and there is no consistent conclusion regarding 
their impact upon managerial remuneration25.
Some studies measured corporate market performance by share price 
while others by shareholder returns. Abell et al (1994) employed the 
former measure and found that there is no relationship between the 
remuneration of both the first and second highest paid directors and the 
post-takeover share price of the acquiring company. However, Lewellen 
and Huntsman (1970) found that the market value of a firm’s outstanding 
common stock is a major factor in the determination of executive 
remuneration level. Moreover, the evidence for the other measure of 
market performance, shareholder returns, are also inconsistent. Some
scholars found that the acquiring shareholder returns are positively related
26to remuneration while others found no grounds for such a
27relationship . However, even where a link has been identified its
28magnitude seems to be extremely small. A UK study by Gregg et al 
(1993) reports that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent increase in shareholder 
returns predicts less than 1 pence (£0.0027) rise in managers’ basic
29compensation (salary and cash bonus excluding stock options). Also in
24 Corporate performance could also be measured by relative accounting or market performance 
measures. Refer to Antle and Smith (1986).
25 The following studies found a positive relationship between executive remuneration and corporate 
performance: Cosh (1975), Meeks and Wittington (1975), Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Firth (1980), 
Hirschey and Pappas (1981), Murphy (1985), Lambert and Larcker (1987), Deckop (1988), Belkaoui 
(1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Ely (1991), Main (1991), Gregg et al (1993, in the main sample), 
Conyon and Leech (1994), Main et al (1994). The following studies found either a negative or a neutral 
relationship between executive remuneration and corporate performance: McGuire et al (1962), Hogan 
McPheters (1980), Kerr and Bettis (1987), Leonard (1990), Gregg et al (1993, in their 1983-88 sub­
sample), Abell at al (1994).
26 Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Masson (1971), Murphy (1985), Abowed (1990), Main (1991), 
Gregg et al (1993 in their 1983-88 sub-sample), Conyon and Leech (1994), Main et al (1994).
27 Lambert and Larcker (1987), Kerr and Bettis (1987), Gregg et al (1993 in their 1989-91 sub-sample), 
Abell et al (1994).
28 The study included 300 large UK companies over the 1980’s and early 1990’s.
29 Furthermore, the study found that for the period 1983-91 there is no relationship between directors’ 
remuneration (excluding options) and corporate performance, whether measured using shareholder 
returns or earning per share. However, in the 1983-88 period, they found a positive and significant 
relationship.
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the USA, Jensen and Murphy30 (1990) found that for every $1,000 
increase in shareholder returns, CEO basic compensation increases by 
$0.30 while CEO total compensation (salary and cash bonus including 
stock options) increases by $0.40; when allowance is made for managerial 
wealth holdings in the form of corporate shares, the overall lifetime 
impact raises to a modest $3.25. Previous studies therefore found that at 
best market performance is related to management remuneration but the 
magnitude of the effect is extremely small.
Profit is the most widely used accounting corporate performance measure. 
The empirical findings of the relationship between profit and managerial 
remuneration in the acquiring company are also inconsistent. O’Reilly et 
al (1988) found that there is a positive relationship between corporate 
profit and managerial remuneration. Hirschey et al (1981) also found that 
the profit has a significantly positive influence on managers remuneration 
in large organisation31. Hogan et al (1980) and Leonard (1990) however, 
found that profit is negatively related to managerial remuneration. One 
plausible cause for the difference in the findings of these studies is that 
each study measured corporate profitability differently.
In sum there is no clear conclusion on the relationship between 
managerial remuneration and accounting or market performance 
measures. There is a further disagreement between scholars on the 
appropriateness of the two measures. Opponents of market measures
30 Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) study included 2213 CEOs listed in the ‘Executive Compensation 
Survey’ published in Forbes from 1974 to 1986. Their sample included 7750 observations.
31 The following studies found a positive relationship between profit and managerial remuneration: 
McGuire et al (1962), Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Cosh (1975), Meeks and Wittington (1975), 
Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Hirschey and Pappas (1981), Lambert and Larcker (1987), Belkaoui (1990).
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argue that they are imperfect proxies for the true managerial efforts as 
managers are unable to hedge the unsystematic risk associated with such 
measures (Murphy, 1985). While opponents of accounting measures 
argue that they could be manipulated to suit certain purposes (Jameson, 
1990). To overcome these criticisms, some studies employed the two 
measures together32. In this study this practice is followed; accounting 
performance is measured by profit, while market performance is 
measured by annual average corporate share price or shareholder returns. 
The two alternative market performance measures are used in separate 
regression equations.
2.2.4 Corporate Governance
Some scholars argue that the formulation of managerial pay is ultimately 
a governance question (Conyon and Leech, 1994). Tricker (1984) argues 
that management is about running the business, and governance is about 
ensuring that it is run properly (Tricker, 1984). The existence of a 
governance body is therefore important for shareholders as the body 
monitors, evaluates and controls organisational agents, to insure that they 
act in the interests of the owners (Keasy and Wright, 1993). There is no 
consistency in the findings of the empirical research in this area, however, 
they seem to suggest that the relationship between governance and 
remuneration is dependent on the governance measure. The following 
section identifies the types of measurable governance factors and provides 
a review of the empirical findings for each type.
32 The following are some of the studies that employed both market and accounting corporate 
performance: Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Masson (1971) , Lambert and Larcker (1987), Abowed 
(1990), Conyon and Leech (1994), Conyon and Gregg (1994).
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The findings for the most commonly used measures of corporate 
governance are as follows,
* Studies suggest that there is no relationship between managerial 
remuneration and concentration of managerial stock ownership ;
* Existence of executive option share plan seems not to have any impact 
on managerial remuneration34;
* Managerial remuneration is depressed if the primary shareholders are 
insurance or pension fund companies35;
* There is no compelling evidence regarding the relationship between 
managerial remuneration and the presence of a remuneration
36committee , number of non-executive directors on the board of
37 38directors , or whether or not the CEO is the chairperson .
Different measures of corporate governance therefore appear to have 
different relationship with managerial remuneration.
In this study we employed one measure of corporate governance, the ratio 
of non-executive directors to total directors on the board. As mentioned 
above, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the significance of the 
non-executive directors on shaping managerial remuneration. Conyon and 
Leech (1994) found that non-executives have a depressing effect on top
39director pay, while Main (1991) found that each extra non-executive 
director on the board increases top executive pay by £4000.
33 (Conyon and Leech, 1994)
34 (Conyon and Leech, 1994).
35 (Conyon and Leech, 1994)
36 ( Main and Johnston, 1993)
37 (Conyon and Leech, 1994; Main 1991)
38 (Conyon and Leech, 1994; Main, 1991)
39 Conyon and Leech (1994) employed basic remuneration of highest paid director (‘hpd’) while Main et 
al (1994) employed total remuneration of the ‘hpd’. Unlike the former study, the latter one included
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2.3 Conclusion
A discussion of the efficiency of takeover reveals that there are 
conflicting views regarding the impact of corporate acquisition activities 
upon shareholders and society at large. The debate revolves around six 
main themes. First, the difficulty in grasping and measuring 'synergetic' 
benefits. Second, the weaknesses of the methodology of the 'event 
studies’. Third, studies that found increases in post-takeover productivity 
were limited to takeovers where management is the buyer, and hence the 
reported increase in productivity cannot be generalised to all types of 
takeovers. Fourth, takeover is seen as a means of capturing private value 
by breaching implicit and explicit contracts with suppliers, workers and 
stakeholders. Fifth, although the role of takeovers as a market disciplinary 
mechanism cannot be unequivocally rejected, it is weakened by the 
presumption that an incumbent management is more efficient than the old 
one and that their strategies will focus on maximisation of shareholders' 
interests.
Indeed, there is substantial support for the view that takeovers are re­
distribution rather than efficiency enhancing mechanisms. These 
arguments lead to questioning the motives for managers involvement in 
corporate acquisition activities. The hypothesis in this study is that 
managers are driven by maximisation of their own utilities when taking 
acquisition decisions as acquirers. As an attempt to examine this
executive share options in the measure of remuneration. Lack of research in this area forces us to 
compare these two studies.
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hypothesis in the study reported here, we examine the impact of corporate 
acquisition activities upon managerial remuneration, while controlling for 
other factors. The variables included in this study are measures of 
corporate acquisition, size, performance and governance. The majority of 
the literature points to the view that both increases in acquisition and 
corporate size enhance managerial remuneration. While increases in 
corporate performance has at best a positive but a small impact upon 
managerial remuneration. Finally, the findings on the impact of 
governance upon remuneration are conflicting and are largely dependent 
on the governance measure.
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CHAPTER 3: Research Concepts, Data, and Methodology
The aim of this chapter is to outline the research concepts and describe 
the research methodology. The chapter is divided into two sections. The 
first contains a detailed description of the research objectives, hypothesis, 
variables, estimation strategy and transformation test. The second is 
concerned with two interrelated topics; the first is to solve the statistical 
problems encountered when modelling the regression equation and the 
second is to outline the modelling and analytical strategies used 
throughout the study.
3.1 Research Objectives. Hypothesises. Period and Variables
3.1.1 Research Objectives
The main aim of this research is to examine management motives behind 
merger and acquisition, with respect to their remuneration. Through 
understanding remuneration schemes and their motivational effect, the 
research reported in this thesis seeks to rationalise the decision to engage 
in corporate takeover activities. The doctrine is that motives behind 
merger and acquisition activities in public companies can be explained 
by the knowledge of changes and effects in remuneration and share 
option schemes received by the decision-maker(s). The research attempts 
to prove the existence (if any) and the size of remuneration premium to 
the highest paid director and the average paid directors from corporate 
acquisition activities. One aspect of highest paid director reward to which 
we draw particular attention, is the gain from executive share option 
schemes.
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The study also aims to determine the impact of the corporate acquisition 
activities upon the work-force. The relationship between acquisition and 
the non-managerial (employees) remuneration, is therefore examined. 
The study would also examine the impact of the control variables - these 
are corporate size, performance and governance - upon both managerial 
and non-managerial remuneration. The following section defines the 
research hypothesis.
3.1.2 Research Hypothesises
The hypothesises of the research reported in this thesis are centred on the 
relationship between remuneration (managerial and non-managerial) and 
corporate acquisition activities, size, performance and governance. 
Accordingly, there are four hypothesises, each of which is described 
below, starting with the acquisition hypothesis.
Acquisition Hypothesis; controlling for other factors40, there is a 
positive relationship between corporate acquisition activities and 
managerial remuneration (basic and total remuneration of the highest paid 
director, and average remuneration per director)41. If the hypothesis is 
accepted, then it could be inferred that managers might be driven by 
maximising managerial utilities when making acquisition decisions and 
that separation of ownership and control might have created the potential 
for management to pursue their self-interest.
Concerning the relationship between corporate acquisition and employee 
remuneration, the hypothesis is that, holding other factors constant42,
40 These are measures of corporate size, performance and governance.
41 The definitions of these variables will be discussed shortly.
42 These are measures of corporate size, performance and governance.
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there is a positive relationship between corporate acquisition activities and 
non-managerial remuneration. An acceptance of the hypothesis would 
provide empirical evidence that employees do benefit from corporate 
acquisition activities.
Corporate Size Hypothesis; controlling for other factors43, there is a 
positive relationship between corporate size and managerial and non- 
managerial remuneration. An acceptance of the hypothesis would provide 
empirical evidence for sales maximisation managerial model by Baumol 
(1959) and Galbraith (1967) which suggests that managers are not 
necessarily constrained to act in the owners interest, but rather their self- 
interest. The tendency is to take actions that maximise corporate size, 
subject to attaining a survival profit level.
Corporate Performance & Governance Hypotheses; As a
consequence of the conflicting views on the impact of corporate 
performance and governance upon remuneration44, we do not have a 
precise hypothesis. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to look at the 
research results.
The results of the impact of corporate performance upon remuneration 
would indicate whether or not, managers and employees are rewarded or 
punished for changes in corporate performance. The results of the impact 
of governance on remuneration would highlight the capability of the 
governance measure in shaping managerial and non-managerial 
remuneration.
43 These are measures of corporate acquisition, performance and governance.
44 As explained in the previous chapter.
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The remaining part of this chapter outlines the boundaries of the 
investigation by defining the research variables and specifying the data 
period and sources.
3.1.3 Definition of The Research Variables
The full definitions of all the variables used in this study are presented in 
Appendix 3. 1. The following section, though, provides brief definitions. 
The research variables can be grouped into two categories, exogenous and 
endogenous.
The Endogenous Variables category consists of four measures of 
remuneration45, these are
• Basic remuneration of the highest paid director;
• Total remuneration of the highest paid director;
• Average basic remuneration per director;
• Average basic remuneration per employee.
Basic Remuneration o f the Highest Paid Director is the sum of the salary 
and cash bonus for the highest paid director as disclosed in the company 
accounts.
Total Remuneration o f the Highest Paid Director is the sum of the basic 
remuneration and the actual and potential executive share option (ESO) 
gain46 of the highest paid director, distributed over the exercisable 
holding period.
45 Used in different regression equations.
46 Actual gain for shares granted and exercised during the research period is calculated as the difference 
between the exercise price and the market price on the exercising date. If options are granted but not 
exercised during the research period, and are ‘in the money’, then they are treated as potential gains.
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Average Basic Remuneration Per Director, is the total directors’ fees, 
emoluments for management services and pensions or pension fund 
contributions paid to, or on behalf of, directors, divided by the number of 
directors.
Average Basic Remuneration Per Employee, is the total wages and 
salaries of employees excluding directors, divided by the total number of 
employees.
The Exogenous Variables category consists of measures of corporate 
acquisition, size, performance and governance.
Corporate Acquisition Measures, This study employs two measures of 
corporate acquisition activities, total acquisition expenditure and 
acquisition rate47. Acquisition expenditure is the total amount spent on 
acquiring other companies excluding any cash received from the sale of 
subsidiaries48. If the cash received from the sale of a subsidiary is more 
than the total consolidation payment then companies where classified as 
‘assets stripping companies’ and separated from the data. The rationale of 
the exclusion is that current returns could be attributed to financial 
management considerations, and not solely to the growth policies. 
Acquisition rate is the proportion of growth expenditure, used in acquiring
The potential gain is calculated as the difference between the exercise price of the option and the market 
price of the share at the end of the research period, that is on 31 December 1992. This evaluation is used 
by Clinch (1991), Main and Johnston (1993) and Abell et al (1994).
[Refer to Appendix 3. 2 for explanation for not using the Black-Scholes model in valuing executive 
share options].
47 These measures are employed in separate regression equations.
48 This is the method that Datastream reports the ‘Acquisition’ measure.
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other companies. It is calculated as the acquisition expenditure divided by 
the total growth expenditure49. The reason for using two measures of 
acquisition is to examine the sensitivity of acquisition’s statistical 
significance to the measures of corporate acquisitiveness. It is important 
to recognise that the data contained companies that were both acquisitive 
and non-acquisitive.
Corporate Size Measures, Three measures of corporate size were 
employed in this study, these are
• Total sales;
• Number of employees; and
• Capital employed.
Total sales, is defined as the amount of sales of goods and services to 
third parties, relating to the normal activities of the company .Number o f  
employees, is the number of domestic and overseas employees. Capital 
employed, reflects the full value of resources available for management 
during the year (Warren, 1990) and is defined as the sum of all non- 
current liabilities.
The reason for incorporating three measures rather than one is to enable 
us to compare our findings and to test whether the results are invariant to 
alternative corporate size measures.
Corporate Performance Measures, Both accounting and market 
performance measures are employed in this study. Pre-tax profit, is the 
accounting performance measure and according to Warren (1990) is the
49 Total growth expenditure is the sum of acquisition expenditure and the total expenditure on the 
purchase of new assets excluding the assets acquired from the subsidiaries.
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most appropriate indicator of the overall business performance as it shows 
the amount of profit generated from the trading activities regardless of 
any exceptional items or tax changes (Warren, 1990). Market 
performance is measured by the annual average share price and 
shareholder returns50. The former is defined as the average of the annual 
aggregate daily closing share price; the latter is the sum of the current 
year’s average share price and dividends, divided by previous year's share 
price. Market performance measures are used in separate regression 
equations.
The Governance Measure is the ratio of non-executive directors to total 
directors on the board of directors.
The relationship between the exogenous and endogenous variables is 
examined by employing multivariate regression equations. The variables 
were collected for a thirteen years period. The data period and sources 
are explained below.
3.1.4 Research Period and Data Sources
The main data included all the UK FT-ALL Share Index companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange between 1980 and 1992, excluding UK 
banks, insurance companies, or UK property/hire purchase/insurance/ 
brokers, due to the different nature of their operations and hence probably 
different relations between the variables.
The data has been divided into four samples corresponding to the four 
types of endogenous variables explained above. Deletion of incomplete
50 To calculate shareholder returns for the period 1980 up to 1992, share price and dividend data were 
collected for the period 1979 up to 1992.
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entries coupled with estimation of some of the missing data51 resulted in 
the following number of companies and observations in each sample:
Table 3 .1 : Number of Companies and Observations in Each Data Sample
Sample Number of 
Companies
Number of 
Observation
Basic Remuneration for the 
Highest Paid Director
361 2831
Total Remuneration for the 
Highest Paid Director
79 600
Average Basic 
Remuneration Per Director
336 2761
Average Basic 
Remuneration Per 
Employee
266 1837
Table 3. 1 shows the number of companies and observations in each 
sample. As can be seen the total number of companies in the main sample 
is 361, all of which are included in the basic remuneration of the highest 
paid director sample, 79 are included in the total remuneration of the 
highest paid director sample, 336 and 226 are included in the average 
remuneration per director and per employee respectively. The table 
clearly shows that the total remuneration of the highest paid director 
sample contains a relatively small number of companies and observations; 
this is due to the limited data on executive share options52. The data was 
collected from four main sources, Datastream, company accounts, register 
of highest paid director share interest and a survey conducted by the 
researcher.
51 Refer to Appendix 3.3 for explanation of the deletion and estimation strategies. It is important to note 
that approximately only 1 percent of the data has been estimated.
52 A questionnaire was sent to 545 companies requesting information on executive share options, only 
79 (15 %) companies replied with completed forms or with a copy of the register of the highest paid 
director share interest.
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It is important to note that the data is unbalanced in the sense of having a
53variable number of time-series observations per individual companies . 
This allowed a much larger sample to be examined than would be the case 
if only balanced data is used. Furthermore, Box and Cox tests were 
applied to examine if there is a need to transform the data. The following 
section explores the transformation test.
3.1.5 Box-Cox Data Transformation Test
Box and Cox (1964) introduce a formal method of finding the most 
appropriate transformation of the endogenous variables to satisfy the 
normality assumption in regression. This method involves systematically 
computing the log-likelihood of a number of transformations to determine 
the transformation with residuals that would most likely come from a 
normal distribution (Kirby, 1993). Transformations are expressed as 
powers of the endogenous variable and for ease of interpretation, the 
powers between -2 and +2 are examined (Kirby, 1993). The data in each 
of the four samples is tested. [Refer to Appendix 3. 4 for further 
explanation of the method].
The findings of the test suggest that there is no statistical need to 
transform the highest paid director remuneration (basic and total) and 
average remuneration per director and per employee. As a result no 
transformation is used on the research data54. The variables are used in a 
regression equation which manifests the relationship between 
remuneration and corporate acquisition, size, performance and 
governance.
53 The regression package used in this study allows estimates from unbalanced data.
54 Refer to Appendix 3.4 for graphical representation of the results.
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3.2 The Untreated Regression Equation
The untreated regression equation is dynamic in nature, and is as follows
y.t = a  + 8 y it l +P [x]jt + ^  + u.f ................................................................ Equation 3 . 1
where,
y Endogenous Variable for company i at time t
[x] Vector of Exogenous Variables for company i at time t
\j/t Year Dummies for each time period
u. Error Term, ~IID
it
Thus, t Time Subscript, where t = 1 to 13
i Firm Subscript, where i = 1 to the
total number of companies in each 
sample (Refer to Table 3.1 in this chapter)
where,
U. =  U. +  V. ........................................................................................................  Equation 3. 2
it i it
p. Fixed firm-specific Effects; p. ~IID
v 'Remaining' Random Disturbance; v ~IID; both v and p. are
independent of each other and of themselves
The dynamic relationship is characterised by the presence of the lagged 
value of the endogenous variable, yi>M among the exogenous variables 
(Baltagi, 1995). Throughout the study, Arellano and Bond’s (1988) 
Dynamic Panel Data regression package (DPD)55 is used to estimate the 
regression parameters56. The package also provides solutions for some of
55 The package is written by in Gauss Language by Arellano and Bond in their 1988 paper and has been 
updated recently. To obtain the package, contact Dr. Steven Bond at either Nuffield College at 
University of Oxford or Institute of Fiscal Studies in London.
56 ‘DPD’ package reports three types of results: One-step estimates with consistent t-statistic, 
one-step with robust heteroskedasticity and consistent t-statistics and two-steps estimates with robust 
heteroskedasticity and consistent t-statistics. The difference between the last two lies in that the two- 
steps estimates reports the most 'optimal' estimates proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). However 
Arellano and Bond state that the estimates of the standard errors obtained with two step estimates could 
be biased downwards, so that t-statistic tends to be biased upwards. Therefore, when presenting the 
results, they suggest using the one-step estimates, which have heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.
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the statistical problems encountered when modelling the regression 
equation. The following section defines the statistical problems and their 
remedies.
3.3 Statistical Problems and Solutions
Three statistical problems are associated with the use of the above 
proposed regression equation:
• Existence of fixed firm-specific effects, jn.-
• Correlation between lagged endogenous variable entering as an 
exogenous variable, y. t x ,and the ‘remaining’ random disturbance, v.t,
• Multi-collinearity between some of the exogenous variables.
The combinations of these problems make OLS estimators biased, 
inconsistent and inefficient57 (Ostrom, 1990; Baltagi, 1995).
3.3.1 Fixed Firm-Specific Effects
Studies that use cross-sections of firms and hence treat firms as
58homogeneous, run the risk of obtaining biased results . Murphy (1985) 
found striking differences in the sign and magnitude between the 
regression estimates using time-series and cross-section data. He argues 
that this indicates that it is important to control for fixed firm-specific 
effects when assessing remuneration 'determinants'. This prompted him to 
conclude that “previous cross-sectional estimates of the compensation-
This method is followed by Nickell (1993) and was recommended by Dr. Bond for the data in this 
research.
57 Refer to Appendix 3.5 for definitions of the statistical terms.
58 Refer to Murphy (1985); Moulton (1986, 1987); Hajivassiliou (1987); Baltagi and Levin (1992) for 
empirical illustration of this point.
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performance relationship are biased and misleading” (Murphy 1985, 
p.41). In this study we employed a first difference technique which is 
widely used59 to eliminate fixed firm-specific effects. The following 
equation is an algebraic illustration of the regression equation after 
applying this treatment
Ayit = a  + 8A yM.i+P A [x]it + vpt + Avit............................ Equation 3.3
Where,
A Indicates first difference
Therefore, the first difference technique eliminates fixed firm-specific 
effects. Moreover, using first differences is also a partial remedy for 
correlation between lagged endogenous variable and the 'remaining' 
differenced disturbance term, Avit.
3.3.2 Correlation between Lagged Endogenous Variable Entering as 
Exogenous variable and the ‘Remaining’ Disturbance Term
The inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand side of 
the regression equation suggests possible correlation between it (Ayj,M) 
and Avit; as yvt_i is obviously correlated withv^.j. This correlation leads 
to biased estimates and does not disappear as sample size increases 
(Ostrom, 1990; Baltagi, 1995). This problem can be solved by using an 
instrumental variables technique60 (henceforth IV) as Ayit_! can be 
instrumented by a variable that is strongly correlated61 withAyijM and not 
correlated with Avit (Arellano and Bond, 1991, 1988; Baltagi, 1995). 
Early in the eighties Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested usingAyi t_2 or
59Refer to Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982), Arellano and Bond (1988,1991), Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990), Nickell (1993), Gregg et al (1993), Curcio (1994), Baltagi (1995).
60 Also called ‘Covariance Technique’
61 But not perfectly correlated otherwise the same problem will occur again,
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simply (levels) yi>t_2 as instruments for A y ^  as these instruments will 
not be correlated with Avit . However, recent studies have found that 
Anderson and Hsiao’s IV estimation leads to consistent but not 
necessarily efficient estimates of the parameters in the model62. In fact a 
series of studies by Arellano and Bond (1988, 1991) and Arellano (1989) 
established a more efficient and consistent IV estimation. They found 
that as long as there is no second-order serial correlation for the 
disturbance term (Avit) of the first differenced equation [Equation 3.3], 
then all instruments beyond (t-2) are valid and lead to consistent, efficient 
and unbiased estimators. They suggested first differencing the model to 
eliminate p. and then to use different instrument sets at each time period.
IV estimators based on this fact are essentially Arellano and Bond's 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) which could be employed 
through the DPD programme.
In this study all the reported results are tested for absence of second-order 
serial correlation by a test built in DPD regression package. All the 
reported results are free from this specific aspect. The results for the 
second-order test are reported for each regression in the regression results 
in appendices 4.1 to 7.8 .
In sum, the estimated results are unbiased, efficient and consistent. 
However we are still faced with multi-collinearity between some of the 
exogenous variables.
62 Due to the following reasons: (1) The method does not make use of all the moment conditions (see 
Ahn and Schmidt, 1995); (2) the method does not account for the differenced structure of the residual 
disturbance Avit,; (3) the method has a singularity point and very large variance over a significant range 
of parameters values (Arellano, 1989,1990). These reasons are cited in Baltagi (1995).
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3.3.3 Multi-collinearity
By definition corporate total sales is related to profit, while profit is 
related to both shareholder returns and share price. Refer to Appendix 3. 6 
for a diagrammatic illustration of the relationship.
Profit and sales are both on the right hand side in the regression equation 
[Equation 3.3], therefore multi-collinearity is expected. This makes it 
difficult to properly interpret the statistical significance and signs of 
regression parameter estimates. The same argument is true for profit, 
shareholder returns and share price.
Correcting for correlation between these exogenous variables can be 
through instrumenting these variables (Arellano and Bond, 1988, 1991). 
We measured the effectiveness of this instrumentation by two methods,
• Examining the pair-wise correlation between the variables (before and 
after instrumentation).
• Using a test built in the DPD regression package.
Consequently, all the reported findings in this study are treated for the 
pair-wise correlation between these exogenous variables.
By providing solutions to these statistical problems, our estimated 
parameters are expected to be unbiased, efficient and consistent and free 
from multi-collinearity between the exogenous variables. The regression 
equation employed in this study measures the impact of growth of 
corporate acquisition upon growth of remuneration while controlling for 
growth of corporate size, performance and governance.
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3.4 Treated Regression Equation
The regression relationship between remuneration and exogenous 
variables is explicitly represented by the following regression equation.
A Remuneration^ = a  + p} A Remuneration j + P2 A Acquisition Measurejt
+ P3 A Sales. + P4 A Capital Employed
+P5 A Number of Employees.t 
+ P A Shareholders Interest Measure.r 6 it
+ P„ A Profit. + P„ A Governance
* 7  it r 8
+ V(/{ + A V it ...................................................  Equation 3. 4
v 'Remaining' Disturbance Error Term, ~IID
\|/ 1 Year Dummies, t = 1 to 13
A First Difference, where At= (t) - (t-1) and At-1= (t-1) - (t-2)
t Suffix for time, t = 1 to 13
i suffix for company, where i = 1 to the number of companies in each data
sample (refer to Table 3.1 in this chapter)
63This regression equation (Equation 3.4) is used in the four data samples. 
In each sample the appropriate measure of remuneration is employed as 
the endogenous variable along with measures of corporate acquisition, 
size, performance and governance as the exogenous variables.
It is important to note that although the phrase 'remuneration 
determinants' is used throughout the study, in examining the impact of 
corporate acquisition, size, performance and governance upon 
remuneration, no cause and effect relationship is assumed or implied.
63 In the regression equation the word 'measure' is used to indicate that there is more than one measure 
for the variable. The measures are used in separate regression equations.
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Rather the regression coefficient is used as an index of the degree of the 
statistical association between the endogenous and exogenous variables64.
3.5 The Modelling Strategy
The main regression equation employed in this study [Equation 3.4] has 
been formulated with alternative modelling strategies in variables 
measures, time lag and 'stacking1.
Alternative Variables Measures, As we already had the occasion to note, 
in this study we employed alternative measures for corporate
acquisitiveness and market performance (in separate regression
equations). Corporate acquisitiveness is measured by 'acquisition 
expenditure' or 'acquisition rate'; while market performance by
'shareholder returns' or 'share price'. Refer to Appendix 3. 7 for an
illustration of the versions of regression equations reflecting these aspects.
The Lag Effect, We have also explored various lagged structures with the 
view of getting a better understanding of the effects of time. Acquisition 
measures have been lagged by up to three periods while the ‘remaining’ 
exogenous variables are lagged by one period. The lags employed in this 
study are explicitly described in Appendix 3.8.
Alternative \Stacking' Techniques, 'Stacking' identifies the number of 
instruments used in the Arellano and Bond's GMM estimation technique.
64 It is conceivable to assume that, ceteris paribus, remuneration at time (t) is partly dependent on 
acquisition (or any other factor) at time (t-1). It is also not inconceivable to assume that, ceteris 
paribus, acquisition (or any other factor) at time (t+1) is partly dependent on remuneration at time (t). 
Theoretically, both arguments are sound, however, this simultaneous relationship is not examined in this 
study. Rather, this study examines the impact of the current and past acquisition upon current 
remuneration.
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The exact instruments used in each type of stacking are explicitly 
described in Appendix 3. 9. We employed four types of stacking, ‘full’, 
‘partial 4’, ‘partial 3’ and ‘partial 2’. All of them employ all the moments’ 
restrictions implied by the lack of second-order serial correlation in the 
differenced equation and are required for asymptotic efficiency. The 
difference lies in the number of instruments employed. In ‘full stacking’ 
we employed all65 the moments' restrictions implied by the lags from 2 to 
13 periods. While in partial 4, 3 and 2 we employed all the available 
moment restrictions implied by lags from 2 to 5, 2 to 4 and 2 to 3 periods 
respectively.
3.6 Analytical Strategy66
To ensure clarity, a uniform analytical strategy has been used in 
interpreting the results. The results for all variables are reported, whether 
found statistically significant or not, in Appendices 4.1 to 7.8. However, 
in analysing the results we will naturally discuss the findings for the 
statistically significant variables only. For simplicity we will follow one 
format in analysing the findings for these variables. The following is an 
algebraic representation of the analytical steps.
65 Our data has 13 time periods (1980-92).
66 A brief description of the analysis strategy is included in all the results chapters.
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Average Contribution of Xj = (pj) (Average Growth of X x) Equation 3.5
Average Contribution of X! 
as a Percentage of the 
Average Remuneration 
Growth
= ((Contribution of X j) / 
(Average Remuneration 
Growth)) * 100
Equation 3.6
Average Contribution of Xi 
as a Percentage of the 
Average Remuneration Level
= ((Contribution of X!) / 
(Average Remuneration Level)) 
*  100
Equation 3.7
where, X, One of the Exogenous variables
Assumption: When exploring the relationship between two variable, a ceteris 
paribus holds for all the ‘remaining* exogenous variables
We will start the analysis by presenting ‘Partial’ stacking regression 
coefficients and (t-statistics) for the variable under investigation, while 
holding other variables constant. This is followed by translating these 
numbers to actual effects, i.e. in sterling pounds. In addition, we 
employed three methods to aid in assessing the substantive significance of 
the contribution of the exogenous variable on remuneration. First, we 
report the ‘average contribution of the exogenous variable’ which is 
obtained by multiplying the average growth in the exogenous variable by 
its1 regression coefficient (Equation 3.5). Second, we compute the ‘the 
average contribution of the exogenous variable as a percentage of the 
average remuneration growth’ (Equation 3.6). Third, we find the ‘the
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average contribution of the exogenous variable as a percentage of the 
average level of remuneration (Equation 3.7). The robustness of these 
findings are examined using 'full* stacking.
3.7 Summary of Research Concepts and Methodology
The main purpose of this study is to determine the extent and direction of 
the statistical association between corporate acquisition activities and 
remuneration (for the highest paid director, directors and employees), 
while controlling for corporate size, performance and governance. 
Furthermore, the study also incidentally attempts to establish the impact 
of corporate size, performance and governance upon remuneration.
The companies in this sample are extracted from LSE FT-All Share Index 
companies. These firms provide a reasonably good sample over a fairly 
long period of time (1980 through 1992). The research data is classified 
into four samples, corresponding to the four types of remuneration. The 
first sample is the basic remuneration of the highest paid director. The 
second sample is an extension of the first, and is the total remuneration of 
the highest paid director. The third and fourth samples are concerned with 
the average^remuneration per director and per employee respectively. The 
untreated regression equation, however, is riddled with statistical 
problems which could invalidate conventional hypothesis testing. 
Arellano and Bond’s Generalised Method of Moments coupled with the 
first differencing technique are used as a regression method and as a 
means to solve the statistical problems. Furthermore, the regression 
equation is formulated using alternative modelling strategies in variables 
measures, lags and in ‘stacking’.
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The next four chapters present the analysis of the four samples, starting 
with analysis of the basic remuneration of the highest paid director.
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CHAPTER 4: determ inants1 Of The Basic Remuneration Of The 
Highest Paid Director
The aim of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the acquisition 
motives and pay ’determinants’ for the highest paid director (henceforth, 
‘hpd’). This entails examining the relationship between growth of basic 
remuneration of the 'hpd' as the endogenous variable, and growth of 
measures of corporate acquisition, size, performance and governance as 
the exogenous variables. In general, the multivariate regression findings 
indicate that growth of basic remuneration of the 'hpd' is significantly 
related to growth of acquisition and shareholder returns and is 
insignificantly related to growth of sales, number of employees, capital 
employed, profit, share price and governance.
In this chapter we will present and discuss these findings, starting with the 
impact of acquisition growth upon growth of the basic remuneration of 
the ‘hpd’. The remaining variables will be discussed together as ‘the other 
determinants’. These findings will be discussed after outlining the 
analytical strategy.
4.1 Analytical Strategy
The general regression results for this chapter are presented in 
appendices 4.1 to 4.4. Furthermore, in this chapter all regression 
equations are specified in 'first differences'. Consequently, variable 
coefficients indicate the effect of change in the 'first difference' of a given 
exogenous variable on the 'first difference' of an endogenous variable. 
However, throughout the chapter we will refer to 'the change in the first
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difference' by the phrase 'growth'. This will assist in presenting the 
results. Furthermore, as all the findings in this chapter are related to 
growth of ‘the basic remuneration of the ‘hpd” , throughout the chapter 
we will refer to it as the ‘remuneration’. We will start the analysis by 
exploring the relationship between acquisition and remuneration, while 
holding other factors constant.
4 J L  Corporate Acquisition and Basic Remuneration of the Highest 
Paid Director
As has been explained in the previous chapter, there are two measures of 
corporate acquisitive activities, ‘acquisition expenditure’ and ‘acquisition 
rate’. In order to analyse the relationship between acquisition and 
remuneration we have divided this section into two parts. The first part, 
examines acquisition expenditure in relationship to remuneration. The 
second part presents the findings for ‘acquisition rate’.
4.2.1 Acquisition Expenditure
Results suggest that, holding other factors constant, there is a positive but 
insignificant relationship between current acquisition expenditure growth 
and current remuneration growth (Appendix 4.1). However, when 
acquisition growth was pushed back in time, we found that there is a 
positive and significant relationship (Appendix 4.1). Next, we will 
manifest the significant findings.
‘Partial stacking’ results give 36.37453 (3.7983) as the acquisition growth 
coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 4.1). This implies that 
for every additional £1 million spent on acquisition expenditure growth in
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the past one year, current remuneration growth increases by £36,375. 
Considering that the average acquisition expenditure growth at (t-1) is 
£206,440, (Table 4.2), then remuneration growth at (t) increases by 
£7,509 in relation to the average acquisition expenditure growth. This 
increase represents 32 percent of the average increase in remuneration 
growth and 5 percent of the average remuneration level (Table 4.3). The 
robustness of these findings has been tested using ‘full’ stacking 
(Appendix 4.1). The result is consistent with UK findings by Conyon and 
Gregg (1994), who reported that two or more corporate involvement in 
takeovers results in higher ‘hpd* basic remuneration.
The acquisition expenditure and remuneration relationship is investigated 
further, by pushing data back in time by two years. This results in 
30.22764 (3.1212) as the acquisition expenditure growth coefficient and 
(t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 4.1). This implies that for every £1 
million spent on acquisition expenditure growth two years ago, current 
remuneration growth increases by £30,228. Considering that the average 
acquisition expenditure growth at (t-2) is £270,410, (Table 4.2). The 
remuneration growth at (t) increases by £8,174 in relation to the average 
acquisition expenditure growth at (t-2) (Table 4.3). This increase 
represents 34 percent of the average increase in current remuneration 
growth and 6 percent of the average remuneration level (Table 4.3). The 
robustness of these findings has been tested using ‘full stacking’ 
(Appendix 4.1).
Therefore, we could infer that there is one and two years lag acquisition 
effect on remuneration. Average acquisition expenditure growth
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contributes just above 30 percent of the average increase in remuneration 
growth and at least 5 percent of the average remuneration level. These 
findings prompt a need for a fundamental re-think about directors' 
motives behind acquisition decisions. This directs us to carry more 
investigation and examine if the results are invariant to alternative 
measures of acquisition.
4.2.2 Acquisition Rate
Acquisition rate is the ratio between acquisition expenditure and total 
investment. It indicates the ratio of ‘acquisitive growth’ to ‘total growth’. 
We ran the same regression equation replacing the ‘acquisition 
expenditure’ variable by ‘acquisition rate’. Results indicate that one year 
lagged acquisition rate growth is positively and significantly related to
67current remuneration growth . Next we explore these findings.
We find 45.81538 and (3.223899) as the acquisition rate growth 
coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 4.3). This indicates 
that for a one percent increase in previous year's acquisition rate growth, 
current remuneration growth increases by £46,815. Considering that the 
average acquisition rate growth at time (t-1) is 0.21 percent, (Table 4.2), 
then remuneration growth at (t) increases by £9,735 in relation to the 
average acquisition rate growth. This increase represents 42 percent of the 
average remuneration growth and 8.5 percent of the average remuneration
67 'Partial' stacking results indicated that the current acquisition rate is negatively and significantly 
related to current remuneration; however, the 'Full' stacking results indicate an insignificant 
relationship.
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level (Table 4.4). The robustness of the findings has been tested by using 
‘full’ stacking (Appendix 4.3)68.
Using UK data for the period 1974 through 1980, Firth (1991, 1980) 
found that change in senior management remuneration69 of the acquiring 
company increases substantially after an acquisition. Interestingly, the 
senior managers seem to gain whether the acquiring firm experienced 
positive or negative abnormal returns subsequent to the takeover 
announcement. Firth (1991) found that the change70 in remuneration of 
the highest paid director following a takeover bid is around £4832 for 
firms experiencing positive abnormal returns and £3917 for firms 
experiencing negative abnormal returns. In addition, using data of 160 
companies, for the period 1985 and 1990, Conyon and Gregg (1994), 
found that ‘hpd’ basic remuneration increases substantially if firms are 
engaged in takeover activity. The results suggest that if firms are engaged 
in two or more takeovers in the past three years, then the remuneration of 
the ‘hpd’ increases by approximately 8 percentage per annum for three 
years. To conclude, the findings in this research are in line with UK 
empirical research.
In summary, results indicate that the one year lagged acquisition rate 
growth is positively and significantly related to current remuneration 
growth. Acquisition rate contributes around 42 percent of the average 
increase in remuneration growth and 8.5 percent of the average
68 Furthermore, the inconsistency in the statistical significance of the current and two years lagged 
acquisition rate growth in ‘partial’ and ‘full’ stacking results imposes a restriction on using the results.
69 For the highest paid director remuneration and chairman.
70 The median.
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remuneration level. The findings here confirm that managers obtain 
lucrative enough rewards to pursue acquisition activities.
The findings indicate that both growth in acquisition expenditure and rate 
are related to growth in remuneration. This implies that the statistical 
significance of acquisition is not sensitive to the acquisition measure.
To conclude, there is enough evidence to support the view that there is a 
positive relationship between acquisition growth and remuneration 
growth. However, acquisition growth is not the only determinant of 
remuneration growth. We shall present the findings for some of the 
'remaining remuneration determinants' next.
4.3 Other ‘Determinants' of Basic Remuneration Of the Highest Paid 
Director
The aim of this section is to build on the acquisition results and to search 
for the significance of some additional remuneration 'determinants'. As 
explained in the previous chapter, along with the acquisition variable on 
the right-hand side of the main regression equation [Equation 3.4 in 
chapter 3], the ‘remaining’ exogenous variables can be classified into four 
categories. The first consists of one variable, lagged remuneration. The 
second is corporate size and consists of three variables; sales, number of 
employees and capital employed. The third is corporate performance and 
consists of accounting and market performance variables. The fourth is 
governance which consists of one ‘governance’ variable.
In discussing the findings, we will follow the same analytical strategy as 
in the above section. The main analysis will be based on ‘partial’ 
stacking; while ‘full’ stacking results will be used as robustness tests. We
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start by examining the relationship between previous year’s remuneration 
and current remuneration, while holding other factors constant.
4.3.1 Previous Year’s Remuneration
We followed Conyon’s (1994) and Main’s (1992) unique remuneration 
formula, in that we included previous year’s remuneration as one of the 
'determinants' of the current year remuneration, iM [Equation 3.4 in 
chapter 3]. Most previous studies have omitted this factor so implicitly 
imposing the restriction thatPj ht.i= 0. This study tests the validity of such 
restriction in the data set. Results indicate that Pj 0 and that 
approximately 50 percent of the current remuneration is dependent on 
previous year’s remuneration (Appendix 4.1). Robustness tests using 
'partial' stacking confirm this finding (Appendix 4.1).
4.3.2 Corporate Size
Corporate size has been found by many scholars as a primary
71‘determinant’ of senior managerial remuneration . Cosh (1975) 
maintained that size alone could explain up to 49 percent of the variance 
in executive remuneration. While Gregg et al (1993) found that a 50 
percent increase in corporate sales72 leads to a 10 percent increase in 
‘hpd’ remuneration. As we had the occasion to note, in this study 
corporate size is measured by three variables, total sales, total number of 
employees and capital employed. The reason for incorporating three
71 Refer to Roberts (1956), Baumol (1962,1967), McGuire et al (1962), Cosh (1975), Hirschey and 
Pappas (1981), Benston (1985), Gomez-Mejia et al (1987), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gregg et al 
(1993).
72 Sales are found to be statistically significant in the following studies: McGuire et al (1962), Cosh 
(1975), Meeks and Wittington (1975), Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Hogan and McPheters (1980), 
Hirschey and Pappas (1981), Lewellen et al (1987), Belkaoui (1990), Gregg et al (1993), Conyon and 
Leech (1994), Main et al (1994).
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measures rather than one is to enable us to compare our findings and also 
to test whether different corporate size measures have different effects on 
remuneration.
Results suggest that none of the growth of corporate size variables is 
statistically related to remuneration growth (Appendix 4.1). To examine 
the relationship further, we used different time lags and different stacking 
techniques. The results of all these tests confirmed the robustness of our 
original findings that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between current or one year lagged corporate size growth measures and 
current remuneration growth (Appendix 4.1-2.4).
73This result is surprising as it is inconsistent with the findings of the 
majority of studies in this area. However, there are two potential reasons 
for this difference. The first reason results as a consequence of not 
treating the firm-specific effects. Most of the previous researchers used a 
cross- section of firms and consequently treated firms as homogeneous. 
While, in our research we used panel data and controlled for firm specific 
effects. As we had the occasion to note, Murphy (1985) found striking 
differences in the sign and magnitude between the time-series and cross- 
sectional regression estimates. He argues that this indicates that it is 
important to control for firm and individual-specific effects when 
assessing remuneration 'determinants'. This prompted him to conclude 
that “previous cross sectional estimates of compensation-performance 
relationship are biased and misleading” (Murphy 1985, p.41). The second 
reason could be a consequence of exclusion of a relevant variable,
73 However, sales are found to be positively and statistically related to total remuneration of the 'hpd'. 
These findings will be discussed in the next chapter.
59
acquisition. Most of the previous research in this area did not include 
acquisition as one of the 'determinants’ of directors' remuneration. This 
might have lead to biased results (Lewis-Beck, 1993, pp. 49). Since the 
previous research in this area does not allow corrections for the 
methodological failures just indicated, as opposed to the methods in this 
research, it is justifiable to conclude that the differences in the findings 
should be in favour of this study. Indeed, our findings are in line with two 
recent UK studies that relate 'hpd' remuneration to sales. Conyon (1994), 
who used panel data, controlled for firm-specific effects and included 
acquisition in the remuneration determinant equation, could not find any 
statistically significant relationship between 'hpd' remuneration and sales 
between 1988 and 1993. Also, Main (1991) conducted a study on 241 UK 
companies listed in Time 1000 in 1985. He found that corporate size, 
measured by both sales and total assets employed are insignificantly 
related to 'hpd' remuneration74. Also the insignificance of sales is in-line 
with US evidence by Boyd (1994) and Masson (1971).
Finally, the insignificance of corporate size measures avoids us from 
having to assess whether different corporate size measures have different 
effects on remuneration. In conclusion, results strongly suggest that 
current and one year lagged corporate size - measured by sales, number 
of employees and capital - is not statistically related to current 
remuneration.
74 His measure of'hpd' remuneration excluded executive share options.
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4.3.4 Corporate Performance
Economic theories have typically indicated that corporate performance 
plays at best a minor role in determining executive remuneration . 
Corporate performance measures can be divided into two categories, 
market and accounting measures. In this study, accounting performance is 
measured by profit; while market performance is measured by annual 
average corporate share price or shareholder returns. Market performance 
measures are used in separate regression equations.
The regression results indicate that growth in profit and share price are
76positively but insignificantly related to growth in remuneration 
(Appendix 4.1). To examine the relationship further, we used different 
time lags and different stacking techniques (Appendix 4.1). All findings 
are in line with the original one, in that accounting and market
77performance measures, represented by growth in profit and share price, 
have no effect on remuneration growth (Appendix 4.1). Robustness tests 
confirm these findings. However, adding appreciation in share price to 
dividends, that is ‘shareholder returns’, reveals a statistically significant
75 The following studies found either a negative or no relationship between executive remuneration and 
corporate performance: McGuire et al (1962), Hogan McPheters (1980), Kerr and Bettis (1987), 
Leonard (1990), Main (1991), Gregg et al (1993), Conyon and Leech (1994), Main et al (1994). 
Although, Gregg et al (1993); Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that shareholders returns have a positive 
impact upon managerial remuneration, the magnitude is small.
Refer to Ciscel and Carroll (1980) and Rosen (1992) for a comprehensive review of the literature.
76 Except in a few cases, the relationship is negative.
77 Boyd (1994) found profit to be insignificantly related to CEO basic remuneration.
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relationship. Results indicate that growth of shareholder returns is 
significantly related to growth of remuneration (Appendix 4.2).
‘Partial stacking’ results give 13.96116 (2.048549) as ‘shareholders 
return’ growth coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 4.2). 
This suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 100 percentage rise in current 
shareholder returns growth, results in £13,961 rise in current 
remuneration growth. Interestingly, in this sample the average shareholder 
returns growth has been decreasing by 0.02487 (Table 4.2). This implies 
that in this sample current remuneration growth decreased by £347 in 
relation to the average current shareholder returns growth. This decrease 
represents 1.5 percent of the average remuneration growth (Table 4.5) and 
0.3 percent of the average remuneration level (Table 4.5). The robustness 
of this finding has been tested by using ‘full’ stacking. (Appendix 4.2). To 
investigate this relationship further, we pushed back all exogenous 
variables by one year. We found that inconsistency between the 'partial' 
and 'full' stacking results which imposed a restriction on using the results.
The market performance results are consistent with both British and 
American studies in this area. The majority of studies suggest that the
78impact of market performance on top executives basic pay is small . In 
the UK Conyon and Gregg’s79 (1994) study who found that shareholder 
returns have a small but significant impact on top director remuneration. 
Their results showed that a doubling of shareholder returns raises
78 Refer to Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gregg et al (1993), Main and Johnston (1993), Conyon (1994), 
Conyon and Gregg (1994), Conyon and Leech (1994).
79 Conyon and Gregg (1994) conducted a study on 160 UK companies between 1985 and 1990.
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O A
directors pay by 6%. Also, these findings are in line with Main's (1991) 
81study who concluded that 'abnormal' and 'normal' shareholder returns 
are positively and significantly related to 'hpd' basic remuneration. Also 
in the USA, Jensen and Murphy82 (1990) found that for every $1,000 
increase in shareholder returns, CEO basic compensation increases by 
$0.30. Conyon and Leech83 (1994) found that although 'hpd' 
remuneration is positively related to corporate performance, the estimated
OA
elasticity is very small, 0.018 (refer to footnote ).
In summary, there is enough evidence to support the view that growth of 
current remuneration is positively related to growth of current shareholder 
returns. However, the magnitude of contribution of shareholder returns to 
remuneration is small. Moreover, growth in both profit and share price are 
insignificantly related to remuneration growth.
4.3.5 Corporate Governance
Governance is measured by the ratio of non-executive directors to total 
directors on the board. ‘Partial’ stacking results suggests that there is no 
significant relationship between growth of current remuneration and
85current governance (Appendix 4.1). The robustness of these findings is 
confirmed by the ‘full’ stacking results. The relationship is further 
investigated by pushing growth of governance back one year. The results
80 Also the following recent UK studies found a positive and a significant relationship between 
shareholder returns and 'hpd' basic remuneration: Gregg et al (1993), Conyon and Leech (1994)
81 Main conducted a study on 241 UK companies listed in Times 1000.
82 Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) study included 2213 CEOs listed in the Executive Compensation Survey 
published in Forbes from 1974 to 1986. Their sample included 7750 observations.
3 Conyon and Leech’s study (1994) conducted a study on 294 UK companies between 1983 and 1986.
84 Evaluated at the mean return on capital
85 In ‘partial’ stacking, we found a statistical and positive relationship between one year lagged 
governance and current remuneration but only in the equation containing 'acquisition rate' as an 
exogenous variable.
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of the ‘partial’ and ‘full’ stacking are inconsistent which imposes a 
restriction on using the results.
In this study the overall evidence suggests that current changes in the 
remuneration of the board do not influence current remuneration growth. 
It is difficult to compare these results with previous UK research mainly 
because there is no compelling conclusion from previous research. 
Conyon and Leech (1994) found that ‘hpd’ remuneration is 
approximately 8 percent lower in companies which reported the existence 
of non-executive directors in their final accounts. While Main (1991) 
found that each extra non-executive director increases 'hpd* remuneration 
by £4,000.
The contrast between Conyon and Leech’s, and results reported here
could be attributed to the fact that each study defined non-executive
differently. Furthermore, the disparity between the results reported here
and Main's could perhaps be attributed to two inter-related reasons. The
first is the different types of data used in the two studies. In this study we
used panel data while in Main's study he used cross-section data. The
second reason could be a consequence of not treating firm-specific effects 
86in Main's study . This study attempted to solve these problems and as a 
result found that growth of corporate governance plays no role in shaping 
the growth of the ‘hpd’ remuneration.
4. Conclusion
No doubt, these results and findings, like virtually all other statistical 
results in this area, will be the subject of some controversy. Nevertheless,
86 As explained earlier.
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the methods of the study are sufficiently sophisticated and the results 
seem sufficiently strong to make it difficult to maintain that acquisition 
activities generate no monetary benefits to the ‘hpd’; or that 'determinants' 
of basic remuneration of the 'hpd' are aligned with the propositions 
suggested by profit maximisation theory. Results indicate that growth in 
profit, average share price, sales, number of employees, capital employed 
and governance do not have any effect on growth in basic remuneration of 
the ‘hpd*.
However, the findings strongly suggest that ‘hpd’ unambiguously and 
invariably benefit from corporate acquisition activities and current 
shareholder returns. Growth in last year’s remuneration, lagged 
acquisition and current shareholder returns are positively related to 
growth in current ‘hpd’ remuneration. These findings suggest a need for 
more investigation of the 'determinants' of 'hpd' remuneration and prompt 
a fundamental re-thinking of directors' motives behind acquisition 
decisions. Towards this goal we examined the effect of acquisition and 
pay 'determinants' on a wider definition of ‘hpd’ remuneration. This is the 
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: ‘Determinants’ Of The Total Remuneration Of The
Highest Paid Director
The aim of this chapter is to broaden our understanding of the acquisition 
motives and pay 'determinants' for the highest paid director (henceforth 
‘hpd’). Towards this goal, we examined the effect of growth of 
acquisition and growth of pay 'determinants' on a wider definition of 
‘hpd’ remuneration. Total remuneration is the sum of basic remuneration 
of the ‘hpd’ and the actual and potential gains from executive share 
options (henceforth ‘ESO’). In this chapter the growth of total 
remuneration of the 'hpd' is regressed against growth of measures of 
corporate acquisition, size, performance and governance. In general, the 
multivariate regression findings suggest that growth of the total 
remuneration of the ‘hpd’ is significantly related to growth of acquisition 
and sales and is insignificantly related to growth of corporate performance 
and governance.
In this chapter we will present and discuss these findings, starting with the 
impact of acquisition growth upon growth of total remuneration of the 
‘hpd’. The remaining variables will be discussed together as ‘the other 
determinants’.
5.1 Analytical Strategy
The regression results for this chapter are presented in appendices 5.1 to 
5.4. Furthermore, in this chapter all regression equations are specified in 
'first differences'. Consequently, variable coefficients indicate the effect 
of change in the 'first difference' of a given exogenous variable on the 
'first difference’ of an endogenous variable. However, throughout the 
chapter we will refer to 'the change in the first difference' by the phrase
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'growth'. This will assist in presenting the results.Furthermore, as all the 
findings in this chapter are related to growth of the total remuneration of 
the ‘hpd’, throughout the chapter we will refer to it as the ‘remuneration’. 
We will start the analysis by exploring the relationship between 
acquisition and remuneration, while holding other factors constant.
5i2__ Corporate Acquisition and Total Remuneration Of the Highest
Paid Director
In this study acquisition is measured by two variables ‘acquisition
87expenditure’ and ‘acquisition rate’ . The reason for incorporating two 
measures is to examine whether the results are invariant to the alternative 
acquisition measure. Results suggest that, ceteris paribus, current and 
one year lagged acquisition expenditure growth are statistically related to 
total current remuneration growth; while current and one year lagged 
acquisition rate growth are insignificantly related to total remuneration 
growth.
5.2.1 Acquisition Expenditure
For the period 1982 to 92 results give -0.24707 (-3.71548) as the 
acquisition expenditure growth coefficients and (t-statistic) respectively 
(Appendix 5.1). This suggests that, ceteris paribus, for every £1 million 
increase in acquisition expenditure growth, remuneration growth 
decreases by £247. Considering that the average acquisition expenditure 
growth at time (t) is £3,698,900 (Table 5.2), then remuneration growth at 
(t) decreases by £914 in relation to the average acquisition expenditure 
growth. This decrease represents a 3 percent of the average growth of
87 Note that the two measures of acquisition are used in separate equations.
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remuneration and 0.5 percent of the average remuneration level (Table
5.3). The robustness tests confirm these findings (Appendix 5.1).
To investigate the relationship between growth of both remuneration and 
acquisition expenditure, we pushed back acquisition expenditure growth 
by one year, while all the 'remaining' exogenous variables remained at 
time (t). The results suggest a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between last year’s acquisition expenditure growth and 
current remuneration growth. Holding other variables constant, the test 
gives 0.511709 (3.150685) as the acquisition coefficient and (t-statistic) 
respectively (Appendix 5.1). This implies that a £1 million increase in 
acquisition expenditure growth is related to a £512 increase in total 
remuneration growth (Table 5.3). Considering that the average acquisition 
expenditure growth at time (t-1) is £15,674,680 then remuneration 
growth at (t) increases by £8,021 in relation to the average acquisition 
expenditure growth. This increase represents a 26 percent of the average 
growth of remuneration and 4 percent of the average remuneration level 
(Table 5.3). The robustness tests confirm these findings (Appendix 5.1). 
Furthermore, when acquisition expenditure and all the ‘remaining’ 
exogenous variables were pushed back by one year, the positive and 
significant relationship between acquisition expenditure and current 
remuneration remained positive and statistically significant (Table 5.3).
These results are in line with a UK study conducted by Abell et al (1994). 
The distinctive feature of this study is that it is the first UK study that 
examined the relationship between corporate acquisition activities and 
executive total remuneration where the latter includes executive share
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88options . They found that the level of acquisition is a statistically 
significant determinant of the total remuneration of the 'hpd1. The 
findings are also in line with Seward and Welsh’s (1995) who conducted 
a study on 152 firms and found that CEO wealth in the forms of executive 
share options is strongly related to both friendly and hostile acquisitions.
Therefore, we could conclude that current and one year lagged acquisition 
expenditure growth are statistically related to changes in current 
remuneration growth. These findings, along with previous chapter's, 
emphasise the need to re-think managers' motives behind acquisition 
decisions. The next section is our attempt to examine if the results are 
invariant to alternate measures of acquisition.
5.2.2 Acquisition Rate
We ran the same regression equations replacing the ‘acquisition 
expenditure’ variable by ‘acquisition rate’ [Equation 3.4 in Chapter 3]. 
Results suggest that current and one year lagged acquisition rate growth 
are insignificantly related to current total remuneration growth (Appendix
5.3). The robustness tests confirm these findings. (Appendix 5.3). This 
indicates that the statistical significance of the impact of acquisitions is 
sensitive to the measure of acquisitiveness used. These findings, 
however, do not weaken the acquisition expenditure results as the 
robustness tests confirm the statistical significance of the relationship 
between acquisition expenditure growth and total remuneration growth.
88 Their sample included 25 UK-based companies who were active in acquisition during 1986-90 period. 
The study could be criticised for using a small sample.
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In summary, results indicate that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between growth of acquisition expenditure and growth of the 
total remuneration of the ‘hpd’. Results suggest that current remuneration 
decreases by just below £250 for every £1 million increase in acquisition 
expenditure growth. However, during the second acquisition year (t-1) 
‘hpd’ start benefiting from increase in acquisition expenditure growth as 
for every £1 million increase in growth of acquisition expenditure, growth 
of total remuneration of the ‘hpd’ increases by just above £500. 
Furthermore, we found that the statistical significance of acquisition is 
sensitive to the acquisitiveness measure. When acquisition rate rather than 
acquisition expenditure is used, the results reveal that growth of 
acquisition rate and total remuneration are insignificantly related. 
However, acquisition is not the only determinant of remuneration. Next, 
we explore some of the 'remaining determinants' of remuneration growth.
5.3 ‘Other Determinants’ of Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid 
Director
The aim of this section is to build on the acquisition results and to search 
for the significance of some additional ‘determinants’ of the 
remuneration. Along with the acquisition variable on the right-hand side 
of the main regression equation [Equation 3.4 in chapter 3], the 
‘remaining’ exogenous variables can be classified into four categories. 
The first consists of one variable, lagged remuneration. The second is 
corporate size and consists of three variables; sales, number of 
employees and capital employed. The third is corporate performance and 
consists of accounting and market performance variables. The fourth is 
governance which consists of one ‘governance’ variable.
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In discussing the findings, we will follow the same analytical strategy as 
in the above section. So the main analysis will be based on ‘partial 3’ 
stacking; while ‘partial 2’ stacking results will be used as robustness tests. 
We start by examining the relationship between previous year’s 
remuneration and current remuneration.
5.3.1 Previous Year’s Remuneration
Results indicate that current remuneration growth is not statistically 
dependent on previous year’s remuneration growth (Appendix 5.1). 
Robustness tests confirm this finding (Appendix 5.1). This is perhaps 
expected, considering that there is no set pattern in exercising the 
executive share option. The interpretation is supported by the finding that 
the fixed part of remuneration, basic remuneration, is statistically 
dependent on the previous year’s basic remuneration (Appendix 4.1).
5.3.2 Corporate Size
Corporate size has been found by many scholars as a primary determinant
89of senior managerial remuneration . In this study corporate size is 
measured by three variables, total sales, total number of employees and 
capital employed. Incorporating different measures will enable us to 
compare our findings and to test whether different corporate size 
measures have different effects on remuneration of the ‘hpd’. Results 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, current and one year lagged sales growth are 
significantly related to current remuneration growth. While current and
89 Refer to Roberts (1956), Baumol (1962,1967), McGuire et al (1962), Cosh (1975), Hirschey and 
Pappas (1981), Benston (1985), Gomez-Mejia et al (1987), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gregg et al 
(1993). Note that most of these studies examined basic rather than total managerial remuneration. The 
studies, however, could be used as a surrogate to total remuneration due to the limited number of 
studies on the impact of corporate size upon total remuneration.
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one year lagged growth of both ‘number of employees’ and ‘capital 
employed’ are insignificantly related to current remuneration growth.
Sales The main results give 0.178979 (3.147312) as the current sales 
growth coefficients and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 5.1). This 
suggests that, ceteris paribus, a £1 million increase in current sales 
growth is related to £179 increase in current remuneration growth. 
Considering that the average sales growth at time (t) is approximately 
£114 million (Table 5.2), then remuneration growth at (t) increases by 
£20,471 in relation to the average sales. This increase represents a 59 
percent of the average growth of remuneration and 11 percent of the 
average remuneration level (Table 5.4). The robustness tests confirm 
these findings (Appendix 5.1).
To investigate the total remuneration growth and sales growth relationship 
further, we pushed back sales and all the remaining exogenous variables 
by one year while acquisition was pushed by two years. The result 
suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship between last 
year’s sales growth and current remuneration growth. Holding other 
variables constant, the test gives 0.120179 (2.310032) as the sales growth 
coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 5.1). This implies that 
a £1 million increase in previous year’s sales growth is related to a £120 
increase in current total remuneration growth (Table 5.4). Considering 
that the average sales growth at time (t-1) is approximately £124 million, 
then remuneration growth at (t) increases by £14,876 in relation to the 
average sales growth. This increase represents 38 percent of the average 
growth of remuneration and 8 percent of the average remuneration level 
(Table 5.4). The robustness tests confirm these findings (Appendix 5.1).
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Comparing the impact of acquisition growth upon remuneration growth 
with the impact of growth of sales upon growth of remuneration, reveals 
that the increase in remuneration growth generated from acquisition 
growth is approximately 300 percent more than increase generated from 
sales growth. Results suggest that for every £1 million increase in 
acquisition expenditure growth, remuneration growth increases by £512 
(section 5.2.1 above), while a £1 million increase in sales growth, 
increases remuneration growth by £179 (section 5.3.2).
These findings are in line with US evidence relating senior executive 
remuneration to sales. Murphy (1985) included gains in executive share 
options in the executive remuneration measure. He conducted a study on 
500 executives from 73 manufacturing industries and found that sales is 
an important determinant of executive remuneration90. Also, the findings 
are in line with a recent UK study by Main et al (1994). Their measure of 
'hpd' remuneration included gains from executive share options. They 
found that sales are statistically and positively related to 'hpd' 
remuneration. Furthermore, reviewing the literature on takeover motives, 
Lev (1983) found that most conglomerates engage in takeover activities, 
solely, for growth; he called this phenomenon 'growth for growth'91. 
Nordhaus (1982) also compared managers who initiate takeovers 
activities to politicians as both “like to build empires” (1982, pp.3).
90 Murphy's study is not directly related to this study for two reasons (1) Murphy's study concentrated 
on manufacturing industry only while this study is concerned with a wider selection of industries; (2) 
Murphy's study examines the executives remuneration while ours is concerned with 'hpd' remuneration.
91 This finding, however, did not lead him to specify decisively that managerial motives drive takeovers 
decisions, rather he concluded that he holds more support for the managerial utility than the profit 
maximisation hypothesis.
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In summary there is enough evidence to support the hypothesis that sales 
play an important role in determining remuneration. The next section 
explores the relationship between remuneration and the other measures of 
corporate size.
Number o f  Employees and Capital Employed Along with all the above 
mentioned exogenous variables, growth of both 'number of employees' 
and 'capital employed' are regressed against remuneration growth. The 
main findings suggest that current and one year lagged growth in number 
of employees and capital employed are insignificantly related to current 
remuneration growth (Appendix 5.1). The robustness tests confirm this 
result (Appendix 5.1).
To examine if the three measures of corporate size have different effects 
on remuneration we looked at their statistical significance and sign. The 
overall results indicate that sales growth is the only corporate size 
measure that has a statistically significant relationship with remuneration 
growth. This implies that studies must be specific when reporting their 
findings. Scholars must limit their conclusion to the corporate size proxy 
used in their study and not generalise their conclusion to all corporate size 
proxies. Concerning their signs, the insignificance of 'capital employed' 
and 'number of employees' imposes a restriction on using the result.
To conclude, results indicate that the current and one year lagged 'sales' 
growth have positive and significant relationship with remuneration 
growth. While growth of 'number of employees' and 'capital employed'
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have a negatively and insignificant relationship with remuneration 
growth.
5.3.3 Corporate Performance,
As we had the occasion to note, economic theories of efficient 
remuneration predict a positive relationship between executive pay and 
corporate performance. There are two types of corporate performance 
measure, accounting and market measures. In this study, growth of profit 
is used as the accounting measure while growth of share price or 
shareholder returns are used as the market performance measures. Market 
performance measures are used in separate equations.
The main results suggest that there is no statistical relationship between 
any of the current or lagged growth of the corporate performance 
measures and growth of remuneration (Appendix 5.1). The robustness 
tests confirm these findings (Appendix 5.1).
These results are in contrast with Murphy’s (1985), who conducted a 
study on 73 American manufacturing industry and found that shareholder 
returns are an important determinant in executive compensation. It is 
difficult to reject Murphy’s findings because of the statistical competence 
of his method, however, the inconsistency between the findings of this 
study and Murphy’s could be attributed to the fact that the data in the 
latter study is from the American manufacturing sector during the mid 
sixties up to the beginning of the eighties, while the former study is 
concerned with the a wide range of British industries from the beginning 
of the eighties up to the beginning of the nineties. However, Main et al 
(1994) used UK data from a wide base of industries for the second half of 
the eighties period, and the results showed a statistically significant
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relationship between changes in total remuneration of the 'hpd' and 
changes in shareholder returns (Main et al, 1994). The inconsistency 
between the results in this study and Main et al’s could be a consequence 
of not treating firm-specific effects in the latter. Most of the previous 
scholars used a cross-section of firms and consequently treated firms as 
homogeneous. In our research we used panel data and controlled for firm- 
specific effects. As has been explained in the previous chapter, Murphy 
(1985) found striking differences in the sign and magnitude between the 
time-series and cross-sectional regression estimates. He argues that this 
indicates that it is important to control for firm and individual-specific 
effects when assessing remuneration 'determinants'. It is justifiable, 
therefore, to conclude that the differences in the findings should be in 
favour of this study. Indeed, our findings are in line with a UK study by 
Abell at al (1994) who controlled for fixed-firm-specific effects and 
found that for the period 1986 through 1990, the percentage change in the 
first and second ‘hpd’ remuneration plus option gain is not significantly 
related to percentage changes in share price or profitability. Furthermore, 
even the economic research that reports a statistically significant 
relationship between the ‘hpd’ remuneration and shareholder returns, 
universally found that the estimated elasticity is quantitatively very small 
(Murphy, 1985; Main et al, 1994; Conyon and Gregg, 1994).
In sum, the findings in this research are in line with some of the UK 
empirical research which found that there is no statistical relationship 
between any of the current or lagged growth of the corporate performance 
measures and growth of remuneration. These findings prompt us to reject 
the view that executive share options are used as a tool to align directors 
and shareholders' interests. Taken together these findings implicitly
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question the substance of executive share options and performance pay- 
related schemes.
Furthermore, these findings provide empirical evidence of Egginton et 
al’s (1993) claim of the inadequate level of disclosure of information 
regarding share options in the UK. Our research supports proponents of 
the view that there is a need to provide more comprehensive and regular 
information about executive share options schemes.
5.3.4 Corporate Governance
Governance is measured by the ratio of non-executive directors to total 
directors on the board. The inclusion of governance in the regression 
equations is aimed at examining whether the institutional design of the 
board of directors has a significant effect on executive remuneration. The 
main findings suggest that there is no statistical relationship between 
remuneration growth and current or one year lagged governance growth 
(Appendix 5.1). The robustness tests confirm these findings (Appendix 
5.1). Therefore, the evidence suggests that non-executives do not play a 
role in shaping remuneration.
Lack of research on the impact of non-executive directors upon total 
remuneration of the ‘hpd’ (which includes executive share options) forces 
us to use the findings based upon the nearest surrogate which is the basic 
remuneration of the top executive. From a survey of the limited literature, 
it was found that there is yet no compelling evidence regarding the 
significance of the non-executive directors on shaping senior
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92remuneration. Conyon and Leech (1994) found that non-executives 
have a depressing effect on top director pay, while Main (1991) found 
that each extra non-executive director on the board increases top 
executive pay by £4000. The inconsistency between the results could be 
attributed to the fact that each of the studies, including this one, have 
measured the non-executive role differently and consequently different 
results were obtained.
To summarise, the empirical finding in this study supports the view that 
non-executives might be the chairman’s ‘buddies’ over time (Cadbury, 
1992), as the results suggest that they do not play any significant role in 
shaping remuneration of the ‘hpd’. These findings stress a need to sharply 
define the role of the non-executive directors and improve the 
management’s accountability.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to determine whether the sum of cash salary, 
bonuses and options gains received by the ‘hpd’ are related to corporate 
acquisition, size, performance and governance. Results suggest that 
growth of current acquisition expenditure is negatively related to growth 
of current remuneration, while growth of last year’s acquisition 
expenditure is positively related to growth of current remuneration. 
However, the positive acquisition contribution in the second acquisition 
year is double the decrease in the first acquisition year. Furthermore, we 
found that the statistical significance of acquisition is sensitive to the 
acquisitiveness measure. When acquisition rate rather than acquisition 
expenditure is used, the results reveal that acquisition rate and total
92 Conyon and Leech employed salary and bonus as ‘hpd’ remuneration while Main (1991) employed 
total remuneration of the 'hpd’ which consisted of salary, bonus and share option. Lack of research in
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remuneration are insignificantly related. This implies that it is important 
to define the acquisition measure but does not weaken the acquisition 
expenditure findings. Therefore, the robustness of the relationship 
between acquisition expenditure and remuneration implies that ‘hpd’ 
might be driven by maximising managerial utilities when making 
acquisition decisions.
Furthermore, the findings suggest that corporate size, measured by sales 
growth, has a positive effect on growth of remuneration. However, the 
increase in remuneration generated from acquisition growth is over and 
above (approximately 300 percent more) the increase generated from 
sales growth. Also, results reveal that growth in ’number of employees 
'and 'capital employed' are insignificantly related to remuneration growth. 
This provides empirical evidence that sales growth is an important 
determinant of remuneration growth. Once again we need to point to the 
fact that scholars must be careful when reporting their conclusions 
regarding the statistical significance of corporate size proxies.
Our results support the view that it is difficult for shareholders and other 
investors to link the financial gains made by directors from share option 
scheme to corporate performance. As the findings in this study suggest 
that accounting and market corporate performance, measured by growth 
of profit, share price and shareholder returns, are insignificantly related 
to remuneration growth. These findings question the effectiveness of 
executive share options and performance-related pay schemes.
this area forces us to compare these two studies.
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The findings suggest that non-executive directors do not play a role in 
determining managerial remuneration. This provides empirical support 
for the need to implement one of the Cadbury Report (1992) 
recommendations that the composition of the board of directors must be 
directed towards improving management’s accountability.
Taken together, these findings implicitly point to a need to regulate the 
relationship between corporate takeover activities and executive share 
option schemes. Also the findings question the effectiveness of 
application of performance-related-pay schemes for executives. 
Furthermore, there is a need to sharply define the non-executive role. 
These recommendations and queries are hoped to be the first step in 
solving the agency problems that exist between shareholders and 
managers.
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CHAPTER 6: ‘Determinants’ Of Average Remuneration Per 
Director
The aim of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the acquisition 
motives and pay 'determinants' for an average paid director in a public 
corporation. This entails examining the relationship between growth of 
average remuneration per director as the endogenous variable, and growth 
of measures of corporate acquisition, size, performance and governance 
as the exogenous variables. The multivariate regression findings suggest 
that growth of average remuneration per director is positively and 
significantly related to growth of acquisition rate and sales and is 
insignificantly related to growth of corporate performance and 
governance.
In this chapter we will present and discuss these findings, startingwith the 
relationship between acquisition growth and growth of average 
remuneration per director, the ‘remaining’ variables will be discussed 
together as ‘the other determinants’. Before presenting the results, 
however, we will outline the analytical strategy.
6.1 Analytical Strategy
The general regression results are presented in appendices 6.1 to 6.4. In 
this chapter all regression equations are specified in 'first differences', 
consequently, variable coefficients indicate the effect of change in the 
'first difference' of a given exogenous variable on the 'first difference' of 
an endogenous variable. However, throughout the chapter we will refer to 
'the change in the first difference' by the phrase 'growth'. This will assist 
in presenting the results. Furthermore, as all the findings in this chapter
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are related to growth of the ‘average remuneration per director’,
93throughout the chapter we will refer to it as the ‘remuneration’ .We 
will start the analysis by exploring the impact of the acquisition growth 
upon remuneration growth, while holding other factors constant.
6.2 Corporate Acquisition and Average Remuneration Per Director
As we had the occasion to note, in this study we employed two measures 
of corporate acquisitive activities, ‘acquisition expenditure’ and 
‘acquisition rate’. To analyse the relationship between acquisition and 
remuneration we have divided this section into two parts. The first part, 
examines the impact of growth of acquisition expenditure upon growth of 
remuneration. The second part explores the findings for ‘acquisition rate’.
6.2.1 Acquisition Expenditure
This section examines the relationship between growth of remuneration 
and growth of acquisition expenditure. The main results using ‘partial’ 
stacking suggest that, holding other factors constant, current 
remuneration growth is positively and significantly related to current 
acquisition expenditure growth but is insignificantly related to one year or 
two years lagged acquisition expenditure growth (Appendix 6.1). The 
robustness tests, using 'full' stacking suggest that both current and one 
year lagged acquisition expenditure growth are insignificantly related to 
current remuneration growth (Appendix 6.1). The inconsistency of the 
statistical significance of acquisition expenditure growth in ‘partial’ and 
‘full’ stacking results imposes a restriction on using the result and on
93 Unless otherwise stated
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reaching a clear conclusion of the impact of acquisition growth 
expenditure upon remuneration growth94. In an attempt to reach a 
conclusion of acquisition impact on remuneration, a different measure of 
corporate acquisition is employed which is acquisition rate. In the next 
section we explore the impact of the growth of acquisition rate upon 
growth of remuneration.
6.2.2 Acquisition Rate
Acquisition rate is the ratio between acquisition expenditure and total 
investment. It indicates the ratio of ‘acquisitive growth’ to ‘total growth’. 
Results indicate that, ceteris paribus, current remuneration growth is 
insignificantly related to current or one year lagged ’acquisition rate' 
growth but significantly related to two years lagged 'acquisition rate' 
growth (Appendix 6.3). Next, we explore these statistically significant 
findings.
‘Partial stacking’ results give 5.302643 and (2.51) as the two years lagged 
acquisition rate growth coefficients and (t-statistic) respectively 
(Appendix 6.3). This suggests that, ceteris paribus, a one percent increase 
in acquisition rate growth at (t-2) is statistically associated with £5,303 
increase in remuneration growth at (t). Considering that the average 
acquisition rate growth is 3.87536 percent, (Appendix 6.2), then the 
current remuneration growth increases by £2,055 in relation to the 
average acquisition rate growth in this sample. This increase represents 18 
percent of the average remuneration growth and 3 percent of the average
94 However, when average remuneration per director is replaced by total of basic remuneration for 
all directors, the findings reveal a statistically significant relationship of acquisition expenditure in both 
‘partial’ and ‘full* stacking (Table 6.5).
83
remuneration level (Table 6.3). The robustness of these findings has been 
tested by using ‘full’ stacking (Table 6.3).
In summary, results indicate that two years lagged acquisition rate growth 
is positively and significantly associated with current remuneration 
growth. While current and lagged acquisition expenditures growths are 
insignificantly related to remuneration growth.
The finding that growth of acquisition rate, and not necessarily acquisition 
expenditure growth is an important determinant of remuneration growth, 
could suggest that the statistical significance of corporate acquisitive 
activities is sensitive to the measure of acquisition. However, in the main 
findings, ‘partial’ stacking, suggest that both acquisition rate growth and 
expenditure growth are statistically significantly related to remuneration 
growth. Robustness tests, using ‘full’ stacking’, confirm the statistical 
significance for 'acquisition rate' growth only. So the inconsistency of the 
statistical significance of the two measures of acquisition is associated 
with the robustness tests and not the main tests. Therefore, the 
inconsistency in the statistical significance of the two acquisition 
measures does not stem from the sensitivity of the acquisition measure but 
rather from the strict restrictions imposed in this study. Therefore, in this 
sample the significance of acquisition is not necessarily sensitive to the 
measure of corporate acquisitiveness. The statistical relation between 
growth of acquisition rate and growth of remuneration is clearly 
significant.
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Lack of research on the 'determinants' of average remuneration per 
director (particularly with respect to corporate acquisition activities) 
forces us to use the findings based upon the nearest surrogate which is the 
remuneration of the top executive. Using UK data for the period 1974 
through 1980, Firth (1991, 1980) found that change in senior management 
remuneration of the acquiring company increases substantially after an 
acquisition. Interestingly, the senior managers seem to gain whether the 
acquiring firm experienced positive or negative abnormal returns 
subsequent to the takeover announcement. Firth (1991) found that the 
change95 in remuneration for the highest paid director and chairman 
following a takeover bid is around £4,832 and £4,169 respectively for 
firms experiencing positive abnormal returns and £3,917 and £3,263 
respectively for firms experiencing negative abnormal returns.
Firth's findings are in contrast with Lambert and Larcker's (1987) study 
who examined 35 large corporate acquisitions in the USA for the period 
1976 through 1980. They found that in the acquiring company, the growth 
of managerial compensation and wealth96, subsequent to corporate 
acquisition, is dependent on the acquisition's effect on the stock price of 
the acquiring firm. Results suggest that there is no significant increase in 
senior management's remuneration (the top three executives) if the 
acquisition resulted in negative returns to the acquiring shareholders. The 
inconsistency between Firth (1980, 1991) and Lambert and Larcker's 
(1987) findings could be attributed to the fact the latter restricted their 
study to large acquisitions in the USA, while the former used a moderate 
measure of acquisitions in the UK. In sum, the findings in this research 
are in line with UK empirical research.
95 Measured at the median.
96 Measured as changes in executive compensation and changes in the stock holdings.
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To conclude, the findings suggest that directors may well pursue 
acquisition activities as a means to maximise their remuneration. Results 
suggest that growth of acquisition rate is positively and significantly 
associated with growth of remuneration with two years lag between 
completion of acquisition and the increase in remuneration growth. 
Furthermore, acquisition growth is not the only determinant of 
remuneration growth. The next section explores the findings for some of 
the ‘remaining pay determinants'.
6.3 'Other Determinants' of Average Remuneration Per Director
The aim of this section is to build on the acquisition results and to search 
for the statistical significance for some of the ‘remaining remuneration 
determinants’. Along with the acquisition variable on the right-hand side 
of the regression equation (Equation 3.4 in chapter 3), the ‘remaining’ 
exogenous variables can be classified into four categories. The first 
consists of one variable, lagged remuneration. The second is corporate 
size and consists of three variables; sales, number of employees and 
capital employed. The third is corporate performance and consists of 
accounting and market performance variables. The fourth is governance 
which consists of one ‘governance’ variable.
In discussing the findings, we will follow the same analytical strategy as 
in the above section. So the main analysis will be based on ‘partial’ 
stacking; while ‘full’ stacking results will be used as robustness tests. We 
start by examining the relationship between previous year’s remuneration 
and current remuneration, while holding other factors constant.
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6.3.1 Previous Year’s Remuneration
Studies that omitted this factor implicitly impose a restriction that growth 
of previous year remuneration has no effect on current remuneration. This 
study tested the validity of such restriction and found that peteris paribus, 
approximately 63 percent of current remuneration growth is dependent on 
previous year’s remuneration growth (Appendix 6.1). Robustness tests 
using 'partial' stacking confirm these findings. Therefore, current 
remuneration growth is largely dependent on previous year's remuneration 
growth.
6.3.2 Corporate Size
Corporate size has been found by many as a primary determinant of
07 • • •senior managerial remuneration . Cosh (1975) maintained that size 
alone could explain up to 49 percent of the variance in executive 
remuneration. In this study corporate size is measured by three variables, 
total sales, total number of employees and capital employed. The reason 
for incorporating three measures rather than one is to enable us to 
compare our findings and to test whether different corporate size 
measures have different effects on remuneration. The results suggest that 
sales growth is significantly related to remuneration growth while growth 
in ‘number of employees’ and ‘capital employed’ are insignificantly
97 Refer to Roberts (1956), Baumol (1962,1967), McGuire et al (1962), Cosh (1975), Hirschey and 
Pappas (1981), Benston (1985), Gomez-Mejia et al (1987), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gregg et al 
(1993).
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related to remuneration growth. The next section explores the findings for 
each corporate size measure.
Sales A survey of the economic and management literature suggest that
•  08 there is a strong link between sales and remuneration . The findings of
this study suggest that, ceteris paribus, current remuneration growth is
insignificantly related to current sales growth but is significantly related
to one year lagged sales growth. The following section explores the
significant findings.
‘Partial stacking’ results give 0.196706 and (2.153954) as the one year 
lagged sales growth coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix
6.1). This suggests that, ceteris paribus, a £1 million increase in last 
year’s sales growth is statistically associated with just under £200 
increase in current remuneration growth. Considering that the average 
sales growth is approximately £83 million (Appendix 6.2), then current 
remuneration growth increases by £1,626 in relation to the average sales 
growth. This increase represents 15 percent of the average remuneration 
growth and 2 percent of the average remuneration level (Table 6.4). The 
robustness of the findings" is tested by using ‘full’ stacking (Table 6.4).
These findings are in line with previous studies in this field. Recent UK 
studies by Main et al and Gregg et al confirm these findings. Main et al
98 McGuire et al (1962), Cosh (1975), Meeks and Wittington (1975), Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Hogan 
and McPheters (1980), Hirschey and Pappas (1981), Lewellen et al (1987), Belkaoui (1990), Gregg et 
al (1993), Conyon and Leech (1994), Main et al (1994). Note that these studies do not necessarily test 
the average remuneration per director, most of them use the top director remuneration. Nonetheless, the 
results could be used as a surrogate for average remuneration per director. Lack of research in average 
payment per director forces us to use these surrogate studies.
Also, when average remuneration per director is replaced by total of basic remuneration for all 
directors, the findings revealed that sales are the only corporate size measure that is significantly related 
to growth in directors' total remuneration (Table 6.6 and Appendix 6.5).
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(1994) conducted a study on 59 UK companies and found that changes in 
aggregate board remuneration are positively and significantly related to 
corporate sales. Gregg et al (1993) also found that a 50 percent growth of 
firm sales is statistically associated with a 10 percent growth of executive 
remuneration100.
Comparing the impact of acquisition growth upon remuneration growth 
with the impact of growth of sales upon growth of remuneration, reveals 
that the acquisition growth has a higher impact upon growth of 
remuneration. Indeed, growth of acquisition rate is related to 18 percent 
of the growth of remuneration, while growth of sales is related to 15 
percent of the growth of remuneration (Table 6.3 and 6.4). Clearly, the 
significant impact of growth of acquisition and sales upon the growth of 
the average remuneration per director suggests that directors may well 
pursue corporate acquisition activities because of the inherent premiums 
in their reward system.
In sum there is enough evidence to support the hypothesis that sales play 
an important role in determining remuneration.
Number o f  Employees & Capital Employed Along with all the above 
mentioned exogenous variables (Equation 3.4 in chapter 3), growth in 
number of employees and capital employed are regressed against 
remuneration growth. Results indicate that growth of current and one year 
lagged capital employed and number of employees are insignificantly
100 Although Gregg at al (1993) examined the top director remuneration, the results here are used as a 
surrogate for average remuneration per director. This is due to the limited research on the average 
remuneration per director.
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related to growth of current remuneration (Appendix 6.1). The robustness 
tests confirm these findings (Appendices 6.1).
Abell et al101 (1994) found that growth of average number of employees 
is insignificantly related to growth of the first and second highest paid 
directors basic remuneration. Furthermore, their study is the only one that 
used capital employed as a proxy of corporate size, and their findings are 
consistent with this study. They found that growth of capital employed 
has insignificant impact upon the growth of the first and second highest 
paid directors basic remuneration. Two plausible explanations can be 
attributed for this difference. In comparison with Abell et al's OLS 
regression equation, the statistical tests in this study were conducted 
within the framework of a more completely developed multivariate model 
designed to cope with serious statistical problems. The second factor is 
the relatively small sample used by Abell et al, 25 companies, in 
comparison with the relatively large sample in this study, 336 companies.
The finding that sales growth is the only corporate size measure that is 
significantly related to remuneration growth indicates that different 
corporate size measures have a different relationship with remuneration. 
These findings are in line with the previous chapter. This confirms our 
recommendation in the previous chapter; that scholars must be specific in 
reporting their findings. They must limit their conclusion to the corporate 
size proxy used in their study and not generalise their conclusion to all 
corporate size proxies. Concerning comparison of the corporate size
101 Abell et al (1994) examined the 'determinants' of the first and second highest paid directors 
remuneration. Their results, however, are used as a surrogate for the average remuneration per director 
as there is a very limited research on the average remuneration per director.
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signs, the insignificance of capital employed and number of employees 
imposes a restriction on implementing a comparison.
To conclude, the findings suggest that corporate size, measured by sales 
growth, is significantly related to remuneration growth while corporate 
size, measured by growth of capital employed and number of employees, 
is insignificantly related to remuneration growth. This underscores the 
need to limit the generalisation of sales findings. Next, we will explore 
the relationship between growth of corporate performance and growth of 
remuneration.
6.3.4 Corporate Performance
The managerial economic literature hypothesises that managers' pay 
should be structured in a way that aligns the interests of shareholders and 
managers to solve the principal-agent dilemma (Holmstrom, 1979, Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). It is also well established that to design such a 
contract, managers' remuneration should be partially dependent on 
corporate performance. Corporate performance measures can be divided 
into two categories, market and accounting measures. In this study the 
former is measured by profit and the latter by share price or shareholder 
returns. Market performance measures are used in separate equations.
The main regression results suggest that, ceteris paribus, growth of 
current and one year lagged profit, share price and shareholder returns are
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positively102 but insignificantly related to remuneration growth103 
(Appendix 6.1). Robustness tests confirm these findings (Appendix 6.1) 
which are consistent with Leonard104 (1990) who reports that corporate 
accounting performance, measured by returns on equity, is insignificantly 
related to managers' basic remuneration. Abell et al (1994) and Kerr and 
Bettis (1987) also found that growth of shareholder returns are
insignificantly related to changes in senior managerial basic 
remuneration. Other studies, however, found that shareholder returns have 
a significant and a positive impact upon senior managerial remuneration. 
Main, Bruce and Buck (1994) found that changes in shareholder returns 
are significantly related to changes in the aggregate board emolument; 
however the study states that the impact is small. Gregg et al (1993) found 
that during the period 1983 to 1991 the annual growth of directors' 
remuneration is 'very weakly' linked to corporate performance; indeed, 
the study reports that this relationship disappeared during the recession 
period 1988 to 1991. The empirical findings, therefore, suggest that at 
best shareholder returns have a weak impact upon remuneration.
To conclude, the findings in this study suggest that current remuneration 
growth is not related to current or lagged growth of accounting or market 
performance measures. These findings highlight the inconsistency 
between the theory and the practice of the structure of managerial 
remuneration. These results, therefore, along with previous chapter’s, 
provide empirical evidence that the current system of managerial pay
102 Except in a few cases, the relationship is negative.
103 However, when average remuneration per director was replaced by growth of total of basic 
remuneration of all the directors, the findings revealed a statistically significant relationship between 
share price and remuneration. Results indicate that current growth in share price is significantly related 
to current growth of total remuneration of the directors (Table 6.7).
104 Leonard (1990) conducted a study on 439 managers' cash salary and bonus between 1981 and 1985.
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'determinants’ does not align the shareholders' and managers' interests. 
This finding strongly calls into question the effectiveness of the current 
system of pay 'determinants' for the managerial team. The next section 
explores the findings for 'governance'.
3.5 Corporate Governance
Governance is measured by the ratio of non-executive directors to total 
directors on the board. ’Partial’ stacking results suggest that, ceteris 
paribus, there is no relationship between remuneration growth and 
governance growth105 (Appendix 6.1) Also, the robustness tests, using 
‘full’ stacking, confirm the insignificance of governance growth upon 
remuneration growth (Appendix 6.1). There is no previous study that 
links directors' remuneration growth and governance growth. It is also, 
difficult to compare these results with research that examined the top 
director remuneration, because there is no conclusive evidence from 
previous research. As we had the occasion to note, Conyon and Leech 
(1994) found that non-executives have a depressing effect on top 
executive pay, while Main (1991) found that each extra non-executive 
director on the board increases top executive pay by £4000. The 
inconsistency between the findings of this study and previous empirical 
findings could be attributed to the fact that each of the studies cited above 
employed different measure of the ‘non-executive governance’, and hence 
reached different conclusions.
105 'Partial stacking' results reveal that one year lagged governance is significantly related to 
remuneration in Version IV regression equation only (Appendix 6.4). However, this significance 
disappears in the main findings, that is in Version I regression equation (Appendix 6.1).
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In summary, the evidence in this study suggests that the growth of the 
non-executives directors, is not an important factor in shaping 
remuneration growth.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter provided empirical tests of the relationship between the 
growth of the average remuneration of all the senior policy-makers in a 
company and the growth of corporate acquisition activities, performance, 
size and governance. Clear conclusions regarding the 'determinants' of 
remuneration emerge from this analysis. The findings establish that 
directors benefit from an increase in two year’s lagged acquisition rate 
growth and one year lagged sales growth. While growth of current and 
one year lagged capital employed, number of employees, profit, share 
price, shareholder returns and governance have insignificant relationships 
with current remuneration growth.
Growth of sales showed up as a variable that has a strong influence on the 
growth of average remuneration per director. The findings of a 
succession of previous empirical studies also concluded that it is in the 
directors' personal financial interest to pursue corporate growth. In this 
study, therefore, we examined the hypothesis that directors use the most 
rapid growth mechanism, acquisition, to optimise their own financial 
returns. The results suggests that the impact of average acquisition growth 
is higher than the impact of average sales growth upon the growth of the 
average remuneration per director.
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Clearly, the significant impact of growth of acquisition and sales upon the 
growth of the average remuneration per director suggests that directors 
may well pursue corporate acquisition activities because of the inherent 
premiums in their reward system. The results, however, do not suggest 
that acquisition activities are not in the shareholders interests, but rather 
that the directors' financial rewards are highly related to acquisition 
activities even after controlling for the inherent increase in post­
acquisition corporate size. These findings suggest a need for a 
fundamental re-thinking of directors' motives behind acquisition 
decisions.
Furthermore, the findings suggest that different corporate size measures 
have different relationship with growth of remuneration. Remuneration is 
significantly related to sales growth and is insignificantly related to 
growth of number of employees and capital employed. This provides 
empirical evidence that studies must be specific about variables when 
reporting their conclusions.
The findings also, reveal a discrepancy between the theory and the 
application of performance-related-pay. Although theories suggest 
positively linking senior management pay and corporate performance, 
empirical results in this study revealed that in fact directors are not 
rewarded nor punished for changes in corporate performance. These 
results suggest that the owners cannot effectively monitor the rewards 
received by their agents and hence there is no alignment of interest 
between the shareholders and managers.
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The results also, suggest the failure of another control mechanism, the 
non-executive directors. Empirical findings suggest that the growth of the 
ratio between non-executive and total directors on the board is 
insignificantly related to growth of average remuneration per director. 
This finding reveals a need to question the non-executives' role and points 
to a need to have a regulatory system that improves management's 
accountability.
Taken together, the findings, queries and recommendations of this chapter 
are in line with the previous one. The findings implicitly point to a need to 
investigate the relationship between corporate takeover activities and 
remuneration. There is a need to account for the lack of a significant 
impact of corporate performance and governance ratio upon directors’ 
remuneration. These recommendations and queries prompt a need for a 
mandatory framework aiming at improving management's accountability 
and narrowing the gulf between shareholders' and managers' interests.
96
CHAPTER 7: 'Determinants* Of Average Remuneration Per 
Employee
Corporate acquisitions and restructuring activities have increased since 
the beginning of the last decade. During this period, acquisitions’ 
purposes, motives, contributions, and impact have been at the centre of 
controversy among managers, public policy-makers and scholars. There 
is, however, limited knowledge of the impact of acquisition on 
employees. The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to develop an 
understanding of the impact of acquisition on employee remuneration; the 
second is to search for the significance of additional organisational factors 
that effect of employee remuneration. This is achieved by examining the 
relationship between growth of average remuneration per employee as the 
endogenous variable, and growth of corporate acquisition, size, 
performance and governance as the exogenous variables. Generally, the 
multivariate regression findings reveal that sales growth is advantageous 
to employees while the growth in number of employees, shareholder 
returns and governance are detrimental. Furthermore, growth of 
acquisition, profit, share price and capital employed seem not to have any 
significant monetary effects on employees average remuneration growth. 
In this chapter we will present and discuss these findings, starting with 
the impact of acquisition upon average remuneration per employee, the 
remaining variables will be discussed together as ‘the other determinants’. 
Before presenting the results, however, we will outline the analytical 
strategy.
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7.1 Analytical Strategy
The general regression results are presented in appendices 7.1 to 7.4. 
Furthermore, in this chapter all regression equations are specified in 'first 
differences'. Consequently, variable coefficients indicate the effect of 
change in the 'first difference' of a given exogenous variable on the 'first 
difference' of an endogenous variable. However, throughout the chapter 
we will refer to 'the change in the first difference' as 'growth'. This will 
assist in presenting the results. Furthermore, as all the findings in this 
chapter are related to growth of ‘average remuneration per employee’106, 
throughout the chapter we will refer to it as the ‘remuneration’.We will 
start the analysis by exploring the relationship between acquisition and 
remuneration, while holding other factors constant.
7.2 Corporate Acquisition & Average Remuneration Per Employee
As we had the occasion to note, in this study there are two measures of 
corporate acquisitive activities, ‘acquisition expenditure’ and ‘acquisition
1H7rate’ . To analyse the relationship between acquisition and 
remuneration we have divided this section into three parts. The first part 
examines the relationship between growth of acquisition expenditure and 
remuneration. The second part explores the findings for ‘acquisition rate’. 
The third part relates the findings of this study to the findings of previous 
studies. As in the previous analysis chapters, the main findings are based 
on ‘partial' stacking while ‘full’ stacking results are used as robustness 
tests.
106 Unless otherwise stated.
107 Note that the two measures of acquisition are used in separate regression equations.
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7.2.1 Acquisition Expenditure
This section examines the relationship between remuneration and 
acquisition expenditure. Results suggest that, holding other factors 
constant, there is an insignificant relationship between current 
acquisition expenditure growth and current remuneration growth
(Appendix 7.1). To investigate the relationship further, acquisition growth
• 108is pushed back in time by one, two and three years . Results are in line
with the above findings that, ceteris paribus, there is an insignificant
relationship between current remuneration growth and lagged acquisition
expenditure growth (Appendix 7.1). The robustness tests confirm these
findings109 (Appendix 7.1). The next section examines whether these
results are invariant to alternative measures of acquisition.
7.2.2 Acquisition Rate
Acquisition rate is the ratio between acquisition expenditure and total 
investment. It indicates the ratio of ‘acquisitive growth’ to ‘total growth’. 
We ran the same regression equations (Equation 3.4 in chapter 3), as 
above, replacing the ‘acquisition expenditure’ variable by ‘acquisition 
rate’. Results suggest that, ceteris paribus, current and one, two and three 
years lagged acquisition rate growth are insignificantly related to current 
remuneration growth (Appendix 7.3). The robustness tests confirm these 
findings (Appendix 7.3).
108 In separate regression equations.
109 Furthermore, we examined the relationship between total of basic remuneration for all employees 
and acquisition expenditure. The main results using 'partial' stacking suggest that there is a negative and 
a statistically significant relationship between the remuneration’ and ‘acquisition expenditure’. 
However, the robustness tests, ‘full’ stacking’, shows an insignificant relationship (Appendix 7.5).
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In summary, results suggest that both acquisition expenditure growth and 
acquisition rate growth are insignificantly related to current remuneration 
growth. We could infer that acquisition growth has no effect on 
remuneration growth and that the statistical significance of corporate 
acquisitiveness is not sensitive to the two measures of acquisition used in 
the study.
These findings are inconsistent with a US study; Brown and Medoff
(1991) found that mergers and acquisition are associated with employee 
wage decline of about 4 percent110. The inconsistency between our results 
and Brown and Medoff s could be attributed to two factors. The first is 
that their data deals exclusively with employment in only one state, 
Michigan, while our data is based on UK-FT All Share Index companies. 
The second is that approximately two thirds of their data is based on small 
and service companies while our data represents large companies and is 
spread over a broad spectrum of industry categories. This implies that 
their results are not comparable to ours and that their results might give a 
misleading picture of the distribution of employment in acquisitive 
companies and hence the effect of acquisition on wages and employment 
(Farber, 1988).
On the other hand, our findings are in line with a UK study conducted by 
Morgan et al (1990). The study is based on a survey in which investment 
managers were asked to indicate the importance of various factors that 
influence acquisition decision-making on a four point scale111.
110 Along with employment growth of about 2 percent
111 The four scale points are ‘very’, ‘moderate’, little’ or ‘none’
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Interestingly, their results revealed that about 75 percent of the 
respondents regarded acquisition impact on employment in the region of 
‘little’ or ‘no’ importance. Only one percent of the respondents regarded 
this impact as 'very' important. The scales used in the study can be 
criticised for being too broadly inclusive and hence subjective. Also, the 
study does not specify the type of impact, monetary or non-monetary. 
However, this ‘broadness’ of the terms used in the study could be seen as 
a strength. It established that none of the impact of acquisition on 
employment is considered by decision makers when taking acquisition 
decision. Indeed, our empirical findings are in line with Morgan's 
findings. Our results however, only indicate that acquisition does not 
necessarily lower the employees’ average financial rewards, but there 
could be other non-monetary impact on labour and society.
112Based on an in-depth field study of 300 interviews , Haspeslagh and 
Jameson (1991) found that acquisition causes destruction of ‘psychic’ 
values for the employees like job satisfaction, career opportunities, status,
• 113and pride of association. These consequences de-motivate employees 
and hence reduce the prospect of creating economic value for the 
acquiring firm’s shareholders. Furthermore, de-motivation could result in 
a reduction in post-ownership productivity. Indeed, Lichtenberg and 
Siegel (1987) showed that most of the firms whose ownership changed 
were performing poorly in terms of (total factor) productivity. The post­
takeover change in productivity of these firms was at least 4 percent lower 
than that of other plants in the same industries. Although, the study did 
not specifically isolate the non-monetary acquisition impact on employees
112 •  • •  •In acquisitive companies.
113 Along with reduction in economic rewards (Haspeslagh and Jameson, 1991).
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and productivity114, their findings could be viewed as starting evidence 
that acquisition could contribute to lowering productivity115. Acquisition, 
therefore, may have impending consequences to employees beyond the 
financial rewards. It also could result in high unemployment and thus 
negative effects in labour market.
The results in this research suggest that there is no monetary impact of 
acquisition growth on employees remuneration growth. While this issue is 
clearly important, there are other acquisition consequences that should be 
considered alongside the monetary impact. Acquisition could cause 
‘psychic’ changes, de-motivation for the employee consequently lower 
productivity. Understanding non-monetary acquisition impact on 
employees and society, therefore, is as important as understanding the 
monetary impact. However, acquisition is not the only factor that could 
effect remuneration. In the next section we will explore some of the 
organisational factors that affect remuneration.
7.3 Other Organisational Factors that Effect Average Remuneration 
Per Employee
The aim of this section is to build on the acquisition results and to find the 
significance of some additional organisational factors that effect 
remuneration116. Along with the acquisition variable on the right-hand 
side of the regression equation [Equation 3.4 in chapter 3], the 
‘remaining’ exogenous variables can be classified into four categories.
114 Which is very difficult to quantify
115 This opens a new research niche: studying the non-monetary impact of acquisition on employees.
116 We do not claim that the factors discussed in this chapter are exhaustive of the organisational factors 
that effect employee remuneration but rather it is an attempt to find the relationship between the growth 
of specific organisational factors and the growth of the average remuneration per employee.
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The first consists of one variable, lagged remuneration. The second is 
corporate size and consists of three variables; sales, number of 
employees and capital employed. The third is corporate performance and 
consists of accounting and market performance variables. The fourth is 
governance which consists of one ‘governance’ variable.
In discussing the findings, we will follow the same analytical strategy as 
in the above section. The main analysis will be based on ‘partial’ stacking
117while ‘full’ stacking results will be used as robustness tests . We start 
by examining the relationship between previous year’s remuneration and 
current remuneration, while holding other factors constant.
7.3.1 Previous Year’s Remuneration
Results suggest that there is no statistical relationship between growth of 
current remuneration and growth of last year’s remuneration (Appendix
7.1). The robustness tests confirm this result (Appendix 7.1). This implies 
that there are other factors that determine remuneration growth. The next 
section examines the impact of growth of corporate size measures upon 
the growth of remuneration.
7.3.2 Corporate Size
Corporate size is represented by three measures, total sales, total number 
of employees and capital employed. The reason for incorporating the 
three measures rather than one, is to enable us to compare our findings 
and to test whether different corporate size measures have different 
impact on remuneration. The following section is our attempt to analyse
1,7 Refer to Appendix 3.9 for explanation of the stacking techniques.
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the relationship between corporate size measures and remuneration, 
starting with sales.
Sales The sales variable is the most commonly used measure of corporate 
118size . Our results indicate that current remuneration growth is positively 
and significantly related to current sales growth and is insignificantly 
related to lagged sales growth119 (Appendix 7.1).
‘Partial stacking’ results give 0.003639 and (2.358689) as the current 
sales growth coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 7.1). This 
implies that, ceteris paribus, a £1 million increase in current sales growth 
is related to £3.6 increase in current remuneration growth. Considering 
that the average sales growth at time (t) is £93,721,160 (Table 7.2) then 
current remuneration grows by £337 in relation to the average sales 
growth in the same period. This increase represents 34 percent of the 
average growth of remuneration and 3 percent of the average 
remuneration level (Table 7.3). The robustness tests using •full1 stacking 
are in line with these findings (Appendix 7.1).
In summary, the results suggest a statistically significant link between 
current remuneration growth and current sales growth and an insignificant 
relationship with lagged sales growth. Although the impact of sales on 
remuneration growth is small, the average sales growth contribution is
118 Sales is used as a measure of corporate size in the following studies: McGuire et al (1962), Cosh 
(1975), Meeks and Wittington (1975), Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Hogan and McPheters (1980), 
Hirschey and Pappas (1981), Lewellen et al (1987), Belkaoui (1990), Gregg et al (1993), Conyon and 
Leech (1994), Main et al (1994).
119 We run further tests using total of basic remuneration for all employees as the endogenous variable. 
Results indicate that the current remuneration is positively and significantly related to current sales and 
insignificantly related to one year lagged sales (Table 7.5).
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large; it represents 34 percent of average remuneration growth (Table 
7.3).
Number o f Employees This variable is defined as the total number of 
domestic and overseas employees, including part-time employees, when 
available. Kaufman (1992) and Abell et al120 (1994) used the number of 
employees as a proxy of corporate size. Our results suggest that, holding 
other factors constant, current remuneration growth is negatively and 
significantly related to current number of employees growth and is 
insignificantly related to lagged number of employees growth (Appendix
7.1). Next we will explore the significant results.
‘Partial’ stacking results give -0.541 (-2.44726) as the growth in current 
number of employees coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix
7.1). This suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 1000 increase in current 
number of employees growth is related to a £541 decrease in current 
remuneration growth. Considering that the average number of employees 
growth is 381 (Table 7.2), then remuneration growth decreases by £206 
in relation to the average number of employees growth. This decrease 
represents 20 percent of the average growth of remuneration and 2 
percent of the average remuneration level (Table 7.4). The robustness of 
these findings has been tested by using ‘full’ stacking (Table 7.4).
120 The Abell et al (1994) results will not be discussed in this chapter as they examined directors’ rather 
than employees’ remuneration
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In summary, results indicate that an increase in current number of 
121employees growth has detrimental effect on current remuneration 
growth. Interestingly, Kaufman (1992) found that firm size measured by 
number of workers is inversely related to productivity gains. His results 
suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent increase in firm size, evaluated
at the median employment level, is statistically related to a 0.5 percent
122reduction in productivity gain. By combining our findings with 
Kaufman's we can infer that the increase in number of employees is 
inversely related to growth of average remuneration per employee and 
productivity.
The overall findings suggest that labour tends to benefit from an increase 
in sales growth and lose from growth in the number of employees.
Capital Employed This variable reflects the full value of resources 
available for management throughout the year and is an indicator of 
corporate size. Abell et al (1994) used capital employed as a measure of 
corporate size123. Our main findings indicate that there is an insignificant 
relationship between growth of current remuneration and growth of 
current capital employed growth (Appendix 7.1). To investigate the 
relationship further, capital employed growth is pushed back by one year. 
The results confirm the insignificant relationship between current 
remuneration and lagged capital employed (Appendix 7.1). The 
robustness of the findings has been tested by using ‘full’ stacking 
(Appendix 7.1)
121 When we regressed growth of total of basic remuneration for all employees against growth of 
number of employees, while holding other factors constant, growth of number of employees remained 
statistically significant (Table 7.8).
122 Measured by multi-factors.
123 Main (1991) used assets employed and Cosh (1975) used net assets as measures of corporate size.
106
The findings for the three corporate size measures can be compared by 
their statistical significance and sign. The findings that sales and capital 
employed growth are the only corporate size measures that are related to 
remuneration growth indicates that different corporate size measures have 
different relationship with remuneration growth124. This confirms our 
recommendation in the previous two chapters; that studies must be 
specific when reporting their findings regarding corporate size measures. 
Scholars must limit their conclusion to the corporate size proxy used in 
their study and not generalise their conclusion to all corporate size 
proxies. Concerning comparison of the corporate size signs, the 
insignificance of 'capital employed' imposes a restriction on using the 
results. However, the other measures of corporate size are significantly 
related to growth of remuneration. The growth of sales is positively 
related while the growth of the number of employees is negatively related 
to remuneration growth. Furthermore, the results suggest that growth of 
capital employed is insignificantly related to growth of remuneration.
7.3.3 Corporate Performance
Corporate performance measures can be divided into two categories, 
market and accounting measures. In this study the former is measured by 
profit and the latter by share price or shareholder returns. Market 
performance measures are used in separate equations.
The main regression results suggest that current and one year lagged 
profit and share price growth are insignificantly related to remuneration
124 This is in line with the findings of the relationship between average director remuneration and the 
three measures of corporate size.
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growth (Appendix 7.1). Robustness tests confirm these findings 
(Appendix 7.1). However, results indicate that growth of shareholder 
returns are significantly related to remuneration growth (Appendix 7.2). 
The following section explores shareholder returns growth relationship to 
remuneration growth, while holding other factors constant.
‘Partial stacking’ result gives -0.12871 (-2.8175) as the current 
shareholder returns growth coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively 
(Appendix 7.2). This implies that, ceteris paribus, a 100 percentage 
increase in current shareholder returns growth is related to £129 decrease 
in current remuneration growth. To assess this contribution we can relate 
it to average shareholder returns growth in this sample. The average 
shareholder returns growth is -0.03066 (Appendix 1.4). This implies that, 
ceteris paribus, current remuneration growth decreases by £4 in relation 
to the average current shareholders return growth. This decrease 
represents 0.4 percent of the average remuneration growth and 0.04 
percent of the average remuneration level (Table 7.5). The robustness of 
this finding has been tested by using ‘full’ stacking’ (Appendix 7.2).
To investigate this relationship further, we pushed back all exogenous 
variables by one year. We found that this negative and significant 
relationship between lagged shareholder returns growth and current 
remuneration growth persists (Appendix 7.2). Results suggest that, ceteris 
paribus, a 100 percentage increase in one year lagged shareholder returns 
growth is related to a decrease of £938 current remuneration growth. To 
assess this contribution we can relate it to average shareholder returns 
growth in this sample. Considering that the average shareholder returns
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are (-0.04216), then current remuneration growth decreases by £40 in 
relation to the average one year lagged shareholders return growth. This 
decrease represents 4 percent of the average remuneration growth and 0.4 
percent of the average remuneration level (Table 7.5). The robustness of 
this finding has been tested by using ‘full’ stacking’ (Appendix 7.2).
To conclude, the results suggest that current and one year lagged 
shareholder returns growth have a negative impact upon growth of 
average remuneration per employee. However, the magnitude of 
shareholder returns growth contribution to remuneration growth is small. 
Moreover, results suggest that both current and one year lagged profit and 
share price growth are insignificantly related to remuneration growth. 
These findings could indicates the non-existence of (non-managerial) 
performance-related-pay. Indeed, there are two opposite views regarding 
using performance-related pay schemes for employees. Proponents of 
such plans argue that these plans lead to diminished agency costs in the 
same way as managerial incentive plans do (Conte, 1992). Opponents 
argue that the performance of an employee does not effect corporate 
performance because an individual's stake in a company is too small 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1962; Jensen and Meckling, 1979). Indeed our 
empirical results suggest that the latter argument applies, as the results in
125this research suggest that employees’ average remuneration is either 
negatively or insignificantly related to corporate performance. Also,
126 127Conte found that generally the contingent parts of employee pay do 
not improve the relationship between employee pay and company
125 Depending on the measure of corporate performance.
126 Conte (1992) examined 5500 non-managerial (employee) pay in the USA.
127 The contingent component of non-managerial pay is measured by the employee stock ownership and 
profit-sharing plans.
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128performance . However, Conte (1992) also found that the earnings of 
companies with a high degree of performance related pay do seem to 
outperform companies with less of such pay. Furthermore, Kaufman
(1992) found a strong relationship between corporate productivity and a 
specific type of incentive, IMPROSHARE129. He found that productivity 
increased in companies that implemented this plan. During the first year 
the median productivity increase was about 8 percent and during the third 
year the cumulative productivity gain increased to 17.5 percent. This 
positive view is confirmed by Mitchell et al (1990) who found that profit 
sharing and employee sharing ownership plans (ESOPs) are positively 
related to corporate productivity, even after controlling for economic and 
non-economic participating factors. Also, a UK study conducted by 
Carruth and Oswald (1989) found that during the period 1954 to 1983, 
changes in employee remuneration are associated with changes in 
profitability. These empirical findings suggest that companies could 
benefit from strengthening the link between employee remuneration and 
organisational performance.
7.3.4 Corporate Governance
Governance is measured by the ratio of non-executive directors to total 
directors. ‘Partial’ stacking results suggests that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between remuneration growth and governance 
growth (Appendix 7.1). Results indicate that current and one year lagged 
governance growth have curtailing effects on current remuneration
128 Measured by corporate earnings.
129 IMPROSHARE is a group incentive plan in which employee compensation is linked via an explicit 
formula to some measure of corporate performance. The study was conducted on 122 companies via a 
questionnaire.
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growth (Appendix 7.1). The significant findings are explored in the next 
section..
‘Partial’ stacking results give -0.21076 (-3.11072) as the current 
governance growth coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix
7.1). This implies that, holding other factors constant, a 1 percent increase 
in governance growth is related to £211 decrease in remuneration growth. 
Considering that the average governance growth is 0.98074 percent, then 
current remuneration decreases by £207 in relation to the average current 
governance. This decrease represents 21 percent of the average 
remuneration growth and 2 percent of the average remuneration level 
(Table 7.6). The robustness of this finding has been tested by using ‘full’ 
stacking’ (Appendix 7.1).
Furthermore, when governance growth was pushed back by one year, this 
significant and negative relationship persisted. ‘Partial’ stacking results 
give -0.30762 and (-3.70759) as the one year lagged governance growth 
coefficient and (t-statistic) respectively (Appendix 7.1). This implies that, 
holding other factors constant, a 1 percent increase in governance growth 
is related to £308 decrease in remuneration growth. Considering that the 
average governance growth is 0.37159 percent, current remuneration 
decreases by £144 in relation to the average current governance. This 
decrease represents 11 percent of the average remuneration growth and 1 
percent of the average remuneration level (Table 7.6). The robustness of 
this finding has been tested by using ‘full’ stacking’ (Appendix 7.1).
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To conclude, results indicate that current and one year lagged governance 
growth have significant and negative impact on employees remuneration 
growth. By contrast, in the previous three analysis chapters, results 
suggested that governance growth has no effect on the growth of both 
highest paid director and directors remuneration. The results of this 
research, therefore, support the view that governance growth has a 
curtailing effect on employee remuneration growth only.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined the relationship between growth of remuneration 
and growth in corporate acquisition activities, size, performance and 
governance. Clear conclusions regarding the organisational factors that 
effect employees average remuneration emerge from this analysis. The 
findings strongly suggest that growth of average paid employee 
unambiguously and invariably benefits from growth of corporate sales 
and suffers from growth in number of employees, shareholder returns and 
governance. Our results also suggest that growth of last year’s average 
remuneration, capital employed, profit and corporate acquisition activities 
have insignificant effects on growth of average remuneration per 
employee.
The findings discredit the view that acquisition implies impending 
consequences for employees’ monetary rewards. Both acquisition 
expenditure and rate have no impact on the growth of employees 
monetary rewards. However, there are other non-monetary acquisition 
consequences that should be considered alongside the monetary impact.
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Acquisition could cause ‘psychic* changes, de-motivation and lower 
productivity for the people who are expected to implement the 
management strategies that supposedly aim to create the maximum 
possible value for the shareholders. Understanding the non-monetary 
impact of acquisition on employees and society, therefore, is as important 
as understanding the monetary impact. This requires managers and 
policy-makers to start considering the monetary and non-monetary impact 
of corporate acquisition activities on the employees.
The striking difference in the sign and the statistical significance among 
the three measures of corporate size and growth of average remuneration 
per employee indicate that it is important to specifying the measure of 
corporate size when reporting the findings regarding corporate size. 
Empirical findings in this study revealed that growth of sales and number 
of employees are both significantly related to growth of employees 
average remuneration per employee, but in different directions. The 
former is positively and the latter is negatively related to growth of 
average remuneration per employees. Our results also suggest that capital 
employed is not related to growth of average remuneration per employee. 
Furthermore, the conclusion that increases in number of employees, 
which is usually associated with acquisition activities, has a curtailing 
effect on growth of average remuneration per employee suggests that 
acquisition might have an indirect effect the remuneration. These findings 
suggest the need for a study that compares employee remuneration before 
and after acquisition, while controlling for number of employees and 
other organisational factors.
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This study reveals a discrepancy between the theory and the application 
of economic theories of efficient employee pay. Although management 
and economic theories suggest positively linking pay and corporate 
performance, empirical results in this study suggest that in reality the 
employees are either punished or not rewarded for improvement in 
corporate performance. Our findings established that growth of average 
remuneration per employee is significantly but negatively linked to 
market corporate performance, measured by growth of shareholder 
returns; and is insignificantly related to market and accounting 
performance measured by growth of share price or profit. These findings 
clearly expose the inconsistency between the theory and application of 
employee efficient pay and hence implicitly question the current method 
of determining employee remuneration.
Our research also provides empirical evidence on a contemporary issue, 
corporate governance. Our results established that increase in corporate 
governance growth has a detrimental effect on employees’ average 
remuneration growth. Interestingly results in the previous chapters 
suggest that governance growth is insignificantly related to growth of the 
remuneration of the highest paid director and the average paid director. 
The contrast in these findings reveals a need to question the non- 
executives' role. The findings suggest that they control the growth of 
employees ’ remuneration but not directors ’.
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusion and Recommendations
The research reported in this thesis attempts to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of managerial motives in the market for corporate control 
by statistically measuring the impact of corporate acquisition activities 
upon the managerial monetary rewards in the acquiring company, while 
controlling for corporate size, performance and the number of non­
executive directors on the board of directors (BOD). The study also 
explores the impact of corporate involvement in takeover activities upon 
the non-managerial remuneration. In addition, the study attempts to 
develop a deeper understanding of the relationship that various studies 
have found, between remuneration - managerial and non-managerial - 
and corporate size, performance and the number of non-executive 
directors on the BOD.
The research data is based on public companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange in the FT-ALL Share Index list, for the period 1980 
through 1992. The statistical analysis is conducted using first-differences 
and Arellano and Bond's Generalised Method of Moments estimators, 
after accounting for some of the statistical problems encountered when 
modelling the data. Growth of managerial and non-managerial 
remuneration measures are regressed separately onto a common set of 
exogenous variables. The present study attempts to put the controversy 
concerning top managerial remuneration in the economic theory of the 
firm in a balanced perspective.
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The primary and indisputable conclusion of the study is that corporate 
acquisition activities, as measured by either total acquisition expenditure 
or acquisition rate, is strongly and positively related to managerial 
remuneration. The analysis isolates a robust positive and significant 
relationship between growth of corporate acquisition and growth of the 
highest paid director's basic and total remuneration and growth of average 
remuneration per director. Furthermore, the findings suggest that there is 
no significant relationship between growth of corporate acquisition 
activities and growth of average remuneration per employee. The clear 
inference is that there is a financial incentive for the management of the 
acquiring companies to be involved in corporate acquisition activities. 
Although the legitimate aim of the market for corporate control is to 
alleviate the agency problems, created by the increasing separation of 
ownership and control in today’s organisations, it seems that it has also 
provided corporate decision-makers with a mechanism which they exploit 
by pursuing their own economic self-interest. It could, therefore, be 
argued that although corporate takeovers aim to prevent managers from 
taking investment decisions that do not lead to an increase in shareholder 
welfare, they have been ‘manipulated’ to serve managerial self-interest. 
The findings of the study reported in this thesis could therefore suggest 
that value maximisation goals of corporate takeovers such as synergy, 
increasing shareholder returns, improving corporate productivity and 
replacing inefficient management are not necessarily the only merger 
motives. Variation in managerial monetary rewards can provide adequate 
explanation of takeovers motives. Indeed, the results of this study show 
that corporate takeovers are indeed one of the mechanisms used to fulfil 
managerial desire for increase in their pecuniary rewards. The evidence,
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therefore, provides empirical support for the managerial utility theory 
which states that corporate involvement in acquisition activities, as an 
acquiring company, is driven by managerial motive. This argument is 
further supported by a second finding of the study.
Our findings suggest that growth of corporate size, measured by growth 
of sales, is positively and significantly related to the growth of the highest 
paid director's total remuneration and the average remuneration per 
director and employee. These results are in line with the findings of the 
majority of the research in this area and hence provide support for the 
sales maximisation hypothesis which states that managers are concerned 
with increasing corporate size, subject to attaining at least a survival 
profit130.
Indeed, the findings that both growth of acquisition and sales have a 
positive impact upon the growth of managerial remuneration, could 
indicate that corporate involvement in acquisition, might be driven by 
advantages of corporate size and the consequent higher growth of 
managerial remuneration. The evidence presented in this study, therefore, 
could be interpreted as support for the view that there is a greater 
incentive for management to shape their decisions in a manner consistent 
with the sales maximisation rather than the profit maximisation theories. 
These results prompt a need for a fundamental re-thinking of managers’ 
motives in corporate acquisitions.
130 Although this study did not specifically examine the notion that organisations obtain ‘survival’ 
profit, intuitively, we could assume so, as otherwise the organisation would have gone into solvency or 
if we assume a perfectly effective market for corporate control, the company would have been taken- 
over.
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The empirical results also suggest that the growth of non-managerial 
remuneration is positively related to the growth of corporate sales and 
negatively related to the growth in number of employees while growth of 
capital employed has no significant impact upon growth of non- 
managerial remuneration.
As we already had the occasion to observe, there is a striking difference in 
the sign and the statistical significance of the three measures of corporate 
size upon remuneration which implies that scholars must be careful in 
reporting their conclusions on the significance of the ‘corporate size’ used 
in their studies and not generalise their conclusions to all corporate size 
measures.
The third conclusion of this study revolves around the impact of corporate 
performance on managerial and non-managerial remuneration. Although, 
the results clearly suggest that growth of shareholder returns are 
positively related to growth of the basic remuneration received by the 
highest paid director and of non-managerial remuneration, the magnitude 
of the coefficient is small. These findings are in line with a large number 
of studies in this area. In addition, the findings suggest that there is no 
statistical relationship between the other two measures of corporate 
performance - growth of aggregate annual share price and growth of pre­
tax profit - and the growth of managerial remuneration, including the 
highest paid director's total remuneration. The results clearly imply that 
managers’ financial interests are not aligned with shareholders' interest 
and hence are not in line with the propositions of the profit maximisation 
hypothesis. What is more striking is that the results clearly imply that 
there is no link between the financial gains made by the highest paid
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director from share option schemes and corporate performance. This is an 
indication that managerial performance-related-pay through executive 
share options is not working or is mis-used.
The fourth conclusion revolves around the impact of the growth in the 
number of non-executive directors on the board and the managerial and 
the non-managerial remuneration. The results suggest that the growth in 
the number of non-executive directors has a significantly detrimental 
effect upon the growth of non-managerial remuneration but has no 
significant effect on the growth of managerial remuneration. Non­
executive directors should ensure an alignment between the growth of 
managerial remuneration, particularly the gains from executive share 
options and the growth of corporate performance. It is alarming therefore, 
to find no significant link between the financial gains made by the highest 
paid director - including executive share options - and corporate 
performance.
Taken together the findings of the study reported in this thesis is 
consistent with the maximisation of senior management’s utility being an 
important motive in corporate acquisition decisions. There is therefore a 
clear need for a proper institutional arrangement that ensures that the 
growth and the structure of managerial remuneration are in line with 
corporate performance.
Shareholders and policy-makers should be concerned about these 
findings. The results highlight the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers and imply that shareholders might be
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receiving lower returns than the maximum possible on their investment. 
From a public policy perspective the result invites a public debate upon 
the social costs of the market for corporate control. We do not argue that 
takeovers are necessarily harmful to shareholders but rather that 
managerial incentives should take account of the changes in shareholders’ 
wealth against the propensity to seek rapid growth. At the very least, the 
results reported in this thesis strongly suggest a need for greater control 
over the decision-making, concerning acquisition, and for tighter 
regulations of managerial remuneration. The following section 
summarises some recommendations that could be considered by policy­
makers and shareholders.
Shareholders must first clearly define the purpose of remuneration and 
accordingly formulate a remuneration policy. Remuneration can be used 
as (1) a motivator, (2) a reward for performance, (3) a form of 
recognition (Ackley, 1993), (4) a means of aligning shareholder and 
executive interests or (5) a combination of these purposes. The purpose of 
remuneration is not necessarily uniform for all companies, rather 
corporate strategies, should dictate the role of remuneration. It is perhaps 
important nonetheless to ensure that the formulation of a remuneration 
policy by each company is in line with a broad common framework. In 
my opinion, the least action that should be taken in the UK, is to follow 
the practice in the US where non-managerial directors are elected by 
shareholders rather than, as it is customary in the UK, by executive 
directors.
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Shareholders could request a complete and detailed disclosure of the 
components of all the remuneration of all directors in the annual financial 
statement. Also, they could request a disclosure of whether or not the 
stock-based remuneration component is linked to current or future 
performance targets. In moving to a pay-for-performance approach, 
companies should define the exact performance measures, the amount of 
pay and the proper delivery system (Thakarar, 1993). The system should 
filter out factors beyond the directors and employee control. Also, 
shareholders must be advised before the completion of corporate 
acquisition of the anticipated changes in corporate performance, and in 
directors’ and employees’ remuneration.
In addition, shareholders of UK public companies could follow the USA
practice where the Financial Accounting Standard Board has issued a 
1^1statement that encourages, but does not enforce, companies to value 
and show compensation, grants of stock, stock options and other equity 
instruments as expenses at the end of each financial year. (Harrison et al, 
1996). These steps would enable shareholders and policy-makers to more 
accurately assess the relationship between remuneration and corporate 
acquisition.
The present study puts the controversy concerning top managerial 
remuneration in a balanced perspective. Nonetheless, the study like most 
others, has several limitations that whilst not weakening the validity of the 
results, restricts their applicability. The limitations are as follows :
131 Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAC) 123, Accounting for a Stock-Based 
Compensation.
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• The study included as exogenous variables measures only of corporate 
acquisition, size, performance and governance, but other exogenous 
variables may be investigated;
• The sample is drawn from the FT-ALL Share Index companies and as 
such, the empirical findings can only be generalised to large public 
companies;
• Also, despite the inclusion of sample companies belonging to widely 
different industries, the research modelling in this study does not 
account for a possible 'industry effect1 on managerial remuneration;
• The possible impact of past remuneration on current acquisition is also 
not explicitly modelled.
The results and the implications of the research reported in this thesis, like 
virtually all other statistical results in this area, will be the subject of some 
controversy. Nevertheless, the results seem sufficiently strong to make it 
difficult to maintain that corporate acquisitive activities generate no 
monetary benefits to the corporate directors; or that the 'determinants' of 
managerial remuneration are aligned with shareholders’ interest. Taken 
together, the results provide strong support for the central hypothesis of 
this study that corporate acquisition decisions are driven by managerial 
motives.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables in 
Basic Remuneration of the Highest Paid
Director Sample: Levels Data
VARIABLES AVERAGE SD COUNT
HPD-B £144,442 £138,991 2831
ACQEXP £27,824,92
9
3120,048,145 2831
ACQRAT 24% 33% 2831
SALES £743,795,8
47
£2,039,677,7
49
2831
PBT £63,661,35
9
-£5,352,289 2831
NOEMP 13,000 26,000 2831
SHRPRC £1.83 £1.69 2831
SHHRTN 2 Times 7 Times 2831
GOV 37% 14% 2831
Table 4.2: Average for All Variables in Basic Remuneration of the Highest
Paid Director Sample: Growth Data
VARIABLES/LAG (0,0) (1,0) (1,1) (2,1) (3,1)
AHPD-B(t) £23,745 £23,745 £23,745 £24,255 £25,495
AHPD-B(t-I) £23,158 £23,158 £23,1587 £25,230 £26,259
AACQEXP £117,160 £206,440 £206,440 £270,410 £339,290
AACQRAT 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
ASALES £153,900 £153,900 £172,960 £168,410 £155,870
APBT £15,420 £15,420 £21,570 £21,710 £22160
ASHRPRC £0.11 £0.11 £0.14745 £0.13 £0.11
ASHHRTN -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -£0.04
ANOEMP 79 79 87 90 80
ACAPEMP £169,430 £169,430 £187,190 £186,760 £177,330
AGOV 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Notes
1. Refer to Appendix 3.8 for explanation of the lags
TABLE 4.3 Relationship Between Growth of Basic Remuneration of the Highest Paid
Director and Growth of Acquisition Expenditure
Lags Coefficient
&
(t-statistic)
Growth of 
HPD-B in 
Relation to 
a£ lm  
Increase in 
ACQEXP
Average 
Growth of 
ACQEXP
Average
ACQEXP
Contribution
Average 
ACQEXP 
Contribution as 
a % of Average 
HPD-B Growth
Average 
ACQEXP 
Contribution 
as a % of 
Average 
HPD-B Level
(LO) 36.374533
(3.798333)
£ 36,375 £206,440 £7,509 32% 5%
(1,1) 37.714168
(3.28573)
£37,714 £206,440 £7,785 33% 5%
(2,1) 30.227643
(3.121236)
£ 30,228 £270,410 £8,174 34% 6%
Notes:
1. ACQEXP and HPD-B refer to Acquisition Expenditure and 
Basic Remuneration for the Highest Paid Director respectively.
2. In the Coefficients column ACQEXP is expressed in £lm, and 
HPD-B in £lk.
3. Average ACQEXP Contribution = (ACQEXP Regression 
Coefficient * Average ACQEXP Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[ Appendices 4.1]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from 
[Tables 4.1 and 4.2]
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TABLE 4.4 Relationship Between Growth of Basic Remuneration of the Highest Paid
Director and Growth of Acquisition Rate
Lags Coefficient & 
(t-statistic)
Growth of 
HPD-B in 
Relation to 
1% Increase 
in Growth of 
Average 
ACQRAT
Average 
Growth of 
ACQRAT 
(%)
Average
ACQRAT
Contribution
Average
ACQRAT
Contribution
as a % of
Average
HPD-B
Growth
Average 
ACQRAT 
Contribution 
as a % of 
Average 
HPD-B Level
(1,0) 45.81538
(3.2239)
£46,815 0.21249 £ 9,735 42% 8.5 %
0,1) 44.67447
(2.8359)
£44,674 0.21249 £9,493 41% 8.29%
(2,1) 25.22076
(2.1153)
£25,221 0.29197 £5,528 24% 4.8 %
Notes
1. ACQRAT and HPD-B refer to Acquisition Rate and Basic 
Remuneration for the Highest Paid Director respectively.
2. In the coefficient column ACQRAT is expressed %, and HPD-B in £lk.
3. Average ACQRAT Contribution = (ACQRAT Regression 
Coefficient * Average ACQRAT Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[ Appendices 4.3]. The averages data is extracted from [Tables
4.1 and 4.2]
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TABLE 4.5 Relationship Between Highest Paid Director Basic Remuneration Growth and 
Shareholder Returns
Lags Coefficient & 
(t-statistic)
Growth of 
HPD-B in 
Relation to 
100 % 
Increase in 
SHHRTN 
Growth
Average
Growth
SHHRTN
Average
SHHRTN
Contribution
Average 
SHHRTN 
Contribution as a 
% of Average 
HPD-B Growth
Average 
SHHRTN 
Contribution as a 
% of Average 
HPD-B Level
(0,0) 13.9612
(2.049)
£13,961 -0.02487 £347 1.5% 0.3 %
0,0) 25.0202
(2.864)
£25,020 -0.02487 £622 2.7 % 0.54 %
Notes
1. SHHRTN and HPD-B refer to Shareholder Returns and Basic 
Remuneration for the Highest Paid Director respectively.
2. In the coefficient column SHHRTN is expressed in % and 
HPD-B in £lk.
3. Average SHHRTN Contribution = (SHHRTN Regression 
Coefficient * Average SHHRTN Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[Appendices 4.2]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from [Tables
4.1 and 4.2]
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables in Total Remuneration
of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Levels Data
VARIABLES 
HPD-B 
HPD-T 
ACQEXP 
ACQRAT 
SALES 
PBT 
NOEMP 
CAPEMP 
SHRPRC 
SHHRTN 
GOV
AVERAGE SD COUNT
£150,095 £159,095 600
£183,000 £252,243 600
£39,507,490 £182,867,065 600
26% 29% 600
£1,030,717,007 £1,904,554,259 600
£110,130,498 £99,869,085 600
19,455 39,734 600
£735,877 £2,064,126 600
£1.91 £1.21 600
6 Times 0.5 Times 600
36% 16% 600
Table 5.2 Average for AH Variables in Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid
Director Sample: Growth Data
Variables/Lag (0,0) (1,0) (1,1) (2,1) (3,1)
AHPD-T(t) £34714 £34714 £34714 £38753 £41031
AHPD-T(t-I) £31569 £31569 £31569 £34622 £39758
AACQEXP £3,698,900 £15,674,680 £15,674,680 £9,789,480 £16,053,070
AACQRAT 7% 3% 3% 4% 4%
ASALES £114376540 £114,376,540 £119,470,220 £123,779,300 £130,536,750
APBT £10680190 £10680190 £14890320 £15779760 £16555950
ASHRPRC £0.16 £16 £18 £14 £15
ASHHRTN -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05
ANOEMP -164 -164 185 -64 333
ACAPEMP £108,668,030 £108,668,030 £124,886,530 £138,882,790 £159,879,770
AGOV 0.92% 0.92% 0.67% 0.71% 0.71%
Notes
1. Refer to Appendix 3.8 for explanation of the lags
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TABLE 5.3: Relationship Between Growth of Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid
Director and Growth of Acquisition
Lags Coefficient
&(t-
statistics)
Growth of 
HPD-T in 
Relation to 
£1 m
Increase in 
ACQEXP
Average 
Growth of 
ACQEXP
Average
ACQEXP
Contribution
Average
ACQEXP
Contribution
as a % of
Average
HPD-T
Growth
Average 
Contribution 
as a % of 
HPD-T Level
(0,0) -0.24707
(-3.71548)
-£247 £3,698,900 -£914 3% 0.5%
(1,0) 0.511709
(3.150685)
£512 £15,674,680 £8,021 26% 4%
0,1) 0.472721
(2.111261)
£473 £15,674,680 £7,410 21% 4%
Notes:
1. ACQEXP and HPD-T refer to Acquisition Expenditure and 
Total Remuneration for the Highest Paid Director respectively.
2. In the coefficient column ACQEXP is expressed in £lm and 
HPD-T is £1K.
3. Average ACQEXP contribution = (ACQEXP Regression 
Coefficient * Average ACQEXP Growth).
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[Appendices 5.1]. The ‘Averages’ data is extracted from 
[Tables 5.1 and 5.2].
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TABLE 5.4 Relationship Between Growth of Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid
Director and Growth of Sales
Lags Coefficient
&(t-
statistics)
Growth of 
HPD-T in 
Relation to 
£1 m
Increase in 
SALES
Average Growth 
of SALES
Average
SALES
Contribution
Average 
SALES 
Contribution 
as a % of 
Growth of 
HPD-T
Average 
SALES 
Contribution 
as a % of 
HPD-T Level
(0,0) 0.178979
(3.147312)
£179 £114,376,540 £20,470.999 59% 11%
(2,1) 0.120179
(2.310032)
£120 £123,779,300 £14,875.672 38% 8%
Notes:
1. SALES and HPD-T refer to Sales and Total 
Remuneration for the Highest Paid Director respectively.
2. In the coefficient column SALES is expressed in£lm and 
HPD-T is £lk
3. Average Contribution = (SALES Regression Coefficient 
* Average SALES Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted 
from [ Appendices 5.1]. The ‘Averages’ data is extracted 
from [Tables 4.1 & 4.2]
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables in
Average Remuneration Per Director Sample: 
Levels Data
VARIABLE Average_______________ SD COUNT
HPD-B £140,969 £132,514 2761
TOTL-DIR £718,399 £769,414 2761
AVG-DIR £76,649 £61,610 2761
ACQEXP £28,407,157 £122,491,820 2761
ACQRAT 25% 33% 2761
SALES £779,357,870 £2,110,931,08
5
2761
PBT £66,438,790 £1,044,582 2761
NOEMP 13,636 27,100 2761
CAPEMP £462,538 £1,464,241 2761
SHRPRC £1.76 £1.31 2761
SHHRTN 2 Times 7 Times 2761
GOV 37% 15% 2761
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Table 6.2 Average for All Variables in Average Remuneration Per Director 
Remuneration Sample: Growth Data
Variables/Lag (0,0)_______(1,0) (1,1) (2,1) (3,1)
ATOTL-DIR(t) £108,229 £108,229 £108,229 £113,135 £124,373
ATOTL-DIR(t-l) £101,861 £101,861 £101,861 £108,840 £115,054
AAVG-DIR(t) £11,176 £11,175 £11,175 £11,686 £12,569
AAVG-DIR(t-l) £10,696 £10,696 £10,696 £11,428 £12,120
AACQEXP £3,667,350 £7,017,330 £7,017,330 £5,487,850 £9,396,550
AACQRAT 5% 3% 3% 4% 5%
ASALES £77,006,650 £77,006,650 £82,648,470 £79,733,410 £92,897,040
APBT £6,151,030 £6,151,030 £9,178,360 £9,044,550 £11,029,500
ASHRPRC £0.18 £0.18 £0.19 £0.19 £0.18
ASHHRTN -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05
ANOEMP 276 277 304 350 486
ACAPEMP £64,026 £64,026 £65,091 £68,564 £75,676
AGOV 0.55% 0.55% 0.28% 0.27% 0.29%
Notes
1. Refer to Appendix 3.8 for explanation of the lags
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Table 6.3 Relationship Between Growth of Average Remuneration Per at (t) and
Growth of Acquisition Rate at (t-21
Stacking
Type
Coefficient
&
( t-statistic)
Growth of AVG- 
DIR in Relation 
to a 1% Increase 
in ACQRAT
Average 
Growth of 
ACQRAT
Average
ACQRAT
Contribution
Average
ACQRAT
Contribution
as a % of
AVG-DIR
Growth
Average 
ACQRAT 
Contribution as 
a % of AVG- 
DIR Level (%)
Partial 4 5.302643
(2.510)
£5,303 3.87536 £2,055 18% 3%
Full 4.160298
(2.387164)
£4,160 3.87536 £1,612 14% 2%
Notes:
1. ACQRAT and AVG-DIR refer to Acquisition Rate and Average 
Remuneration Per Director respectively.
2. In the coefficients column ACQRAT is expressed in % and AVG- 
DIR in £lk.
3. Average ACQRAT Contribution = (ACQRAT Regression 
Coefficient * Average ACQRAT Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[Appendices 6.1]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from [Tables 6.1 
and 6.2]
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TABLE 6.4 Relationship Between Growth of Average Remuneration Per Director at (t)
and Growth of Sales at (t-1)
Stacking Coefficient
&
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
AVG-DIR in 
Relation to 
£lm Increase 
in Growth of 
Average 
SALES
Average in
Growth
SALES
Average
SALES
Contribution
Average
Sales
Contribution 
as a % of 
Average 
AVG-DIR 
Growth
Average
SALES
Contribution
as a % of
Average
AVG-DIR
Level
Partial 4 0.196703
(2.153954)
£196.703 £82,648,470 £1,625.7 15% 2%
Full 0.188156
(3.133812)
£188.156 £82,648,470 £1,555.4 14% 2%
Notes
1. SALES And AVG-DIR refer to Sales and Average Remuneration Per 
Director respectively.
2. In the coefficients column SALES is expressed £lm and AVG-DIR in 
£lk.
3. Average SALES Contribution = (SALES Regression Coefficient * 
Average SALES Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[Appendices 6.1]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from (Tables 6.1 and 
6.2]
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TABLE 6.5 Relationship Between Growth of Total of Basic Remuneration for All
Directors at (f) and Growth of Acquisition Expenditure at (t)
Stacking Coefficient & 
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
Total TOTL- 
DIR in 
Relation to a 
£lm Increase 
in ACQEXP
Average 
Growth of 
ACQEXP
Average
ACQEXP
Contribution
Average
ACQEXP
Contribution
as a % of
TOTL-DIR
Growth
Average
ACQEXP
Contribution
as a % of
TOTL-DIR
Level
Partial 4 0.92477
(3.129697)
£924.77 £108,229 £3391.46 3% 0.5%
Full 0.62797
(2.416036)
£627.97 £108,229 £2302.99 2% 0.3%
Notes:
1. TOTL-DIR refer to the Total of the Basic Remuneration for 
All Directors.
2. In the coefficients column ACQEXP is expressed in£lm  and 
TOTL-DIR in £lk.
3. Average ACQEXP Contribution = (ACQEXP Regression 
Coefficient * Average ACQEXP Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table is extracted from 
[Appendix 6.5]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from [Tables
6.1 and 6.2]
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TABLE 6.6 Relationship Between Growth of Total of Basic Remuneration for All
Directors at (t) and Growth of Sales at ft-3)
Stacking Coefficient
&
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
TOTL-DIR in 
Relation to a 
£lm  Increase in 
SALES
Average 
Growth of 
SALES
Average
SALES
Contribution
Average 
SALES 
Contribution 
as a
Proportion of
TOTL-DIR
Growth(%)
Average 
SALES 
Contribution 
as a
Proportion of 
TOTL-DIR 
Level (%)
Partial 4 0.473933
(2.478686)
£473.933 £92,897,040 £44,026.97 35% 6%
Full 0.479668
(2.83939)
£479.668 £92,897,040 £44,559.74 36% 6%
Notes:
1. SALES and TOTL-DIR refer to Sales and Total of Basic 
Remuneration for All Directors respectively.
2. In the coefficients column SALES is expressed in £lm  and 
TOTL-DIR in £lk.
3. Average SALES Contribution = (SALES Regression 
Coefficient * Average SALES Growth)
4. This regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[Appendix 6.5]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from [Tables
6.1 and 6.2]
139
TABLE 6.7 Relationship Between Growth of Total of Basic Remuneration for All
Directors at (t) and Growth Share Price at (t)
Stacking Coefficient & 
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
TOTL-DIR in 
Relation to a 
£0.01 Increase 
in SHRPRC
Average 
Growth of 
SHRPRC 
(£)
Average
SHRPRC
Contribution
Average
SHRPRC
Contribution
as a % of
TOTL-DIR
Growth
Average
SHRPRC
Contribution
as a % of
TOTL-DIR
Level
Partial 4 0.481411
(2.021037)
0.4814 0.18 £8,831 8% 1%
Full 0.611548
(3.211972)
0.6115 0.18 £11,217 10% 2%
Notes:
1. SHRPRC and TOTL-DIR refer to Share Price and Total of 
Basic Remuneration for All Directors respectively.
2. In the coefficients column SHRPRC is expressed in £0.01 and 
TOTL-DIR in £lk.
3. Average SHRPRC Contribution = (SHRPRC Regression 
Coefficient * Average SHRPRC Growth)
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[Appendix 6.5]. The ‘Average* data is extracted from [Tables
6.1 and 6.2]
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics for All Variables in
VARIABLE
TOTL-EMP
AVG-EMP
ACQEXP
ACQRAT
SALES
PBT
NOEMP
CAPEMP
SHRPRC
SHHRTN
GOV
Average Remuneration Per Employee Sample:
Levels Data
AVERAGE SD COUNT
£129,668,228 282,905,575 1837
£10,895 527 1837
£27,944,965 99,534,002 1837
24% 32 1837
£750,131,004 1,486,275,796 1837
£67,720,844 -6,732,620 1837
13000 21000 1837
£442,037 £1,300,111 1837
£1.87 £1.31 1837
7 Times 9 Times 1837
37% 14% 1837
Table 7.2: Average for All Variables in Average Remuneration Per Employee
Remuneration Sample: Growth Data
Variables/Lag (0,0) (1,0) (1,1) (2,1) (3,1)
ATOTL-EMP(t) £16,341,907 £16,341,907 £16,341,907 £16,853,099 £17,769,754
ATOTL-EMP(t-l) £13,981,614 £13,981,615 £13,981,615 £16,182,042 £16,814,132
AAVG-EMP(t) £1,008 £1,008 £1,008 £1,084 £1,101
AAVG-EMP(t-l) £931 £931 £931 £1,004 £1,105
AACQEXP £3,130,990 £7,240,690 £7,240,690 £7,455,050 £13,532,670
AACQRAT 5% 3% 3% 5% 6%
ASALES £93,721,160 £93,721,160 £88,087,280 £96,077,710 £95,814,740
APBT £7,299,500 £7,299,500 £10,582,220 £10,859,430 £10,218,070
ASHRPRC 1.97 1.97 2.24 2.06 1.83
ASHHRTN -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07
ANOEMP 381 381 388 452 408
ACAPEMP £71,672,150 £71,672,150 £71,574,950 £81,364,360 £89,807,590
AGOV 0.98% 0.98% 0.37% 0.48% 0.35%
Notes
1. Refer to Appendix 3.8 for explanation of the lags
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TABLE 7.3 Relationship Between Growth of the Average Remuneration Per Employees
at (t) and Growth of Sales at ft)
Lag Coefficient
&
( t-statistic)
Growth of AVG- 
EMP in Relation 
to a Elm Increase 
in SALES
Average 
Growth of 
SALES
Average
SALES
Contribution
Average 
SALES 
Contribution 
as a % of 
Growth of 
AVG-EMP
Average
SALES
Contribution
as a % of
AVG-EMP
Level
(0,0) 0.003639
(2.358689)
3.639 £93,721,160 £337 34% 3%
(1,0) 0.003472
(2.367866
3.472 £93,721,160 £328 33% 3%
Notes:
1. SALES and AVG-EMP refer to Sales and Average 
Remuneration Per Employee respectively.
2. In the coefficients column SALES is expressed in £1 million 
and AVG-EMP in Elk.
3. Average SALES Contribution = SALES Regression 
Coefficient * Average SALES Growth.
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[ Appendices 7.1]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from 
[Tables 7.1 and 7.2]
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TABLE 7.4 Relationship Between Growth of the Average Remuneration Per Employees
and Growth in Number of Employees
Lags Coefficient & 
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
AVG-EMP in 
Relation to a 
1000 Increase 
in NOEMP
Average 
Growth of 
NOEMP
Average
NOEMP
Contribution
Average
NOEMP
Contribution
as a % of
AVG-EMP
Growth
Average
NOEMP
Contribution
as a % of
AVG-EMP
Level
(0,0) -0.541
(-2.44726)
-£541 381 -£206 20% 2%
(1,0) -0.51986
(-2.45969)
-£520 381 -£198 20% 2%
Notes:
1. NOEMP and AVG-EMP refer to Number of Employees 
and Average Remuneration Per Employee respectively.
2. In the coefficients column NOEMP is expressed in £1 
million and AVG-EMP in £lk.
3. Average NOEMP Contribution = NOEMP Regression 
Coefficient * Average NOEMP Growth.
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted 
from [ Appendices 7.1]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted 
from [Tables 7.1 and 7.2]
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TABLE 7.5 Relationship Between Growth of the Average Remuneration Per Employees
and Growth of Shareholder Returns
Lags Coefficient
&
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
AVG-EMP in 
Relation to a 1 
fold Increase 
in SHHRTN
Average 
Growth of 
SHHRTN
Average
SHHRTN
Contribution
Average
AVG-EMP
Contribution
as a % of
Growth of
Average
SHHRTN
Average 
AVG-EMP 
Contribution 
as a % of 
Growth of 
AVG-EMP
(0,0) -0.12871
(-2.8175)
-£129 -0.03066 -£4 0.4% 0.04%
(L0) -0.13228
(-2.8084)
-£132 -0.03066 -£4 0.4% 0.04%
(1,1) -0.93852
(-11.5799)
-£938 -0.04216 -£40 4% 0.4%
(2,1) -0.9444
(-8.44327)
-£945 -0.05421 -£51 5% 0.5%
(3,1) -1.04216
(-18.2613)
-£1042 -0.06554 -£68 6% 0.6%
Notes:
1. SHHRTN and AVG-EMP refer to Shareholders returns and 
Average Remuneration Per Employee respectively.
2. In the coefficients column SHHRTN is expressed in times 
factors and AVG-EMP in Elk.
3. Average SHHRTN Contribution = SHHRTN Regression 
Coefficient * Average SHHRTN Growth.
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[ Appendices 7.1]. The ‘Average* data is extracted from 
[Tables 7.1 and 7.2]
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TABLE 7.6 Relationship Between Growth of the Average Remuneration Per Employees
and Growth of Governance
Lags Coefficient & 
( t-statistic)
Growth of AVG- 
EMP in Relation 
to a 1% Increase 
in GOV
Average 
Growth of 
GOV 
(% )
Average 
Contribution 
of GOV
Average GOV 
Contribution as 
a % of AVG- 
EMP Growth
Average GOV 
Contribution as 
a % of AVG- 
EMP Level
(0,0) -0.21076
(-3.11072)
-£211 0.98074 -£207 21% 2%
(1.0) -0.21655
(-2.96918)
-£212 0.98074 -£212 21% 2%
0.1) -0.30762
(-3.70759)
-£308 0.37159 -£144 11% 1%
(2,1) -0.30096
(-4.18602)
-£301 0.48482 -£146 13% 1%
(3,1) -0.13757
(-1.861)
-£138 0.35462 -£49 4% 0.4%
Notes:
1. GOV and AVG-EMP refer to Governance and Average 
Remuneration Per Employee respectively.
2. GOV is expressed in % and AVG-EMP in £1K.
3. Average GOV Contribution = GOV Regression Coefficient * 
Average GOV Growth.
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[ Appendices 7.5]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from 
[Appendix 7.1 and 7.2].
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TABLE 7.7 Relationship Between Growth of the Total of Basic Remuneration for All
Employees at (t) and Growth of Sales at (t)
Lag Coefficient & 
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
TOTL-EMP in 
Relation to a £lm 
Increase in 
SALES
Average SALES 
Growth
Average SALES 
Contribution
Average 
SALES 
Contribution 
as a % of 
Growth of 
TOTL-EMP
Average 
SALES 
Contributio 
n as a % of 
TOTL- 
EMP Level
(0,0) 76.46144
(4.573551)
£76,461 £93,721,160 £7,166,055 44% 6%
(1,0) 73.28507
(5.222804)
£73,286 £93,721,160 £6,868,362 42% 5%
Notes:
1. SALES and TOTL-EMP refer to Sales and Total of Basic 
Remuneration for All Employee respectively.
2. In the coefficients column SALES expressed in£l million and 
TOTL-EMP in £1K
3. Average SALES Contribution = SALES Regression 
Coefficient * Average SALES Growth.
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[ Appendices 7.5]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted from 
[Tables 7.1 and 7.2]
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TABLE 7.8 Relationship Between Growth of the Total of Basic Remuneration For all
Employees and Growth in Number of Employees
Lag Coefficient & 
( t-statistic)
Growth of 
TOTL-EMP in 
Relation to a £1 
Million Increase 
in NOEMP
Average 
Growth of 
NOEMP
Growth of 
TOTL-EMP in 
Relation to 
Growth of 
Average 
NOEMP
Average 
NOEMP 
Contributio 
n as a % of 
Growth of 
TOTL-EMP 
(%)
Average 
NOEMP 
Contributi 
on as a % 
of TOTL- 
EMP 
Level (%)
0 .1 ) -6647.07
(-3.08466)
-£6,647,700 388 -£2,532,774 16% 2%
(2,1) -5449.89
(-3.15603)
-£5,449,890 451 -£2,076,408 15% 2%
Notes:
1. NOEMP and TOTL-EMP refer to Number of Employees and 
Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employee respectively.
2. In the coefficients column NOEMP expressed in £1 million 
and TOTL-EMP in £lk.
3. Average NOEMP Contribution = NOEMP Regression 
Coefficient * Average NOEMP Growth.
4. The regression results reported in this table are extracted from 
[ Appendices 7.5]. The ‘Average’ data is extracted form 
[Tables 7.1 and 7.2].
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Appendix 1 NOTATIONS
NOTATION DESCRIPTION
VARIABLES
HPD-B Highest Paid Director Basic Remuneration
HPD-B(t) Highest Paid Director Basic Remuneration at time 
(t)
HPD-B(t-1) Highest Paid Director Basic Remuneration at time 
(t-1)
HPD-T Highest Paid Director Total Remuneration
HPD-T(t) Highest Paid Director Total Remuneration at time 
(0
HPD-T(t-I) Highest Paid Director Total Remuneration at time 
(t-1)
AVG-DIR Average Remuneration Per Director
AVG-DIR(t) Average Remuneration Per Director at time (t)
AVG-DIR(t-l) Average Remuneration Per Director at time (t-1)
TOTL-DIR Total of Basic Remuneration for All Directors
TOTL-DIR(t) Total of Basic Remuneration for All Directors at 
time (t)
TOTL-DIR(t-l) Total of Basic Remuneration for All Directors at 
time (t-1)
AVG-EMP Average Remuneration Per Employee
AVG-EMP(t) Average Remuneration Per Employee at time (t)
AVG-EMP(t-l) Average Remuneration Per Employee at time (t-1)
TOTL-EMP Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employees
TOTL-EMP(t) Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employees at 
time (t)
TOTL-EMP(t-1) Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employees at 
time (t-1)
ACQEXP Acquisition Expenditure
ACQRAT Acquisition Rate
SALES Sales
NOEMP Number of Employees
CAPEMP Capital Employed
PBT Profit Before Tax
SHRPRC Share Price
SHHRTN Shareholders Returns
GOV Governance
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OTHERS
CONST Constant
OBN Number of Observations
N Number of Companies
YR Year Dummies
FROM Starting Year
TO Ending Year
SARGAN Sargan Test to examine validity of the instruments
2SC Second - Order Serial Correlation
DF Degrees of Freedom
nss Not Statistically Significant
LAG (0,0), (1,0), (1,1), (2,1), 
(3,1)
Refer to Appendix 8.3 for full explanation
Version I to IV Regression 
Equations
Refer to Appendix 3.7 for full explanation
SD Standard Deviation
DPD Dynamic Panel Data
GMM Generalised Methods of Moment
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APPENDIX 2: NOTES
These notes apply to the regression results reported in appendices 4.1 to 7.8
1. Each cell in the variables columns contains two figures; the top one is the 
regression coefficient, while the bottom one is t-statistic value
2. Each cell in Sargan column contains two figures; the top one is the Sargan value, 
while the bottom one is the degrees of freedom. The test examines the instruments 
validity and is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square.
3. Each cell in 2SC column contains two figures; the top one is the second-order 
serial correlation value and the bottom one is the t-statistic value.
4. Refer to Appendix 7.3 for full explanation of Versions I to IV regression equations.
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Appendix 3.1 Definition Of Variables
This appendix provides detailed definitions of all the variables in the research and 
indicates their sources. The variables are grouped into two categories, endogenous and 
exogenous variables. The endogenous variables category consists of all the 
remuneration measures, while the endogenous one consists of measures of corporate 
acquisition, size, performance and governance. 'Datastream' code is in brackets.
Endogenous Variables
This category consists o f four remuneration measures.
•  Highest Paid Director Basic Remuneration -  (224)
This is the sum of cash payment and bonus for the highest paid director 
remuneration as disclosed in the published accounts. As Conyon (1994) and 
Conyon and Leech (1994) highlighted, the definition of highest paid director 
does not necessarily coincide with the chief executive officer. This variable is 
collected through ‘Datastream’ and ‘company accounts’.
•  Highest Paid Director Total Remuneration
This is the sum of the highest paid director basic remuneration and actual or 
potential gains from executive share option scheme (ESO). As explained above, 
highest paid director basic remuneration is collected from ‘Datastream’ and 
company final accounts. While 'ESO' data is collected from company accounts, 
register of directors shares interest and a survey conducted by the researcher. A 
questionnaire was sent to 545 companies. It requested the details of the highest 
paid director ESO scheme, for the period 1980 up to and including 1992. One 
hundred and ten (110) companies replied while the remaining rejected 
participation. Out of 110 (20%) responses 79 (15 %) were fully completed 
replies.
To evaluate ESO gain we classified them into Types 1 and 2, based on if  they 
have been exercised during the research period. Type 1, are ESO granted and 
exercised during the research period (1980-92). Type 2, are ESO granted during 
the research period but not exercised up to the end of 1992. The following 
section explores the evaluation method for each type.
TYPE 1, If the option is granted and exercised during the research period then 
actual gain is the difference between the market price on the exercising date and 
the exercise price. The total actual gain is obtained by multiplying the actual 
gain by the number of options exercised.
TYPE 2, If options granted but not exercised during the research period, and are 
‘in the money’ then they are treated as potential gains. The potential gain is 
taken to be the difference between the exercise price of the option and the 
market price of the share at the end of the research period, that is on 31
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December 1992. This evaluation132 is used by Abell et al (1994), Main and 
Johnston (1993) and Clinch (1991).
The two types of gains are distributed across the exercisable holding period 
which is defined as the total holding period excluding the first three years closed 
period. This treatment is based on the fact the directors are not able to exercise 
their options in the first three years.
In short, highest paid director total remuneration is the sum of the basic 
remuneration and the actual and potential ESO gain distributed on the 
exercisable holding period.
•  Average Basic Remuneration Per Directors (Items 125/242)
Calculated as the sum of the basic remuneration for all the directors divided by 
total number of directors. Basic remuneration for all the directors (125) is the 
total directors fees, emoluments for management services and pensions or 
pension fund contributions paid to, or on behalf of, directors. Compensations for 
loss of office and ex gratia payments are excluded. Number o f directors (242) is 
the number of both executives and non-executives excluding alternate directors. 
These variables are collected through ‘Datastream’.
•  Average Basic Remuneration Per Employees (Items 215/219)
Calculated as the sum of basic remuneration for all employees, excluding 
directors’ remuneration, divided by total number o f employees. The basic 
remuneration for all employees (215), is total wages and salaries o f non- 
managerial employees. While total number o f employees (219) is total number 
of domestic and overseas employees, including part-time, when available.
Exogenous Variables 
Corporate Acquisition Measures
Two measures of corporate acquisition activities are employed in this study, total 
acquisition expenditure and acquisition rate. The two measures are used in separate 
regression equations. The reason for using two measures of acquisition is to examine 
the sensitivity of the acquisition statistical significance to the measure of corporate 
acquisitiveness. These variables are collected through ‘Datastream’. The following 
section defines each variable.
•  Total Acquisition Expenditure (Item 455)
Acquisition variable is defined as total consideration of acquisition, this is the 
sum of:
Equity issued for acquisition 
Loan issued for acquisition 
Preference issued for acquisition 
Cash issued for acquisition
132Refer to Appendix 3.2 for explanations of the reasons for not using Black and Scholes valuation 
Model.
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1Any cash received from the sale of subsidiaries is deducted from this sum 
The exclusion is based on the grounds that current returns could be attributed to 
financial management considerations, and not solely to growth policies.
•  Acquisition Rate -  [455/(455+431)]
This shows acquisition expenditure as a proportion o f total growth expenditure. 
Total growth expenditure is the sum of total acquisition expenditure, (455), and 
fixed assets purchased (431). Fixed assets purchased is defined as fixed assets 
purchased by the company excluding assets acquired from new subsidiaries.
It is important to note that companies in this research do not necessarily form a 
representative sample o f only acquisitive companies, and no attempt was made 
to get such a sample as that would have been difficult without a compromise in 
the research design, and because the purpose of the research is not to examine 
remuneration of acquisitive companies but to find the relationship, if  any, for a 
representative sample of the population parameters whether acquisitive or not. 
In retrospect the sample includes companies that had no acquisition activities 
during the research period.
Corporate Size Measures
In this study we employed three measures of corporate size - total sales, number of 
employee and capital employed - to enable us to compare our findings and to test 
whether the results are invariant to alternative measures. These variables are collected 
through ‘Datastream’.
•  Total Sales (Item 104)
The amount of sales of goods and services to third parties, relating to the normal 
activities of the company. This amount usually does not include Value Added 
Tax or any other taxes relating directly to turnover, and is net of trade discounts. 
For brewing and tobacco companies where excise duties are not separately 
disclosed, the values entered here are gross.
•  Total Capital Employed (Item 322)
134
This is the sum of all non-current liabilities which includes all the long-term 
resources o f capital. These are loans, equity and funds available as a result of 
retaining profit within the business. Capital employed reflects the full value of 
resources available for management during the year (Warren, 1990).
133 If the cash received from the sale of a subsidiary, is more than the total consolidation payment then 
companies where classified as "Assets Stripping Companies" and separated from the main model.
134 Current liabilities are excluded as they represent a short-term resources of finance
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•  Total Number of Employees (219)
This is the total number of domestic and overseas employees, including part- 
time, when available.
Corporate Performance Measures
Corporate performance measures can be divided into two categories, market and 
accounting measures. In this study, accounting performance is measured by profit; 
while market performance is measured by annual average corporate share price and 
shareholder returns. These variables are collected through ‘Datastream’.
•  Pre-tax Profit (including Associates) -  adjusted (Item 157)
This the pre-tax profit adjusted for exceptional/extraordinary items, non­
operating provisions and exchange profits/losses according to Warren (1990). 
Operating profit before tax is the most appropriate indicator of overall business 
performance. In particular it is appropriate in assessing the corporate relative 
performance year by year, as it shows the amount of profit generated from the 
trading activities regardless of any exceptional items or of tax changes (Warren, 
1990).
•  Share Price
The average of the aggregate daily closing share price for the operating year.
•  Shareholder Returns
Shareholder returns are the sum of the current share price and current dividends 
divided by previous year’s share price, represented by
[ Share Price (t) + Dividend (t) / Share Price (M) ]
where, ‘t’ is indicates of time period
Governance Measure
This category consist o f one measure.
•  Governance (Items 243/242)
Calculated as the ratio between non-executives (243) and total number of 
directors on the board of directors (242). Total number of directors includes 
executive and non-executive directors but excludes alternate directors.
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Appendix 3 .2  Criticism of Using Black-Scholes Model In Valuing ESO
The aim of this appendix is to define executive share options and to explore the 
reasons for the inappropriateness of valuing ESO using the Black and Scholes pricing 
model.
Executive share options (ESO) are contracts granted to executives allowing the 
purchase of corporate common stock at favourable prices (Samuels et al, 1990). In the 
UK, ESO are usually exercisable after three years from the granting date and lapse ten 
years from the granting date. ESO are introduced to obtain goal congruence between 
managers and shareholders (Samuels et al, 1990; Lewellen et al, 1985).
There is no market for executive share options, which complicates the pricing of these 
options. However, scholars and practitioners have been using versions of call options 
valuations to price ESO. Option valuation models are based on an arbitrage strategy, 
that is hedging against the underlying asset and re-balancing continuously until 
expiration. The Black and Scholes (1973) valuation method (henceforth B-S) is one of 
the most popular methods used in valuing ESO. However, some scholars argue that 
there are fundamental differences between ESO and Options and therefore B-S is an 
inappropriate model for ESO's valuation. These differences are discussed next.
On the one hand, ESO’s realistic value could be higher than the value imputed by B-S 
model, because managers as insiders, naturally, have a good knowledge o f the best 
exercising time. On the other hand ESO’s realistic value could be lower than the B-S 
valuation because of the restrictions imposed on exercising executive options which 
implies a severe departure from the option-pricing theory. These restrictions are 
embedded in ESO characteristics like, non-transferability, short selling prohibition, 
absence of the ability to diversify risk associated with options pay off and restrictions 
on exercising the options after leaving the firm's employment135. These restrictions 
introduce a serious complication in valuing executive stock option that is not present 
in the valuation of market options. Indeed concern about the inappropriateness of 
using B-S in valuing ESO has increased greatly in recent years. Clinch (1991) and 
Abell et al (1994) used different methods in valuing ESOs. In the study reported in 
this thesis, we have followed Clinch and Abell et al pricing of ESO by using the 
actual company share price on a date related to the research period. The valuation 
method is explained in the body of the thesis (Section 3.1.3 and in Appendix 3.1)
135 Noreen and Wolfson (1981), Murphy (1985), Lambert and Larcker (1986).
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Appendix 3 .3  Deletion and Estimation Technique for the Missing Entries
The main data set consisted of data on 545 companies for thirteen years period, 
starting 1980 and ending 1992. However, after deleting the cases with less than 
five entries and after estimating the missing values for variables with a maximum 
of two missing entries, the number of companies in the main sample decreased to 
361 companies with 2109 entries. The two strategies used to estimate the missing 
values are explained below.
Estimation technique of The Highest Paid Director and Average Basic 
Remuneration per Director, The ratio between highest director and total 
directors' remuneration in t+1, in conjunction with the available variable in year t 
were used to estimate the missing variable in year t. The following formulas were 
used:
Formula for finding the highest paid 
director basic remuneration (hpdt),
hpdt = ( hpdt+i * dir t) / dir t+i
Formula for finding the average 
remuneration per director (dirt),
dirt = ( dirt+1 * hpd t) / hpd t+i
Where, hpd t 'hpd' 
hpd t+1 'hpd' 
dirt Rem 
dirt+1 Rem
)asic remuneration, at time (t) 
remuneration at time (t+1) 
uneration for all directors at time (t) 
uneration for all directors at time (t+1)
Estimation for the Variables Sales, Capital Employed, Number of Employees 
and Profit
The missing variable at (t) has been estimated by taking the average o f the 
variable at the year before (t-1) and the year after (t+1), using the following 
formula1
Missing valuet = (Value t+l + Value t-i) / 2, where, t current year
t+1 previous year
t-1 the following year
Approximately 1% of the data were estimated by applying these two estimation 
strategies
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Appendix 3 .4  Box-Cox Transformation Method & Results
As we had the occasion to note Box-Cox is a formal method of finding the most 
appropriate transformation of the endogenous variable to satisfy the normality 
assumption in regression. The method involves systematically computing the log- 
likelihood of a number of transformations to determine the one with residuals that 
would have most likely come from a normal distribution. Transformations are 
expressed as powers of the endogenous variable (y). It is conventional to examine 
transformation to the powers of -2 to +2.
The Box-Cox method involves three steps, first, computing the log-likelihood of the 
transformation powers, second, plotting the graphs and third, interpreting results and 
graphs. Each of these steps is discussed below.
First. The following equations are used to compute the log-likelihood of the 
transformation powers:
If P o  0 then the log-likelihood equals
L(P) = N In (|P|) + N (P-l)In (GM) - F(N,2) In (SSresiduais);
If P =0, then
L(P)= - N (GM) - F(N,2) In (SSresiduals)
Where,
P Power of Transformation o f y = {-2,-1.5,-1,-0.5,
0, 0 .5 ,1 ,1 .5 ,2}
N Number of Cases
GM Geometric Mean of the endogenous variable
F F Distribution function which converts points
into probabilities 
SSresiduals Sum of Squared Residuals
Second. Plot the Log-likelihood of the transformation powers against the powers 
themselves [Refer to Figures 3.1 to 3.4 in next page]. The power with the maximum 
log-likelihood represents the optimal power of transformation of the endogenous 
variable.
Third. Analysis of The Results
The data and charts in Figures 3.1 - 3.4 show that the log-likelihood increases with 
powers of ‘y* up to about the power 1 and then starts to decrease. This implies that the 
best transformation is 'no transformation' for all the data samples.
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Con. Appendix 3,4: Cqx-Bqx Transformat ion Data and Graphs
Figure 3.1: The Log-Likelihood of the Transformation 
Powers against the Powers Themselves for the 
Basic Remuneration of the 'hpd' Sample
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Figure 3.2: The Log-Likelihood of the Transformation 
Powers against the Powers Themselves for the 
Total Remuneration of the 'hpd* Sample
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Con. Appendix 3.4: Cox-Box Transformation Data and Graphs
Figure 3.3: The Log-Likelihood of the Transformation 
Powers against the Powers Themselves for the 
Average Remuneration Per Director Sample
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Figure 3.4: The Log-Likelihood of the Transformation 
Powers against the Powers Themselves for the 
Average Remuneration Per Employee Sample
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Appendix 3 .5  Glossary of Some of the Statistical Terms
TERM DESCRIPTION
Unbiased
Estimators
A
The expected value of the estimators, say p, is equal to the true 
value, p.
Efficient
Estimator
If it has smaller variance than any other estimator of p.
Consistent
Estimator
If both its bias and variance approach zero as sample size 
approaches infinity
Source: Ostrom, 1990.
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Appendix 3 .6  Relationship Between Sales. Profit. Share Price 
And Shareholder Returns
 <----- ► Direct Relationship
< —  * Indirect Relationship
.......
Sales Profit< —
Share Price
Shareholder Returns
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Appendix 3. 7 Versions I to IV Regression Equations
Corporate acquisitiveness and shareholder interests have been measured by more than 
one variable (used in separate regression equations, obviously) to test if  the results are 
invariant to alternative measures. Consequently, we have formulated four versions of 
the main regression equation (Equation 3.4) suing different measures o f the variables. 
The four versions are titled equations I to IV and are described allegorically as 
follows:
Versions to IV of Regression Equation
Versions of
Regression
Equation
Variables
Version I A Remuneration^ = a  + P A Remuneration ^.i + P A Acquisition Expenditure.
+ P3 A Sales. + p  ^A Capital Employed +P5 A Number of Employees.+P6 A Share 
Price + P? A Profit.t + Pg A Governance + vj/t + A v it
Version II A Remuneration^ = a  + p} A Remuneration ^  + P2 A Acquisition Expenditure t 
+ P3ASales.+ P A Capital Employed. +p A Number of Employees.+P A 
Shareholders Returns + P A Profit + P  A Governance + vi/t + A v itit *7 it r 8 11
Version III A Remuneration^ = a  + Pt A Remuneration ^  + P2 A Acquisition Rate|t 
+ P3 A Sales. + P4 A Capital Employed. +P5 A Number of Employees. + P6 A Share 
Price + P A Profit + P  A Governance + u/t + A v itit 7 it 8 Tl “
Version IV A Remuneration = a  + Pt A Remuneration ^  + P2 A Acquisition Rate t 
+ P3 A Sales.+ P4 A Capital Employed +P5 A Number of Employees.+P6 A 
Shareholders Returns + P A Profit. + P  A Governance + vi/t + A v itit 7 it r 8 T1 "
All regression equations include the three measures of corporate size, governance and 
profit, however as mentioned above, they differ in the market performance and 
acquisition measures.
• Equations I and II employ the same acquisition measure, that is acquisition 
expenditure, but differ in the market performance measures. The former employs 
share price and the latter employs shareholder returns.
• Equations III and IV employ the same acquisition measure, that is acquisition rate, 
but differ in the market performance measures. The former employs share price and 
the latter employs shareholder returns
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Appendix 3 .8  Alternative Time Lag
The main regression equation (Equation [3.4]) has been designed with five time lags 
in the acquisition variable and the ‘remaining’136 exogenous variables. The following 
table is an algebraic representation of the time lag equations.
Ayi,, = a  + 5Ayi>t.1 + AACQM + PA[x]u +Avu +v|^  [LAG (0,0)]
AyM = a  + 8 Ay^i + A ACQ^.j + PA [x]M + Avu + ^  [LAG (1,0)]
Ayi,t = a  + 8 Ay^., + A A C Q ^ + p A [x]^, + Av M + vpt [LAG (1,1)]
Ay* = a+ 8 AyM_, + A ACQM_2 + P A [x]^., + Av u + v j [LAq  (2,1)]
Ayi,t = a  + 8 Aylt_, + A A C Q ^ + p A [x ]^  + Au M + vpt [LAG (3,1)]
where, ACQ Acquisition measure
[x] All the remaining endogenous
t Suffix for time
A First Difference
u Error Term
V The 'remaining' Disturbance term
In all lag equations, Ayit.l5 on the right hand side of the regression equation, is always 
lagged by one period. However in
• ‘No Lag’ equation [LAG (0,0)] acquisition and all the remaining exogenous 
variables are at time (t). This reflects the notion that individual's current rewards 
may correspond to current efforts, performance and activities.
• In one-year lag’ equations, there are two versions of this type. In the first version, 
[LAG (1,0)], acquisition is lagged by one period, (t-1), while the 'remaining’ 
exogenous variables are at (t). In the second version, [LAG (1,1)], acquisition and 
all the 'remaining' exogenous variables are lagged by (t-1).
In ‘two’ and ‘three- years lag equations [LAG (2,1) and (3,1) respectively], 
acquisition is lagged by (t-2) and (t-3), respectively, and the 'remaining' exogenous 
variables are at (t-1). This modelling strategy, where the endogenous variables pre­
date the exogenous one, has recently been used in management remuneration studies 
by Gregg et al (1993), Main (1993) Conyon and Leech (1994), Conyon (1994) and 
Abell et al (1994). The reflects the view that current remuneration may correspond to 
past performance and effort levels. Hence, we must consider the time required for 
company performance, strategies and activities to have an impact on remuneration.
136 The ‘remaining’ exogenous variables are: sale, capital employed, number of employees, share price, 
shareholder returns and governance.
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Appendix 3. 9 Explanation o f ’Full* and 'Partial1 Stacking
The following table specifies the instruments used in each type of stacking:
Number of Time Periods in the research sample =13
Stacking
Type
Technical
Notation
Instruments Used
Full GMM(99) Used all the optimal efficient instruments from (t-2) 
and earlier. These are,
[t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5, t-6, t-7, t-8, t-9, t-10, t-11, t-12]
Partial (4) GMM(4) Used the first four instruments starting from the (t- 
2). These are [t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5]
Partial (3) GMM(3) The first three instruments were used: [t-2, t-3, t-4]
Partial (2) GMM(2) The first two instruments were used: [t-2, t-3]
The main results for all samples, except ‘total highest paid director remuneration’ are 
based on ‘partial 4’ stacking results; while ‘full* stacking results are used as 
robustness tests. In the highest paid director's total remuneration’ sample the number 
of companies was relatively small, 79, and hence we were unable to use ‘full’ or 
‘partial 4’ stacking. Instead we used ‘partial 3’ results in the main analysis and 
‘partial 2’ stacking as the robustness tests.
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Appendix 4.1 Regression Results for Basic Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Verion I
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-B ACQEXP SALES NOEMP CAPEMP PBT______ SHRPRC GOV______ YR OBN N FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) 2.5165
0.2363
0.5565
4.5082
0.0501
0.0045
41.4161
0.6107
10.0729
0.0966
-57.0681
-0.6639
102.4388 
1.7499
17.6085
0.9251
-6.7864
-0.0728
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 135.6092
33
1.083
(1,0) 13.2097
0.8737
0.5364
3.2659
36.3745
3.7983
-71.9143
-0.8741
76.7012
0.6757
11.7544
0.1078
59.0845
0.9491
17.2532
0.7273
51.7759
0.5544
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 58.0887
33
-0.544
(1,1) 29.5563 
1.7446
0.5494
4.5766
37.7142
3.2857
-112.2179
-1.3679
64.2677
0.9421
60.2632
0.5684
-5.7661
-0.1406
-29.1897
-1.3288
-148.3791
-1.6758
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 42.2851
33
-0.544
(2,1) 28.2982
2.2099
0.1723
1.3920
30.2276
3.1212
-64.5716
-0.9916
61.2014
0.8360
-22.5780
-0.2049
56.6832
0.9729
13.2483 
0.6528
-60.3731
-0.7598
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 80.4679
32
0.097
(3,1) 40.9178
2.4817
0.0834
0.5072
14.6040
1.0228
-46.2119
-0.6346
55.4755
0.7004
-7.8448
-0.0796
87.6193
1.3419
4.2361
0.2575
-88.0240 
-1.0002
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 110.3693
30
-0.351
Full
Stacking
(0,0) -6.7699
-0.6233
0.5325
5.1946
3.1693
0.4168
67.5171
1.3866
-18.9661
-0.2981
-60.9984
-1.1420
101.4266
1.9800
16.4909
1.2899
-4.0525
-0.1189
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 172.9274
61
1.145
(1,0) -1.8338
-0.1954
0.5016
4.6682
20.4878
3.5553
25.5425
0.5857
-5.6922
-0.0965
-25.4829
-0.4649
81.7551
1.5077
13.8645 
1.0889
-20.6552
-0.5478
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 137.8088
61
0.266
(1,1) 15.9740
1.3786
0.4834
5.6895
22.3974
3.4729
-39.7202
-0.9338
40.5633
0.9200
-23.2293
-0.4222
34.0123
1.1440
-9.0911
-0.7394
-125.1778
-3.1656
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 104.6275
61
0.032
(2,1) 15.7894 
1.0053
0.2742
2.6115
18.2077
2.0221
-33.9619
-0.7657
22.1128
0.3911
-9.5516
-0.1496
55.7181
1.0574
5.1429
0.3884
-92.9944
-2.2989
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 129.8547
60
0.334
(3,1) 26.3816
1.3343
0.1285
1.1104
12.1566
1.5182
-26.1718
-0.4906
42.9336
0.7429
-22.7470
-0.3765
89.2433
1.3868
3.5471
0.2524
-77.9843
-2.0948
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 143.3596
58
-0.17
o>
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Appendix 4 .2  Regression Results for Basic Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Verion II
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-B ACQEXP SALES NOEMP CAPEMP PBT SHHRTN GOV_______YR OBN N FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) 4.2901
0.3318
0.5842
4.4217
0.6736
0.0598
35.0649
0.4830
-3.5185
-0.0308
-22.6467
-0.2657
92.2146 
1.5486
13.9612
2.0485
-28.0617
-0.3297
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 136.8896
33
1.052
(1,0) 16.6712
0.9828
0.5569
3.2449
37.3184
3.7528
-82.5770
-0.9728
87.9106
0.6989
20.0481
0.1781
54.0286
0.8113
25.0202
2.8641
48.0548
0.5535
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 55.6152
33
-0.559
(1,1) 24.2715 
1.3709
0.5368
4.3628
35.3340
3.3667
-116.3950
-1.5289
46.2921
0.6364
79.7819
0.7919
-10.8545
-0.2522
-24.1860
-1.8891
-151.4391
-1.8090
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 41.2704 
33
-0.513
(2.1) 30.5740
2.1986
0.1794
1.3553
29.4562
2.9472
-65.5873
-1.0374
64.7031
0.8633
-20.8396
-0.2048
60.7966
0.9938
-3.3568
-0.3331
-73.0445
-0.9768
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 79.1812
32
0.063
(3,1) 41.9239
2.4414
0.0754
0.4575
14.4164
0.9976
-35.6573
-0.4870
37.1877
0.4544
-1.4710
-0.0156
89.4576
1.3675
-12.2494
-1.0789
-97.5161
-1.1162
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 108.0015
30
-0.379
Full
Stacking
(0,0) -4.7451
-0.4400
0.5415
5.1152
4.3455
0.5725
64.3451
1.3247
-23.1881
-0.3500
-44.8194
-0.8375
97.4813
1.8961
13.7598
2.0223
-11.4454 
-0.3333
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 175.9819
61
1.177
(1,0) 0.1481
0.0154
0.5096
4.6471
21.0667
3.6114
23.1681
0.5233
-3.3034
-0.0525
-20.1511
-0.3538
78.8193 
1.4390
18.9579
2.8590
-23.9255
-0.6286
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 136.9983
61
0.243
(1,1) 15.3933
1.2998
0.4718
5.2542
21.9592
3.5011
-46.2467
-1.1471
36.3988
0.8025
-11.2168
-0.2041
34.1382
1.0972
-19.6999
-2.0400
-130.6459
-3.3714
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 100.8502
61
-0.002
(2,1) 16.7655 
1.0264
0.2747
2.5555
17.3754
1.9766
-33.5253
-0.7836
23.7948
0.4091
-10.4959
-0.1676
59.9810
1.0961
-10.3106
-1.2026
-98.1907
-2.5075
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 127.3384
60
0.323
(3,1) 28.8410
1.4266
0.1205
1.0362
11.6647 
1.4381
-18.1985
-0.3414
31.3437
0.5168
-20.8271
-0.3552
92.5310
1.4170
-13.8293
-1.2436
-83.5086
-2.2505
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 141,1516
58
-0.198
05
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Appendix 4.3 Regression Results for Basic Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Verion III
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-B ACQRAT SALES NOEMP CAPEMP PBT SHRPRC GOV______ YR OBN N FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
10,0) 3.5257
0.3374
0.5570
4.1711
-22.0011 
-2.0765
40.8639
0.5707
8.9565
0.0871
-51.7760
-0.5634
104.1653
1.5511
25.8030
1.2798
-12.8290
-0.1416
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 95.5285
33
1.012
(1,0) 12.1333
0.7483
0.6696
3.8931
45.8154
3.2239
-40.7447
-0.4824
41.2453
0.3677
-4.2886
-0.0393
72.3285
1.1158
14.4649
0.5978
22.5466
0.2397
84,8 2109 361 1982 1992 40.9177
33
0.628
(1,1) 29.5761
1.6734
0.6756
5.1774
44.6745
2.8359
-57.5324
-0.6966
52.1485
0.7280
-9.9658
-0.0949
23.2709
0.6613
-27.1315
-1.1492
-147.4545
-1.7248
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 34.3607
33
0.469
(2,1) 28.2025
1.8865
0.2340
2.0232
25.2208
2.1153
-45.5060
-0.6979
29.8118
0.4292
-14.8383
-0.1378
71.4777
1.2010
6.4009
0.3258
-90.4121
-1.1608
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 90.2218
32
0.152
(3,1) 38.9481
2.5164
0.1112
0.8333
19.4672
1.4363
-31.4308 
-0.4411
31.8673
0.3940
-10.0732
-0.1185
86.9118
1.3753
4.5135
0.2774
-65.6079
-0.9170
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 99.8665
30
-0.25
Full
Stacking
(0,0) -6.3602
-0.5807
0.5290
4.8784
-8,5374
-1.2336
75.0862
1.5415
-26.5991
-0.4150
-60.5242
-1.0971
105.6378
1.8986
21.1940
1.6196
-7.0953
-0.1973
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 161.9050
61
1.05
(1,0) -1.9178
-0.1877
0.5624
5.0336
23.5615
2.7023
42.7596
0.9182
-13.8715
-0.2258
-47.5403
-0.8523
95.1318 
1.6740
15.4490 
1.1682
-20.3029
-0.5461
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 114.7843
61
0.82
(1,1) 13.9009
1.1852
0.5371
6.3987
22.6127
2.5575
-3.0255
-0.0691
24.7980
0.5262
-57.9330
-1.0873
53.1784
1.6525
-6.1039
-0.5136
-113.9574
-3.0227
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 99.7371
61
0.817
(2,1) 15.4642
0.9450
0.2828
2.7567
14.8239 
1.3496
-8.6785
-0.1939
15.9098
0.2674
-41.3814
-0.6912
74.5450
1.3232
7.0503
0.5294
-91.2575
-2.3164
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 140.7170
60
0.312
(3,1) 28.2513
1.4535
0.1382
1.1777
19.1873
2.2984
-26.2549
-0.5336
36.2445
0.6301
-23.7405
-0.4219
92.0427 
1.4098
4.1318
0.2862
-71.1999
-1.7686
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 121.4133
58
-0.222
o
Appendix 4.4 Regression Results for Basic Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Verion IV
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-B ACQRAT SALES NOEMP CAPEMP PBT______ SHHRTN GOV______ YR OBN N FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) 6.9318
0.5741
0.5845
4.3186
-20.2235
-1.8625
33.1243
0.4561
1.8336
0.0166
-20.7763
-0.2343
97.0319 
1.4233
19.2897
2.3296
-38.6802
-0.4682
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 100.5844
33
0.982
(1,0) 15.0721
0.8223
0.6979
3.8707
47.1496
3.1213
-50.7022
-0.5784
51.1276
0.4138
3.0446
0.0270
64.8752
0.9607
29.4399
2.5676
23.4015
0.2619
84,8 2109 361 1982 1992 38.6094
33
0.673
(1,1) 24.4240
1.2967
0.6584
5.3515
43.0233
2.9478
-69.2926
-0.8998
33.5650
0.4280
22.3994
0.2243
15.2638
0.4018
-29.4211
-2.1047
-156.4482
-2.0151
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 32.5778
33
0.305
(2,1) 29.4692
1.7962
0.2483
1.9985
23.3634
1.8882
-51.4050
-0.8121
29.6740
0.4114
-3.3754
-0.0330
71.4708
1.1717
-7.9120
-0.7642
-105.2383 
-1.4404
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 89.3820
32
0.138
(3,1) 40.1850
2.5001
0.1002
0.7453
19.5280
1.3828
-20.0939
-0.2833
14.1345
0.1689
-5.6321
-0.0678
89.3877 
1.4050
-12.5661
-1.0909
-75.6167
-1.0592
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 97.5953
30
-0.297
Full
Stacking
(0,0) -3.2893
-0.3073
0.5429
4.9580
-6.6557
-0.9653
69.7832 
1.4787
-27.9083
-0.4214
-42.7259
-0.7738
103.3502 
1.8484
15.9697
2.1912
-17.3312
-0.4758
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 169.6495
61
1.054
(1,0) 0.3277
0.0315
0.5742
5.0095
24.4777
2.7317
40.3290
0.8594
-11.7884
-0.1810
-41.4935 
-0.7108
91.8756
1.6065
21.4914
2.7668
-24.1500
-0.6307
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 112.9499
61
0.832
(1,1) 13.7796
1.1478
0.5251
5.8986
22.9928
2.5866
-11.0549
-0.2629
21.2414
0.4341
-43.6922
-0.8102
53.5716
1.6129
-21.7323
-2.2606
-121.3883
-3.2620
nss 2109 361 1982 1992 95.0011
61
0.757
(2,1) 16.7211
0.9853
0.2867
2.7187
13.6129 
1.2420
-10.5899
-0.2426
16.6906
0.2740
-36.6363
-0.6053
77.6266
1.3419
-11.6813
-1.3363
-98.3839
-2.5550
nss 1748 361 1983 1992 138.4960
60
0.292
(3,1) 30.7498 
1.5408
0.1280
1.0801
18.8095
2.1823
-17.7461
-0.3635
25.6606
0.4275
-23.5328
-0.4256
95.5617
1.4408
-12.9788
-1.1241
-76.9379
-1.9177
nss 1387 361 1984 1992 119.8638
58
-0.26
APPENDIX 5.1 Regression Results for Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Version I
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-T ACQEXP SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV YR OBN N FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial 3 (0,0) -229.1247
-1.0921
-0.1211
-1.2523
-0.2471
-3.7155
0.1790
3.1473
1.1822
1.6957
0.0746
0.3682
-7.5177 
-1.0492
-0.0900
-1.8221
-5.6836
-0.9103
nss 442 79 1982 1992 66.4280
25
-1.076
(1,0) -119.2814
-1.1230
0.0491
0.4131
0.5117
3.1507
0.0747
1.4473
0.5201
1.3858
0.1206
0.6509
-5.0408
-1.1843
-0.0348
-0.9536
-4.8595 
-1.0644
nss 442 79 1982 1992 36.9254
25
-1.077
(1,1) 96.6865
1.4693
0.0051
0.0395
0.4727
2.1113
0.0131
0.1655
0.2639
0.6093
0.2069 
1.4484
-3.8551
-2.3545
-0.0217
-0.7477
-0.9041
-0.2801
nss 442 79 1982 1992 59.7989
25
-0.333
(2,1) -63.2337
-1.1001
-0.2724
-1.3648
0.1267
0.9157
0.1202
2.3100
0.6567
1.2851
0.2539 
1.4847
-1.2111 
-1.0062
-0.0528
-1.4885
1.8551
0.5310
nss 363 79 1983 1992 91.9686
24
-1.112
(3,1) 19.1736
0.4439
-0.1761
-1.2679
-0.3441
-1.3290
0.1485
1.3658
-0.2221
-0.3008
0.3164
1.5472
2.4883
0.4230
0.0501
0.6213
-2.2578 
-0.6011
nss 284 79 1984 1992 95.9744
22
-1.507
Partial 2 (0,0) -199.7748
-0.9468
-0.1315
-0.8119
-0.2654
-4.9699
0.1799
3.0793
1.0993
1.3435
0.0893
0.4604
-6.3197
-0.8764
-0.0812
-1.2792
-5.4301
-0.7135
nss 442 79 1982 1992 58.0094
16
-1.041
(1,0) -96.3212
-0.8824
0.0250
0.1529
0.5581
3.9332
0.0722
1.3073
0.5727
1.4126
0.1111
0.5728
-3.9056
-0.9496
-0.0383
-0.9505
-7.3358
-1.2757
nss 442 79 1982 1992 22.1362
16
-1.29
(1,1) 77.9409
1.2011
-0.0042
-0.0225
0.4943
2.2586
0.0012
0.0158
0.1168
0.2015
0.2435
1.5756
-3.0210
-1.6997
-0.0007
-0.0148
-3.6854
-0.7128
nss 442 79 1982 1992 47.8987
16
-0.145
(2,1) -40.5419
-0.8514
-0.1889
-0.6840
0.0879
0.6089
0.1085
2.3535
0.3361
0.5728
0.2656
1.6735
-0.6111
-0.5772
-0.0160
-0.3489
-0.5729
-0.1442
nss 363 79 1983 1992 84.2959
15
-1.021
(3,1) -59.0843
-0.8234
-0.1830
-0.7164
-0.4872 
-1.4409
0.1848
1.1374
-0.8402 
-1.0304
0.2237 
1.0650
-2.5683
-0.3728
0.1000
1.2711
3.6068
0.6535
91 284 79 1984 1992 74.8345
13
-0.957
t o
APPENDIX 5.2 Regression Results for Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Version II
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-T ACQEXP SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV YR OBN N FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial 3 (0,0) -226.0918
-1.0916
-0.1182
-1.2066
-0.2513
-3.7093
0.1803
3.2220
1.1876
1.7161
14.1421 
1.0942
-7.5082
-1.0523
-0.0904
-1.8383
-5.8784
-0.9286
nss 442 79 1982 1992 65.3773
25
-1.106
(1,0) -118.5022
-1.1244
0.0517
0.4387
0.5120
3.1505
0.0764 
1.4879
0.5338
1.4526
13.4667
1.2516
-5.1505
-1.1986
-0.0363
-1.0201
-4.8370 
-1.0642
nss 442 79 1982 1992 36.9214
25
-1.131
(1,1) 103.7022
1.5030
0.0074
0.0557
0.4700
2.0718
0.0156
0.1975
0.2927
0.6652
-1.1382
-0.0685
-4.0307
-2.4170
-0.0250
-0.8414
-0.4902
-0.1586
nss 442 79 1982 1992 60.1354
25
-0.39
(2,1) -59.8031
-1.0529
-0.2660
-1.3271
0.1260
0.8983
0.1224
2.3325
0.6545
1.3561
10.1182
0.5779
-1.3172
-1.0734
-0.0530 
-1.6047
2.1083
0.6085
nss 363 79 1983 1992 91.9212
24
-1.102
(3,1) 16.3047
0.3486
-0.1735
-1.2816
-0.3315
-1.2864
0.1502
1.4191
-0.1901
-0.2479
31.8731
1.0521
2.5498
0.4187
0.0460
0.5452
-1.6649 
-0.5126
nss 284 79 1984 1992 96.3558
22
-1.502
Partial 2 (0,0) -196.3438
-0.9461
-0.1273
-0.7835
-0.2706
-5.0453
0.1813
3.1952
1.1143
1.3822
17.1990
1.2596
-6.2913
-0.8790
-0.0822
-1.3204
-5.8879
-0.7451
nss 442 79 1982 1992 56.2765
16
-1.081
(1,0) -95.2320
-0.8816
0.0278
0.1703
0.5582
3.9499
0.0735 
1.3493
0.5925
1.5091
17.0529
1.3115
-3.9698
-0.9637
-0.0401
-1.0389
-7.5884
-1.3008
nss 442 79 1982 1992 21.8985
16
-1.377
(1,1) 84.6151
1.2465
0.0018
0.0093
0.4900
2.2136
0.0039
0.0503
0.1351
0.2328
3.4001
0.2083
-3.1688
-1.7820
-0.0028
-0.0595
-3.2142
-0.6499
nss 442 79 1982 1992 48.8103
16
-0.195
(2,1) -36.5624
-0.7762
-0.1738
-0.6286
0.0843
0.5800
0.1099
2.3715
0.3039
0.5421
16.1144
0.9188
-0.6748
-0.6256
-0.0128
-0.2915
-0.4751
-0.1165
87 363 79 1983 1992 84.0337
15
-1.011
(3,1) -66.2772
-0.9529
-0.1806
-0.7118
-0.4748
-1.4132
0.1846
1.1597
-0.8505
-1.0142
38.1809
1.2365
-2.2095
-0.3205
0.1003
1.2312
4.0102
0.7863
91 284 79 1984 1992 74.0386
13
-0.956
u
APPENDIX 5.3 Regression Results for Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Version III
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-T ACQRAT SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV YR OBN N FROM TO SABGAN 2SC
Partial 3 (0.0) -269.1932
-1.1195
-0.1147
-1.1700
-2.3618
-0.7722
0.1403
2.3230
0.8858
1.2768
0.2713
1.1281
-9.1256
-1.3350
-0.0571
-1.1767
-5.6626
-0.8610
nss 442 79 1982 1992 61.5455
25
-1.079
(1,0) -227.5790
-1.1683
-0.0155
-0.1095
3.2635
0.8015
0.1162
2.0867
0.8066
1.2768
0.1434
0.7280
-8.3190
-1.3910
-0.0537
-1.1316
-5.3180
-0.8922
nss 442 79 1982 1992 56.4122
25
-1.293
(1,1) 69.2509
2.3358
-0.0376
-0.2447
4.8701
0.8471
0.0938
2.0530
0.5060 
1.0364
-0.1634
-0.4000
-2.7055
-1.2629
-0.0416
-1.1681
3.4663
0.8616
83 442 79 1982 1992 53.0434
25
-1.171
(2,1) -37.5048
-0.5688
-0.2791
-1.5480
4.4247
1.7456
0.0965
1.8213
0.5249
0.7303
0.1509
0.7056
-1.2009 
-1.0509
-0.0227
-0.4785
-1.2364
-0.1971
nss 363 79 1983 1992 62.9654
24
-1.15
(3,1) 9.7683
0.2145
-0.1381
-1.1521
-0.3653
-0.2264
0.0737
1.2166
0.4178
1.0321
0.2314 
1.0649
8.1561
0.9388
-0.0139
-0.3858
-1.5515
-0.5009
nss 284 79 1984 1992 96.1018
22
-1.284
Partial 2 (0,0) -211.8558
-1.0125
-0.1238
-0.7637
-4.5780
-0.9780
0.1200
2.2121
0.5638
0.6858
0.4256
1.3395
-7.1780
-1.1595
-0.0177
-0.2641
-5.1023
-0.6680
nss 442 79 1982 1992 35.5525
16
-1.036
(1,0) -181.2952
-1.0628
0.0397
0.1592
4.7029
0.8368
0.0942
1.6132
0.6773
0.9142
0.1586
0.7049
-6.4424 
-1.2445
-0.0331
-0.5759
-8.7008
-0.9197
nss 442 79 1982 1992 35.3365
16
-1.276
(1,1) 45.3085
0.9696
0.0451
0.1658
6.2441
0.8331
0.0793
1.5388
0.2711
0.4361
-0.2233
-0.4186
-1.9060
-0.7778
-0.0095
-0.1942
0.5177
0.1091
nss 442 79 1982 1992 37.6462
16
-1.059
(2,1) -43.4541
-0.6324
-0.3406
-1.3831
4.8972
1.6156
0.0948
1.7154
0.5870
0.7663
0.1770
0.7348
-0.9665
-0.7904
-0.0241
-0.4176
-3.2699
-0.3896
nss 363 79 1983 1992 54.4301
15
-1.109
(3,1) -43.8741
-0.7014
-0.0226
-0.0986
-1.6424 
-0.8185
0.0587
0.8507
-0.2479
-0.3979
-0.0222
-0.0608
7.3553
0.7250
0.0434
0.7416
3.5466
0.6048
91 284 79 1984 1992 71.2326
13
-1.125
vi
APPENDIX 5.4 Regression Results for Total Remuneration of the Highest Paid Director Sample: Version IV
STACKING LAG CONST HPD-T ACQRAT SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV YR OBN N FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial 3 (0,0) -267.5235
-1.1132
-0.1092 
-1.0794
-2.4280
-0.7951
0.1438
2.3541
0.9128
1.3311
24.6665
1.1263
-9.3951
-1.3565
-0.0596
-1.2473
-5.7213
-0.8665
nss 442 79 1982 1992 60.3435
25
-1.098
(1,0) -223.7520
-1.1688
-0.0060
-0.0422
3.4558
0.8383
0.1169
2.1110
0.8100
1.3256
31.7806 
1.0799
-8.3469 
-1.4279
-0.0543
-1.1822
-5.3141
-0.8912
nss 442 79 1982 1992 54.5578
25
-1.283
(1,1) 66.5095
2.4982
-0.0424
-0.2763
4.7101
0.8400
0.0922
2.0424
0.4907
0.9975
-23.8610
-0.5493
-2.6186
-1.2424
-0.0401
-1.1324
3.3398
0.8794
83 442 79 1982 1992 54.9085
25
-1.129
(2,1) -28.5442
-0.4019
-0.2878
-1.5429
4.9025
1.8831
0.0971
1.7530
0.4972
0.6928
33.2599
1.3954
-1.2280
-1.0926
-0.0185 
-0.3811
-1.5816
-0.2371
nss 363 79 1983 1992 58.4213
24
-1.131
(3,1) 3.4113
0.0642
-0.1376
-1.1337
0.2064
0.0925
0.0755
1.2395
0.4086 
1.0301
32.9804
0.8594
8.2162
0.9470
-0.0133
-0.3676
-0.9806
-0.3606
nss 284 79 1984 1992 96.7898
22
-1.287
Partial 2 (0,0) -208.5331 
-1.0040
-0.1181
-0.7117
-4.7848
-0.9903
0.1242
2.3102
0.6102
0.7579
39.3481 
1.2489
-7.5035
-1.1909
-0.0210
-0.3238
-5.6635
-0.6961
nss 442 79 1982 1992 33.5095
16
-1.062
(1,0) -170.0361
-1.0576
0.0692
0.2662
5.4068
0.9080
0.0892
1.5208
0.6717
0.9613
49.8713
1.1022
-6.2050
-1.2685
-0.0314
-0.5778
-9.6687
-0.9836
nss 442 79 1982 1992 30.1470
16
-1.285
(1,1) 41.5536
0.8574
0.0294
0.1119
5.7248
0.8271
0.0788
1.5335
0.2436
0.3928
-24.7036
-0.4938
-1.7782
-0.7290
-0.0071
-0.1475
0.4376
0.0939
nss 442 79 1982 1992 41.7331
16
-1.036
(2,1) -36.1851
-0.4813
-0.3677
-1.4695
5.6112
1.7827
0.0957
1.6231
0.5918
0.7886
38.9106
1.2959
-1.0183
-0.8108
-0.0223
-0.3787
-3.8586
-0.4133
nss 363 79 1983 1992 48.2073
15
-1.112
(3,1) -49.5981
-0.8171
-0.0277
-0.1227
-1.0419
-0.3957
0.0583
0.8590
-0.2634
-0.4572
27.2844
0.6728
7.6546
0.7737
0.0456
0.8540
3.3318
0.6633
91 284 79 1984 1992 73.3426
13
-1.132
APPENDIX 6.1 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Director Sample: Version I
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-DIR ACQEXP SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -66.5019
-0.5961
0.6280
3.0453
0.5885
2.0062
0.1255 
1.7404
-0.5098
-0.7698
0.3096 
1.2003
-20.9699
-1.5503
-0.0269
-0.1957
4.5267
0.3437
336 2089 1982 1992 81.6645
33
1.157
(1,0) -45.0972
-0.5974
0.5537
2.2731
0.5721 
1.0425
0.1149 
1.6488
-0.2504
-0.3796
0.4311 
1.7092
-18.5679 
-1.0054
-0.0654
-0.6036
2.3435
0.1752
336 2089 1982 1992 99.4177
33
1.874
(1,1) 98.2769
1.1620
0.5651
2.2436
0.1361
0.2255
0.1967
2.1540
0.1111
0.2060
0.0223
0.0628
-24.3163
-1.9487
0.1042
0.5484
-37.9979
-1.9664
336 2089 1982 1992 42.9926
33
0.927
(2,1) 11.2324
0.1117
0.4181
1.8621
0.4440
0.8501
0.1083
1.5013
0.3659 
1.2844
0.1213
0.3736
4.2672
0.3409
0.0378
0.4297
-23.7233
-1.5089
336 1753 1983 1992 67.3909
32
0.834
(3,1) -16.6364
-0.2166
0.2403
1.2005
-0.2525
-0.8575
0.2767
1.6653
0.3472
1.6292
0.0808
0.2640
-1.5143
-0.0693
0.0019
0.0293
-22.2852
-1.5280
336 1417 1984 1992 68.7353
30
0.308
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 55.1911
0.9772
0.4925
3.4378
0.4405
1.5309
0.0716
1.2213
-0.4658
-0.9152
0.4251
1.8880
-0.8999
-0.1095
0.0205
0.1797
-0.6403
-0.0599
336 2089 1982 1992 183.7049
61
1.031
(1,0) 63.2120
1.0845
0.5051
3.1939
0.1311
0.3860
0.0637
1.2791
-0.3353
-0.6353
0.4973
2.2668
0.7894
0.0896
0.0113
0.1121
-1.1793
-0.1092
336 2089 1982 1992 199.5434
61
1.508
(1,1) 85.7048
1.5228
0.4451
2.7918
-0.1499
-0.4344
0.1882
3.1338
0.1767
0.4379
0.2022
0.6954
-9.2587
-0.9788
0.0500
0.3426
-29.4185
-2.9892
336 2089 1982 1992 102.1517
61
0.574
(2,1) 29.0908
0.2688
0.3266
2.4478
0.3913
1.2061
0.1187
2.2146
0.2359
0.8008
0.2228
0.7857
7.7762
0.7393
0.0446
0.3891
-24.9586
-3.0052
336 1753 1983 1992 105.9977
60
0.551
(3,1) -35.7756
-0.3696
0.1471 
1.0674
-0.1370
-0.5204
0.2736
2.5555
0.3111
1.3647
0.1861
0.6117
4.2143
0.2935
0.0010
0.0154
-26.9844
-3.4719
336 1417 1984 1992 92.3077
58
-0.059
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APPENDIX 6.2 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Director Sample: Version II
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-P1R ACQEXP SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -74.5287
-0.6299
0.6452
3.1053
0.6172
2.1332
0.1319 
1.7642
-0.4797
-0.6993
3.6187
0.4920
-23.0089
-1.6520
-0.0330
-0.2413
3.7730
0.2856
336 2089 1982 1992 81.9928
33
1.17
(1,0) -53.9759
-0.6708
0.5793
2.3433
0.5786
0.9996
0.1224 
1.6704
-0.1957
-0.2835
4.3244
0.5876
-20.9582
-1.2411
-0.0748
-0.7012
1.3385
0.0982
336 2089 1982 1992 100.2946
33
1.974
(1,1) 97.3333
1.1519
0.5793
2.3805
0.1501
0.2464
0.1920
2.1292
0.1182
0.2173
-3.8873
-0.5411
-24.2100
-1.9369
0.1070
0.5643
-37.8977
-1.9597
336 2089 1982 1992 42.6032
33
0.939
(2,1) 10.3192
0.1040
0.4386
2.0677
0.4212
0.8007
0.1048 
1.4726
0.3898 
1.4298
-0.4512
-0.0687
4.2954
0.3464
0.0377
0.4434
-23.4003
-1.4591
336 1753 1983 1992 67.4431
32
0.88
(3,1) -15.7766
-0.2048
0.2484
1.2465
-0.2495
-0.8508
0.2798
1.6869
0.3540
1.6560
-0.3051
-0.0483
-2.3132
-0.1082
0.0013
0.0210
-21.8999
-1.5027
336 1417 1984 1992 69.1559
30
0.338
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 54.8617
0.9947
0.5133
3.5539
0.4758
1.6815
0.0750
1.2545
-0.4272
-0.8032
4.4258
0.6184
-2.1106
-0.2580
0.0174
0.1526
-1.9223
-0.1801
336 2089 1982 1992 185.4919
61
1.031
(1,0) 63.4644
1.1176
0.5339
3.3648
0.1149
0.3286
0.0674 
1.3402
-0.2815
-0.5042
4.5165
0.6259
-0.4870
-0.0552
0.0083
0.0827
-2.7131
-0.2503
336 2089 1982 1992 202.1364
61
1.596
(1,1) 84.7377
1.5153
0.4741
3.0466
-0.1182
-0.3311
0.1803
3.0268
0.2069
0.5125
-1.8178
-0.2978
-9.2112
-0.9971
0.0522
0.3601
-29.0812
-2.9482
336 2089 1982 1992 102.5139
61
0.684
(2,1) 28.4396
0.2645
0.3547
2.7689
0.3734
1.1534
0.1135
2.1407
0.2740
0.9536
1.5458
0.2422
7.6732
0.7347
0.0453
0.4025
-24.5431
-2.9343
336 1753 1983 1992 106.8095
60
0.653
(3,1) -32.4086
-0.3373
0.1607
1.1623
-0.1218
-0.4634
0.2761
2.5588
0.3342 
1.4884
2.7279
0.4502
3.4624
0.2438
-0.0006
-0.0083
-26.7521
-3.4451
336 1417 1984 1992 93.1262
58
0
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APPENDIX 6.3 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Director Sample: Version III
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-PIR ACQRAT SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -45.9371
-0.5757
0.6601
3.0207
1.0849 
0.3194
0.1168
1.9904
-0.3522
-0.4837
0.3603
1.3035
-16.9950
-1.7995
-0.0315
-0.2150
2.5019
0.1711
336 2089 1982 1992 97.6709
33
1.652
11,0) -50.3947
-0.5969
0.6628
3.0247
2.8285
1.2619
0.1037
1.9329
-0.3667
-0.5335
0.3502
1.3369
-18.4421
-1.8883
-0.0156
-0.1096
3.7005
0.2708
336 2089 1982 1992 94.0014
33
2.048
(1,1) 96.3379
1.1797
0.5928
2.5397
1.9625
0.6395
0.1893
2.0127
0.1603
0.3306
-0.0310
-0.0816
-22.3969
-1.9043
0.1053
0.5503
-37.4551
-1.9527
336 2089 1982 1992 42.6748
33
1.065
(2,1) 13.8290
0.1897
0.3900
1.8638
5.3026
2.5100
0.0919 
1.4232
0.4571
1.6916
-0.0597
-0.1945
5.3042
0.4718
0.0192
0.1960
-10.7598
-0.8614
336 1753 1983 1992 67.6136
32
1.294
(3,1) -8.9300
-0.1143
0.2926
1.2936
5.6518
0.9376
0.2115
1.1523
0.3374
1.4198
0.1555
0.4157
2.8513
0.1334
0.0191
0.3037
-22.2932
-1.4982
336 1417 1984 1992 50.9232
30
-0.115
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 59.0531 
1.0689
0.5262
3.6462
-1.3894
-0.6261
0.0643
1.3998
-0.3647
-0.6513
0.5382
2.3209
-0.1921
-0.0211
0.0250
0.2006
-0.6864
-0.0596
336 2089 1982 1992 191.8572
61
1.706
(1,0) 64.4689
1.1424
0.5350
3.5420
1.2778
0.8729
0.0576
1.2774
-0.3553
-0.6473
0.4660
2.1009
0.9049
0.1042
0.0233
0.1973
-0.6975
-0.0645
336 2089 1982 1992 193.4248
61
1.614
(1,1) 89.9730 
1.6864
0.4520
2.8070
2.0001 
1.0270
0.1774
3.1282
0.1916
0.5099
0.1121
0.3705
-8.0595
-0.9262
0.0461
0.3091
-29.9352
-3.0867
336 2089 1982 1992 99.5781
61
0.858
(2,1) 24.8902
0.2555
0.3179
2.4703
4.1603
2.3872
0.1154
2.1456
0.2581
0.8853
0.0857
0.2907
6.5130
0.6154
0.0553
0.5116
-20.8083
-2.6443
336 1753 1983 1992 101.1981
60
0.782
(3,1) -32.8680
-0.3405
0.1651
1.0661
2.8901
0.7791
0.2444
1.9161
0.2971
1.2160
0.2163
0.6582
5.8119
0.3665
0.0117
0.1736
-27.0087
-3.3938
336 1417 1984 1992 84.4444
58
-0.249
APPENDIX 6.4 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Director Sample: Version IV
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-PIR ACQRAT SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -55.7658
-0.6532
0.6805
3.0644
1.7264 
0.5164
0.1261
2.0490
-0.3079
-0.4064
2.8916
0.4226
-19.3300
-2.0330
-0.0410
-0.2838
0.9866
0.0676
336 2089 1982 1992 96.8426
33
1.668
(1,0) -59.8357
-0.6662
0.6844
3.0790
3.2992 
1.4860
0.1094
1.9657
-0.3282
-0.4617
4.3276
0.4418
-20.9402
-2.1716
-0.0196
-0.1371
2.6029
0.1885
336 2089 1982 1992 93.5141
33
2.174
(1,1) 95.1852
1.1753
0.6070
2.8188
2.4278
0.7909
0.1828
1.9669
0.1663
0.3447
-4.4696
-0.5185
-21.8515
-1.8590
0.1097
0.5755
-37.3285
-1.9327
336 2089 1982 1992 41.8322
33
1.116
(2,1) 12.6835
0.1766
0.3914
1.9774
5.5759
2.5738
0.0884 
1.4082
0.4602
1.7333
-4.1258
-0.6989
5.3219
0.4716
0.0194
0.1952
-9.9276
-0.7649
336 1753 1983 1992 66.0330
32
1.211
(3,1) -7.8058
-0.0989
0.2986
1.3210
5.5953
0.8967
0.2175
1.2010
0.3516 
1.4888
9.0366
0.7732
2.0803
0.0995
0.0173
0.2758
-22.0287 
-1.4797
336 1417 1984 1992 51.5934
30
-0.093
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 60.4947
1.1243
0.5525
3.8047
-0.9335 
-0.4175
0.0684 
1.4703
-0.3021
-0.5107
4.9846
0.6305
-1.2454
-0.1381
0.0189
0.1522
-2.4385
-0.2138
336 2089 1982 1992 197.3627
61
1.741
(1,0) 65.3218
1.2012
0.5644
3.7165
1.6118
1.0876
0.0586
1.2813
-0.3044
-0.5302
4.6668
0.5548
-0.2157
-0.0248
0.0213
0.1788
-2.0864
-0.1923
336 2089 1982 1992 194.6771
61
1.73
(1.1) 88.7372 
1.6843
0.4832
3.1511
2.4966 
1.3028
0.1681
2.9490
0.2225
0.5988
-2.1396
-0.2976
-7.5866
-0.8820
0.0498
0.3355
-29.6979
-3.0498
336 2089 1982 1992 97.5804
61
0.984
(2,1) 23.4201
0.2433
0.3378
2.7250
4.5041
2.5635
0.1080
2.0042
0.2816
0.9644
-0.5388
-0.0782
6.4084
0.6112
0.0588
0.5423
-20.1661
-2.5511
336 1753 1983 1992 99.1450
60
0.81
(3,1) -29.8903
-0.3104
0.1765
1.1343
2.7733
0.7284
0.2506
1.9700
0.3222 
1.3435
7.5636
0.8715
4.9145
0.3138
0.0095
0.1417
-26.8632
-3.3819
336 1417 1984 1992 85.6180
58
-0.197
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APPENDIX 6.5 Regression Results for Total of Basic Remunearion for All Directors Sample : Version I
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL-DIR ACQEXP SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV_______ N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -80.0319
-0.6527
0.7484
4.5687
0.9248
3.2197
0.1760
1.7881
-0.9363
-1.5815
0.3154 
1.4269
-23.5725
-1.6336
0.0560
0.5452
-0.2052
-0.0160
336 2089 1982 1992 75.1239
33
0.287
(1,0) -10.7463
-0.1662
0.8615
6.6085
-0.1682
-0.3278
0.1119 
1.5344
-0.5489
-0.8485
0.4814
2.0210
-7.8960
-0.7445
0.0046
0.0418
10.2279
0.7829
336 2089 1982 1992 115.1089
33
1.107
(1,1) 53.1197
0.9363
0.9013
4.9059
-0.6764
-1.4297
0.0949 
1.3500
0.9685
2.4366
-0.0376
-0.1263
-9.7470
-0.8309
-0.0531
-0.5580
-16.2594
-0.8179
336 2089 1982 1992 72.8345
33
0.716
(2,1) 26.3181
0.3644
0.5744
4.0112
0.7367 
1.4606
0.0432
0.5373
0.6862
1.6115
0.1516
0.6532
6.8474
0.6178
0.0352
0.4247
-8.6814
-0.6003
336 1753 1983 1992 102.1927
32
0.589
(3,1) -55.5446
-0.7310
0.2253
0.8156
0.0779
0.2312
0.4739
2.4787
0.5461 
1.9043
0.1157
0.3913
-24.0292
-1.5986
0.0062
0.0737
-18.5244
-1.7976
336 1417 1984 1992 86.1880
30
0.92
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 24.0607
0.4377
0.6219
5.2259
0.6280
2.4160
0.1418
2.0141
-0.8829
-1.8991
0.5097
2.7738
-4.4604
-0.5948
0.1003
1.2947
1.2861
0.1615
336 2089 1982 1992 237.5313
61
0.546
(1,0) 36.1753
0.6559
0.6571
7.7513
-0.0190
-0.0499
0.1210
2.0972
-0.6677
-1.3895
0.6115
3.2120
-0.4020
-0.0557
0.0782
0.9225
5.6230
0.7486
336 2089 1982 1992 265.8537
61
1.198
(1,1) 54.5729
1.2552
0.6438
5.1528
-0.2731
-0.7869
0.1244
1.6025
0.5182
1.4359
0.1397
0.5645
-3.7588
-0.4635
0.0552
0.7111
-17.9955
-1.6813
336 2089 1982 1992 180.4294 
61
0.856
(2,1) 31.8714
0.3282
0.4696
3.6814
0.6413
1.9253
0.0711
0.7641
0.4099
0.8771
0.2757
1.2132
8.5101
0.8289
0.1157
1.4491
-17.4159
-1.8200
336 1753 1983 1992 158.1501
60
0.544
(3,1) -67,3330
-0.7291
0.0450
0.2390
0.2199
0.6619
0.4797
2.8394
0.5019
1.8744
0.3250
1.2680
-12.9879
-1.0536
0.0349
0.4656
-24.7172
-3.2650
336 1417 1984 1992 124.0260 
58
0.209
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APPENDIX 6.6 Regression Results for Total of Basic Remunearion for All Directors Sample : Version II
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL-DIR ACQEXP SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV_______ N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -86.9712
-0.6685
0.7729
4.7306
0.9552
3.3419
0.1816
1.7968
-0.9037
-1.4593
7.1102
1.3619
-25.8462
-1.7455
0.0507
0.4859
-2.3618
-0.1791
336 2089 1982 1992 76.0382
33
0.255
(1,0) -16.4484
-0.2453
0.9113
7.1410
-0.2108
-0.3959
0.1155
1.5178
-0.4764
-0.6889
5.8759
1.1232
-10.2083
-0.9298
-0.0062
-0.0544
7.4889
0.5629
336 2089 1982 1992 120.2748
33
1.118
(1,1) 52.6436
0.9255
0.9100
5.5092
-0.6628
-1.3852
0.0894
1.3059
0.9735
2.5194
0.5929
0.1316
-9.4210
-0.7960
-0.0518
-0.5536
-16.2837
-0.8180
336 2089 1982 1992 71.3520
33
0.717
(2,1) 26.4706
0.3663
0.6023
4.5036
0.7041
1.4238
0.0361
0.4625
0.7283
1.7732
4.6129
0.8457
6.9102
0.6309
0.0312
0.3778
-8.3821
-0.5716
336 1753 1983 1992 101.6599
32
0.649
(3,1) -53.4028
-0.7190
0.2498
0.9271
0.0776
0.2310
0.4683
2.4260
0.5654
2.0221
3.3948
0.7330
-24.6826
-1.6898
0.0024
0.0292
-17.7512
-1.7423
336 1417 1984 1992 86.6820
30
0.965
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 26.4421
0.4780
0.6608
5.4950
0.6614
2.5586
0.1420
2.0310
-0.8288
-1.6811
6.7746 
1.4549
-5.6024
-0.7469
0.0952
1.2222
-1.5176
-0.1888
336 2089 1982 1992 240.6545
61
0.492
(1,0) 39.1602
0.7390
0.7140
8.1098
-0.0691
-0.1753
0.1198
2.1444
-0.5862
-1.1130
6.0610
1.2975
-1.5893
-0.2232
0.0706
0.8095
2.4417
0.3250
336 2089 1982 1992 273.6399
61
1.213
(1,1) 54.1076 
1.2464
0.6724
5.9150
-0.2632
-0.7328
0.1140
1.5094
0.5570
1.5432
3.0297
0.6397
-3.3665
-0.4180
0.0532
0.6782
-17.7986
-1.6575
336 2089 1982 1992 177.9210
61
0.905
(2,1) 34.5492
0.3563
0.5065
4.1747
0.6156
1.8929
0.0604
0.6715
0.4701
1.0301
6.7221
1.1318
8.8355
0.8772
0.1114
1.4010
-16.9285
-1.7573
336 1753 1983 1992 159.6231
60
0.648
(3,1) -59.4201
-0.6645
0.0740
0.3956
0.2313
0.6975
0.4753
2.8419
0.5436
2.0747
6.8208 
1.3620
-13.4520
-1.1133
0.0294
0.3969
-24.0401
-3.2397
336 1417 1984 1992 128.2493
58
0.322
oo
APPENDIX 6.7 Regression Results for Total of Basic Remunearion for All Directors Sample : Version III
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL-DIR ACQRAT SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV_______ N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -16.1694
-0.2242
0.8245
6.2811
0.1204
0.0302
0.1189 
1.4922
-0.5599
-0.9233
0.4962
1.9841
-9.1871
-0.8747
0.0051
0.0466
9.9325
0.7374
336 2089 1982 1992 120.2693
33
1.179
(1,0) -19.8673
-0.2789
0.8231
5.6864
0.9085
0.3374
0.1176
1.4491
-0.5626
-0.9383
0.4817
1.9958
-10.1307
-0.9384
0.0093
0.0904
9.8317
0.7722
336 2089 1982 1992 120.5647
33
1.199
(1,1) 61,1723 
1.0248
0.7672
4.2729
0.1952
0.0686
0.1111
1.6015
0.6964
2.0318
-0.0550
-0.1621
-13.6617
-1.3667
-0.0054
-0.0587
-16.2064
-0.8716
336 2089 1982 1992 93.8886
33
1.185
(2,1) 34.0595
0.4451
0.6249
3.7757
4.6780
1.9954
0.0154
0.1921
0.8014
1.9178
-0.0795
-0.2912
9.7549
0.9206
0.0313
0.3629
2.2185
0.1570
336 1753 1983 1992 93.6750
32
0.913
(3,1) -56.2096
-0.7202
0.2651
0.9955
3.3438
0.9927
0.4483
2.3680
0.5198
1.6972
0.1625
0.4963
-23.3103
-1.5764
0.0226
0.2726
-19.3926
-1.9213
336 1417 1984 1992 72.9372
30
0.492
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 33.0986
0.6337
0.6450
5.8596
-1.8087
-0.8198
0.1224
2.0789
-0.6972
-1.5477
0.6826
3.5927
-1.6469 
-0.2429
0.0914
1.0229
6.0121
0.7673
336 2089 1982 1992 254.7604
61
1.268
(1,0) 37.2687
0.7179
0.6576
5.5973
0.5723
0.2941
0.1178
1.9033
-0.6648
-1.4255
0.6003
2.8591
-0.3383
-0.0494
0.0795
0.9452
5.5191
0.7540
336 2089 1982 1992 266.6619
61
1.189
(1,1) 59.9331
1.4317
0.6118
4.0929
0.8345
0.3999
0.1191
1.6219
0.4749
1.3936
0.1019
0.3551
-2.7681
-0.3843
0.0624
0.8683
-18.6458
-1.8099
336 2089 1982 1992 187.0447 
61
1.065
(2,1) 30.2335
0.3227
0.5114
3.4383
2.5859
1.2626
0.0706
0.7481
0.4822 
1.0743
0.1337
0.5162
8.5254
0.8057
0.1103
1.3727
-14.0211
-1.5732
336 1753 1983 1992 172.2881
60
0.922
(3,1) -72.7963
-0.7900
0.0648
0.3367
2.0254
0.7377
0.4910
2.9320
0.4774
1.6810
0.3551
1.3171
-15.0777
-1.3358
0.0481
0.6312
-25.6209
-3.4407
336 1417 1984 1992 115.8131
58
0.018
ooro
APPENDIX 6.8 Regression Results for Total of Basic Remunearion for All Directors Sample : Version IV
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL-DIR ACQRAT SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV________N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -23.3821
-0.3157
0.8727
6.3825
1.3351
0.3270
0.1238
1.4851
-0.4760
-0.7140
5.0756
0.8076
-11.2319 
-1.0684
-0.0151
-0.1354
6.9626
0.5159
336 2089 1982 1992 123.6993
33
1.16
(1.0) -30.0115 
-0.4005
0.8617
5.9438
1.7001
0.6740
0.1216 
1.4439
-0.4957
-0.7808
6.0668
1.1640
-13.4832
-1.2458
0.0017
0.0161
7.0490
0.5473
336 2089 1982 1992 125.6722
33
1.304
(1,1) 59.2176
1.0110
0.7795
5.0383
0.9872
0.3773
0.1018
1.5559
0.7189
2.2688
1.0816
0.2620
-12.5440
-1.2442
-0.0076
-0.0853
-15.5291
-0.8344
336 2089 1982 1992 92.4905
33
1.214
(2,1) 35.7382
0.4540
0.6355
4.1876
5.1849
2.1756
0.0042
0.0533
0.8184
2.0055
0.8537
0.1125
10.3829
0.9785
0.0314
0.3711
3.6541
0.2522
336 1753 1983 1992 86.0740
32
0.861
(3,1) -54.3419
-0.7113
0.2833 
1.0904
3.0798
0.8877
0.4490
2.3515
0.5427
1.8312
8.7524
1.2423
-24.2149
-1.6752
0.0174
0.2138
-18.6487
-1.8680
336 1417 1984 1992 74.9545
30
0.604
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 38.1206
0.7702
0.6995
6.1560
-1.1896
-0.5188
0.1210
2.1181
-0.6022
-1.2019
6.7470
1.2824
-2.3858
-0.3646
0.0787
0.8679
2.5842
0.3392
336 2089 1982 1992 271.7948
61
1.257
(1.0) 41.5663
0.8476
0.7083
5.9805
1.0905
0.5686
0.1139
1.8738
-0.5848
-1.1624
6.2471 
1.2834
-1.3871
-0.2063
0.0736
0.8575
2.3527
0.3212
336 2089 1982 1992 274.8817
61
1.255
(1.1) 58.7987
1.4057
0 ,6437
4.8726
1,4871
0.7723
0,1055
1.5194
0,5266
1.6068
3,1719
0.7706
-1 ,6175 
-0 .2252
0,0580
0.8146
-18 ,2475
-1.7791
336 2089 1982 1992 182,5492
61
1,142
(2,1) 31.8889
0.3421
0.5408
3.9201
3.0936
1.5130
0.0563
0.6104
0.5264
1.1780
4.6537
0.6539
8.8851
0.8577
0.1105
1.3772
-13.1225
-1.4565
336 1753 1983 1992 166.9341
60
0.92
(3,1) -65.0184
-0.7269
0.0925
0.4809
1.9314
0.6831
0.4902
2.9329
0.5202
1.8691
10.3583
1.5382
-15.7405
-1.4102
0.0424
0.5599
-25.0021
-3.4241
336 1417 1984 1992 120.2317
58
0.147
ooco
Appendix 7.1 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Employees Sample: Version I
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-EMP ACQEXP SALES OBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) 0.8383
1.2393
-0.0132
-0.2152
-0.0049
-0.7648
0.0036
2.3587
0.0053
0.3394
-0.0030
-1.4752
-0.5410
-2.4473
0.0000
0.0194
-0.2108
-3.1107
266 1305 1984 1992 42.7498
25
-0.19
(1.0) 0.8431
1.2505
-0.0232
-0.3703
-0.0009
-0.1123
0.0035
2.3679
0.0002
0.0140
-0.0038
-1.5527
-0.5199
-2.4597
0.0007
0.3056
-0.2165
-2.9692
266 1305 1984 1992 44.2988
25
-0.004
(1.1) 1.0132 
1.0334
-0.0554
-0.8080
-0.0060
-0.6563
0.0017
0.5719
0.0565
1.0778
-0.0029
-0.7170
-0.3286
-1.1634
-0.0080
-1.0936
-0.3076
-3.7076
266 1305 1984 1992 23.1039
25
-0.267
(2,1) 0.9022
0.9559
0.0163
0.1916
0.0205 
1.3400
-0.0006
-0.1280
0.0678
0.9154
-0.0006
-0.0925
0.0032
0.0085
-0.0099
-1.0224
-0.3010
-4.1860
266 1039 1985 1992 11.8178
24
-0.626
(3,1) 0.0711
0.1568
0.0809
0.3957
0.0132
1.0626
0.0005
0.1973
0.0746
1.4396
-0.0043
-0.7655
-0.0526
-0.2285
-0.0095
-1.3552
-0.1376
-1.8610
266 773 1986 1992 17.3324
22
-0.372
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 0.9632
1.7711
-0.0408
-0.5077
-0.0015 
-0.3069
0.0025
2.7720
0.0002
0.0169
-0.0018 
-0.9573
-0.3693
-2.9799
0.0006
0.3234
-0.1430
-2.9008
266 1305 1984 1992 87.7781
40
0.087
(1,0) 0.9677 
1.7500
-0.0437
-0.5286
-0.0042
-0.8718
0.0025
2.7165
-0.0006
-0.0501
-0.0026
-1.3301
-0.3708
-3.0859
0.0007
0.4050
-0.1352
-2.8087
266 1305 1984 1992 86.7253
40
0.127
(1.1) 0.8992
1.5724
-0.0469
-0.8899
-0.0043
-0.7908
0.0010
0.8721
-0.0037
-0.2202
0.0015
0.4886
-0.1636
-1.0832
0.0009
0.3359
-0.1836
-3.3828
266 1305 1984 1992 85.2999
40
-0.068
(2,1) 0.7450 
1.3849
0.0013
0.0253
0.0154
1.6575
0.0000
0.0258
0.0044
0.2075
0.0028
0.6410
-0.0126
-0.0631
-0.0010
-0.3322
-0.1891
-4.0959
266 1039 1985 1992 49.8217
39
-1.465
(3,1) 0.6876
1.3350
-0.0744
-0.2982
0.0105
0.9741
-0.0010
-0.4071
0.0099
0.5155
0.0015
0.4525
0.0607
0.2677
-0.0012
-0.4688
-0.0487
-0.8708
266 773 1986 1992 50.2324
37
1.048
oo
Appendix 7.2 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Employees Sample: Version II
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-EMP ACQEXP SALES OBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) 0.7949
1.1736
-0.0134
-0.2101
-0.0045
-0.7060
0.0036
2.3688
0.0035
0.2137
-0.1287
-2.8175
-0.5431
-2.4677
0.0003
0.1159
-0.2110
-3.1335
266 1305 1984 1992 43.0718
25
0.48
(1,0) 0.7800
1.1628
-0.0227
-0.3551
-0.0021
-0.2730
0.0034
2.3983
-0.0016
-0.1063
-0.1323
-2.8084
-0.5278
-2.5164
0.0010
0.3992
-0.2113
-2.9437
266 1305 1984 1992 44.4543
25
0.614
(1,1) 0.9674
0.9935
-0.0469
-0.6438
-0.0045
-0.5009
0.0016
0.5460
0.0531
1.0141
-0.9385
-11.5799
-0.3186
-1.1473
-0.0075
-1.0130
-0.3075
-3.7143
266 1305 1984 1992 25.2628
25
-0.975
(2,1) 1.0288
1.1486
0.0191
0.2236
0.0221
1.4613
-0.0006
-0.1588
0.0528
0.7390
-0.9444
-8.4433
0.0252
0.0722
-0.0078
-0.8249
-0.3048
-4.3225
266 1039 1985 1992 13.7201
24
-1.337
(3,1) -0.0137
-0.0300
0.1105
0.5170
0.0115
0.9574
0.0004
0.1701
0.0683 
1.4400
-1.0422 
-18.2613
-0.0433
-0.1903
-0.0087
-1.3383
-0.1344
-1.8844
266 773 1986 1992 18.5852
22
-1.178
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 0.9357
1.7277
-0.0426
-0.5020
-0.0010
-0.2182
0.0025
2.8126
0.0000
-0.0032
-0.1153
-3.0727
-0.3791
-3.0046
0.0006
0.3294
-0.1442
-2.9526
266 1305 1984 1992 87.5598
40
0.656
(1,0) 0.9298
1.6697
-0.0450
-0.5217
-0.0054
-1.0654
0.0025
2.7023
-0.0004
-0.0328
-0.1231
-3.4191
-0.3889
-3.1459
0.0007
0.3867
-0.1340
-2.7970
266 1305 1984 1992 84.7407
40
0.678
(1,1) 0.9215
1.6174
-0.0454
-0.8139
-0.0026
-0.4786
0.0008
0.6846
-0.0077
-0.3933
-0.8632
-8.8841
-0.1366
-0.8357
0.0015
0.5005
-0.1856
-3.4224
266 1305 1984 1992 91.3087
40
-1
(2.1) 0.9786
1.6189
0.0047
0.0860
0.0201
1.5695
-0.0003
-0.1393
-0.0042
-0.1580
-0.9142
-8.0854
0.0494
0.1944
0.0002
0.0469
-0.1971
-4.1612
266 1039 1985 1992 43.4593
39
-1.249
(3,1) 0.6913 
1.2030
-0.0785
-0.2817
0.0058
0.8040
-0.0008
-0.3518
-0.0018
-0.0851
-0.9974
-9.2251
0.0692
0.2925
0.0004
0.1528
-0.0572
-0.9828
266 773 1986 1992 60.5020
37
-1.292
Appendix 7.3 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Employees Sample: Version III
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-EMP ACQRAT SALES OBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) 0.9134
1.2520
-0.0179
-0.2929
-0.0202
-0.9002
0.0038
2.4819
0.0030
0.1793
-0.0037
-1.6021
-0.5639
-2.5765
0.0003
0.1349
-0.2261
-2.9846
266 1305 1984 1992 39.2708
25
-0.27
(1,0) 0.7170
1.1397
-0.0155
-0.2461
0.0294 
1.2401
0.0031
2.1296
-0.0050
-0.3519
-0.0037
-1.7908
-0.4912
-2.2815
0.0014
0.6379
-0.2111
-3.0718
266 1305 1984 1992 41.2514
25
-0.019
(1,1) 0.9558
0.9953
-0.0425
-0.6115
0.0167
0.6365
0.0016
0.5295
0.0542 
1.0746
-0.0038 
-1.0202
-0.2951
-1.0515
-0.0077 
-1.0907
-0.3087
-3.6895
266 1305 1984 1992 24.0050
25
-0.562
(2,1) 0.8059
0.9089
-0.0289
-0.3376
0.0120
0.4764
0.0007
0.1871
0.0832 
1.3244
-0.0052 
-1.0606
-0.2123
-0.6258
-0.0114
-1.3399
-0.2638
-3.9574
266 1039 1985 1992 16.9455
24
-0.633
(3,1) 0.0520
0.1052
0.0874
0.4386
-0.0109
-0.5532
0.0017
0.8983
0.0445
1.1982
-0.0011 
-0.2152
-0.1555
-0.7755
-0.0055
-1.1579
-0.1780
-2.5391
266 773 1986 1992 21.8961
22
0.536
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 0.9339
1.6115
-0.0437
-0.5309
0.0041
0.2966
0.0024
2.8222
-0.0007
-0.0642
-0.0021
-1.2021
-0.3620
-2.9872
0.0007
0.3678
-0.1421
-2.8641
266 1305 1984 1992 88.4512
40
0.169
(1,0) 0.9470
1.7270
-0.0434
-0.5245
0.0003
0.0153
0.0025
2.7648
-0.0007
-0.0635
-0.0021
-1.1622
-0.3674
-2.9664
0.0007
0.3872
-0.1436
-2.9714
266 1305 1984 1992 88.2369
40
0.14
(1,1) 0.9405
1.6277
-0.0436
-0.8177
-0.0047
-0.2538
0.0009
0.8351
-0.0016
-0.0969
0.0006
0.2123
-0.1510
-1.0310
0.0005
0.1977
-0.1907
-3.3295
266 1305 1984 1992 85.4800
40
0.259
(2,1) 0.5945 
1.2600
-0.0170
-0.3492
0.0268
1.5920
0.0002
0.1156
-0.0014
-0.0786
0.0005
0.1463
-0.0541
-0.3089
0.0004
0.1635
-0.1608
-3.6240
266 1039 1985 1992 65.3531
39
0.574
(3,1) 0.5700
1.2886
-0.0448
-0.1774
-0.0114
-0.8203
0.0000
0.0167
0.0009
0.0393
0.0032
0.6663
-0.0002 
-0.0011
0.0001
0.0197
-0.0964
-2.2251
266 773 1986 1992 52.2232
37
1.127
ooO)
Appendix 7.4 Regression Results for Average Remuneration Per Employees Sample: Version IV
STACKING LAG CONST AVG-EMP ACQRAT SALES OBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) 0.8534
1.1670
-0.0171
-0.2727
-0.0194
-0.8796
0.0037
2.4784
0.0009
0.0543
-0.1304
-2.7745
-0.5660
-2.5781
0.0006
0.2299
-0.2246
-2.9960
266 1305 1984 1992 39.6784
25
0.474
(1,0) 0.6679
1.0571
-0.0144
-0.2260
0.0283
1.2086
0.0031
2.1348
-0.0071
-0.4770
-0.1437
-3.2543
-0.4937
-2.3006
0.0017
0.7273
-0.2091
-3.1213
266 1305 1984 1992 41.6406 
25
0.748
(1,1) 0.8605
0.9146
-0.0329
-0.4518
0.0231
0.9160
0.0015
0.5148
0.0491
0.9956
-0.9241
-11.9813
-0.2852 
-1.0644
-0.0070
-0.9931
-0.3037
-3.6364
266 1305 1984 1992 25.6930
25
-1.022
(2,1) 0.8498
1.0174
-0.0198
-0.2367
0.0089
0.3510
0.0007
0.1920
0.0725
1.1914
-1.0068 
-13.0155
-0.2091
-0.6718
-0.0099
-1.1845
-0.2657
-4.1764
266 1039 1985 1992 20.7553
24
-1.229
(3,1) 0.0106
0.0204
0.1093
0.5053
-0.0162
-0.8178
0.0019
1.0957
0.0466 
1.3464
-1.0445
-16.8972
-0.1699
-0.8833
-0.0058
-1.2854
-0.1782
-2.6114
266 773 1986 1992 21.4734
22
-1.136
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 0.9039
1.5473
-0.0447
-0.5215
0.0048
0.3491
0.0025
2.8399
-0.0008
-0.0682
-0.1176
-3.0944
-0.3723
-2.9937
0.0007
0.3623
-0.1426
-2.8930
266 1305 1984 1992 87.9967
40
0.681
(1,0) 0.9265
1.6693
-0.0444
-0.5151
-0.0010
-0.0584
0.0025
2.7891
-0.0006
-0.0528
-0.1161
-3.3046
-0.3787
-2.9904
0.0006
0.3713
-0.1450
-3.0281
266 1305 1984 1992 87.6125
40
0.682
(1,1) 0.9111
1.6169
-0.0419 
-0.7411
0.0046
0.2947
0.0008
0.6627
-0.0062
-0.3238
-0.8617
-8.8518
-0.1277
-0.8123
0.0012
0.4241
-0.1865
-3.3330
266 1305 1984 1992 91.9342
40
-0.983
(2,1) 0.7772
1.5490
-0.0141
-0.2690
0.0250 
1.4413
-0.0001
-0.0741
-0.0106
-0.4395
-0.9576
-7.8700
-0.0125
-0.0585
0.0018
0.5146
-0.1612
-3.7273
266 1039 1985 1992 72.2838
39
-1.041
(3,1) 0.6633
1.1965
-0.0451
-0.1562
-0.0172
-1.2139
-0.0001
-0.0751
-0.0049
-0.1956
-1.0086 
-9.8859
0.0314
0.1523
0.0009
0.2655
-0.0926
-2.1238
266 773 1986 1992 55.9419
37
-1.298
oo
Appendix 7.5 Regressin Results for Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employees Sample: Version I
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL- ACQEXP SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
______________________________ EMP___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -3637.4197
-0.2725
0.7225
8.1452
-97.9691
-2.1226
76.4614
4.5736
31.8545
0.2867
114.3835
1.8551
1197.0185
0.6710
10.1935
0.9999
5921.3968
1.8623
266 1305 1984 1992 25.1087
25
-0.05
(1.0) -2097.5669
-0.1959
0.7371
8.2192
13.1384
0.2114
73.2851
5.2228
-22.6731
-0.2042
88.4751 
1.4647
1573.2012
1.4218
17.1988
1.7616
4727.5099 
1.4247
266 1305 1984 1992 45.0076
25
-0
11,1) 2352.9857
0.0913
1.5215
7.2238
-37.5275
-0.6670
-57.0948
-1.6821
175.8465
1.1794
-81.7844
-1.1727
-6647.0689
-3.0847
-26.6191
-1.5626
-10168.2993
-3.4224
266 1305 1984 1992 43.6542
25
-0.73
(2,1) 116.5838
0.0076
1.4429 
7.2629
-36.6042
-0.4942
-50.2151
-1.5602
97.3396
0.5060
-60.6722
-0.9678
-5449.8916
-3.1560
-24.8531
-1.3272
-5724.6005
-1.8138
266 1039 1985 1992 116.6674
24
0.381
(3,1) -34179.0373
-1.1590
1.2202
4.5058
233.9652
1.8809
-26.8723
-0.4748
294.5515
1.4625
-99.7018
-0.9946
-3805.8278
-1.5358
-42.2207
-1.9747
-10911.5750
-2.5121
266 773 1986 1992 23.1994
22
0.578
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 2543.5710
0.5044
0.7014
6.8552
-38.3091
-0.8578
71.9307
4.5313
89.9245
0.8805
20.9476
0.5639
867.1932
0.5629
9.8120
1.1772
1320.5139
0.7344
266 1305 1984 1992 303.1312
40
0.816
(1,0) 2436.3789
0.5036
0.7107
7.5966
-0.4350
-0.0070
70.8093
5.7931
74.3779
0.8442
14.9391
0.5043
1033.0590
1.2136
11.2437 
1.5547
1230.0422 
0.7730
266 1305 1984 1992 314.4176
40
0.765
(1,1) -5448.1266
-0.4812
1.3301
10.4906
-75.0337
-1.2002
-33.1869
-1.2055
47.1841
0.2951
15.9206
0.3682
-4394.2253
-2.9852
-6.7841
-0.4779
-3765.0503
-1.5503
266 1305 1984 1992 270.1378
40
-0.57
(2,1) -7527.3178
-0.9345
1.4063 
9.7390
65.0560
1.0213
-54.5625
-2.3880
-118.6923
-0.5488
32.9432
0.6924
-2664.2099
-2.1747
-0.5672
-0.0316
-1514.1889
-0.5501
266 1039 1985 1992 398.3885
39
1.081
(3,1) -19903.0381
-1.5596
1.0589
7.2907
158.1483
2.0397
-9.7982
-0.3933
50.8476
0.3332
-17.9432
-0.4356
-2496.9039
-2.6148
-14.7718
-1.1941
-3502.6906
-1.3454
266 773 1986 1992 175.7518
37
0.996
co00
Appendix 7.6 Regressin Results for Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employees Sample: Version II
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL- ACQEXP SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
______________ EMP___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -2531.6519
-0.1912
0.7034
8.1349
-92.2063
-2.0052
81.1729
4.8824
41.2186
0.3908
665.4975
0.6165
1049.4590
0.6362
10.1483
1.0100
5925.6584
2.0554
266 1305 1984 1992 22.6364
25
-0.05
(1,0) -1731.7273
-0.1314
0.7263
7.7858
40.0221
0.5743
74.7669
4.9302
-30.8400
-0.2862
805.9296
0.7095
1937.5869
1.6232
17.2651
1.6858
5951.0773 
1.8452
266 1305 1984 1992 27.8376
25
-0.21
(1,1) 1579.2068
0.0632
1.5421
7.5413
-43.3116
-0.7663
-61.7624
-1.9436
170.8900
1.1664
-822.6582
-0.7063
-6460.3226
-3.2160
-27.5168
-1.5972
-9793.6892
-3.3948
266 1305 1984 1992 46.5477
25
-0.71
(2,1) -152.3797
-0.0090
1.4675 
7.1197
-50.0865
-0.6743
-54.9051
-1.6686
105.2386
0.5596
364.3479
0.3859
-5512.6484
-3.1530
-25.7171
-1.3307
-6469.7673
-2.1239
266 1039 1985 1992 96.9067
24
0.178
(3,1) -34249.4501
-1.2119
1.2497 
4.5708
232.1490 
1.8800
-35.6715
-0.6363
259.7821
1.2876
556.1945
0.4258
-3417.5821
-1.4321
-40.0622
-1.8915
-10413.4241
-2.4761
266 773 1986 1992 25.5808
22
0.623
Full
Stacking
(0,0) 2330.1215
0.4204
0.6998
7.1265
-40.4191
-0.8862
72.2856
4.6854
85.5913
0.8820
425.5154
0.8023
1008.2483
0.6631
10.0031
1.2161
1886.0492
1.1229
266 1305 1984 1992 247.6466
40
0.753
(1,0) 2150.8306
0.3543
0.7124
7.6274
19.8120
0.2890
69.3475
5.5321
57.5870
0.6771
495.5713
0.8834
1449.1441
1.6830
12.0611
1.6758
2196.3741
1.4186
266 1305 1984 1992 227.8277
40
0.534
(1,1) -5169.5886
-0.4317
1.3327
10.4571
-69.7051
-1.0875
-33.6751
-1.2228
51.8548
0.3273
-322.1778
-0.4974
-4435.7010
-2.9613
-6.8430
-0.4801
-4115.2155
-1.7096
266 1305 1984 1992 252.3441
40
-0.6
(2,1) -6933.6217
-0.8288
1.3994
10.0232
59.1850
0.9130
-52.7496
-2.3079
-106.2520
-0.5054
267.0586
0.3773
-2812.7742
-2.1759
-0.9745
-0.0546
-1937.4928
-0.7014
266 1039 1985 1992 378.4358
39
1.038
(3,1) -19855.1421
-1.5754
1.0634 
7.3080
155.6851
2.0053
-10.8403
-0.4381
44.3335
0.2965
-73.6627
-0.1110
-2466.7164
-2.5959
-14.3648
-1.1801
-3401.7494 
-1.2748
266 773 1986 1992 179.4590
37
1.008
Appendix 7.7 Regressin Results for Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employees Sample: Version III
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL-
EMP
ACQRAT SALES PBT SHRPRC NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -3134.3166
-0.3100
0.7364
8.1393
133.1220
0.2922
74.1345
4.7940
-15.5687
-0.1554
75.8255
1.3723
1439.2984
1.0955
17.1399
1.8821
4186.8934
1.4731
266 1305 1984 1992 52.4959
25
0.119
(1,0) -3083.5770
-0.2933
0.7439
8.2620
252.3915
0.5133
72.7183
5.1810
-24.8720
-0.2182
79.8932
1.5495
1487.7896
1.1668
18.0291
1.6265
4593.1185
1.5920
266 1305 1984 1992 45.6263
25
-0.03
(1,1) 6226.4506
0.2384
1.5219
7.1507
-828.0064
-1.2796
-58.3122
-1.6977
181.3300
1.1285
-87.8591
-1.1666
-6605.3698
-3.0472
-28.6721
-1.5493
-10288.0865
-3.2164
266 1305 1984 1992 37.5595
25
-0.78
(2,1) 2015.6493
0.1424
1.4277 
7.5888
-517.3317
-1.1609
-50.6661
-1.6666
96.9032
0.5702
-37.5772
-0.6019
-4991.3763
-2.8684
-25.5114
-1.4150
-5317.0823
-1.8128
266 1039 1985 1992 121.3997
24
0.32
(3,1) -37806.1316
-1.3899
1.2082 
4.2575
755.2604
1.2953
6.1502
0.1168
216.3972
1.2029
-59.3940
-0.5925
-6336.3737
-2.5444
-32.0419
-1.5177
-10025.8729
-2.4724
266 773 1986 1992 32.3081
22
0.103
Full
Stacking
(0,0) -2416.4977
-0.4105
0.7245
7.6430
456.9677
2.0962
69.2199
4.7921
77.6947
0.8420
4.3263
0.1082
1254.4713 
1.0506
10.3131
1.3778
1042.7260
0.5968
266 1305 1984 1992 229.2084
40
0.747
(1,0) 4244.5704
0.9917
0.6935
7.2970
-377.1988 
-1.0800
74.4055
4.8856
83.1596
0.9589
17.3513
0.4133
805.0411 
0.6018
10.4307 
1.4836
915.1964
0.5435
266 1305 1984 1992 271.8359
40
0.69
(1,1) -4227.3982
-0.3811
1.3358
9.9744
22.2754
0.0380
-39.0943
-1.4918
53.7103
0.3537
4.9583
0.1119
-3669.5224
-2.6867
-8.2075
-0.6115
-3723.9025
-1.5359
266 1305 1984 1992 287.5759
40
-0.78
(2,1) -4238.7038
-0.5221
1.3405 
11.3868
-741.2141 
-1.8864
-43.8994
-1.9624
-40.6329
-0.2139
40.6046
0.8505
-3047.0005 
-2.6411
-6.0997
-0.3460
-2044.1656
-0.8308
266 1039 1985 1992 301.6013
39
0.119
(3,1) -26863.9341
-1.7907
1.1483
7.0328
438.6230
1.0895
-2.5583
-0.0878
-21.9228
-0.1326
17,5697
0.3394
-3506.0088
-2.6741
-5.5444
-0.3476
-4387.8230
-1.6325
266 773 1986 1992 163.4097
37
0.69
COo
Appendix 7.8 Regressin Results for Total of Basic Remuneration for All Employees Sample: Version IV
STACKING LAG CONST TOTL- ACQRAT SALES PBT SHHRTN NOEMP CAPEMP GOV N OBN FROM TO SARGAN 2SC
____________________ EMP___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Partial
Stacking
(0,0) -2135.3666
-0.1903
0.7237
8.3036
64.4728
0.1357
77.4718
4.9225
-10.3559
-0.1090
607.9819
0.6941
1402.4348
1.0851
16.6791
1.7876
4756.6212
1.8228
266 1305 1984 1992 40.2405
25
-0.01
(1,0) -2463.8334
-0.2189
0.7304
8.3251
213.7829
0.4345
76.1738
5.3608
-18.0325
-0.1649
497.0874
0.4719
1459.3536
1.1987
17.4975
1.5693
5012.4295
1.9101
266 1305 1984 1992 36.7303
25
-0.13
(1,1) 5577.6245
0.2197
1.5465 
7.4429
-843.6331
-1.3149
-64.0447
-1.9656
176.0521
1.1117
-1216.3865
-0.9360
-6357.9048
-3.1378
-29.7188
-1.5802
-9937.2629
-3.2470
266 1305 1984 1992 39.6376
25
-0.76
(2,1) 1754.3137
0.1158
1.4479
7.4268
-508.0912
-1.1596
-54.4978
-1.7827
96.9619
0.5738
804.1934
0.8208
-4979.1178
-2.8404
-25.8228
-1.3977
-5795.6223
-2.0381
266 1039 1985 1992 108.2487
24
0.239
(3,1) -37763.4663
-1.4356
1.2295
4.3281
798.0244 
1.4004
-0.1672
-0.0033
193.2632
1.1424
1820.2343
1.2220
-6062.3895
-2.6727
-30.7525
-1.5229
-9665.3366
-2.4564
266 773 1986 1992 34.3378
22
0.068
Full
Stacking
(0,0) -2474.6447
-0.3962
0.7254
8.0063
426.4926
1.9377
68.9202
4.9545
70.0830
0.8064
289.2638
0.6880
1418.4062
1.1943
10.6389 
1.4677
1687.8856
1.0871
266 1305 1984 1992 201.8598
40
0.621
(1,0) 4020.3538
0.8354
0.6922
7.6753
-398.0371
-1.1526
74.7240
5.0910
77.3900
0.9574
678.6433
1.2327
957.0591
0.7331
10.6775
1.5697
1506.7166
0.9967
266 1305 1984 1992 229.0240
40
0.647
(1,1) -4153.4025
-0.3537
1.3415
9.9707
37.8501
0.0641
-39.9455
-1.5275
57.7180
0.3871
-233.5427
-0.3480
-3740.8502
-2.7094
-8.3265
-0.6173
-4049.6185
-1.6427
266 1305 1984 1992 267.7239
40
-0.79
(2,1) -3790.7668 
-0.4411
1.3375
11.2828
-691.9391
-1.7670
-42.5819
-1.8815
-32.7831
-0.1730
663.3686
0.9122
-3183.4620
-2.5901
-6.1149
-0.3430
-2493.7458 
-1.0022
266 1039 1985 1992 291.8673
39
0.139
(3,1) -26917.9336
-1.7648
1.1445
6.9354
430.8078
1.0528
-1.3012
-0.0442
-17.0647
-0.1063
792.6822
0.7412
-3546.9610
-2.6519
-5.7579
-0.3639
-4477.7962
-1.6137
266 773 1986 1992 161.1654
37
0.676
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